THE  JAMES  K.  MOFFITT   FUND. 


LIBRARY  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


GIFT    OF 

JAMES    KENNEDY   MOFFITT 

OF  THE   CLASS  OF  '86. 


Accession  No.      .  0 O  6 3  S     Class  No . 


vs 


\ 


HERBERT   SPENCER 


AND    HIS    CRITICS. 


BY 


CHARLES  B.  WAITE,  A.  M,, 

AUTHOR    OF   "HISTORY  OF   THE  CHRISTIAN    RE- 
LIGION TO  THE  YEAR  200,"  "A  CONSPIRA- 
CY AGAINST  THE  REPUBLIC,"  ETC. 


CHICAGO: 

C.  V.  WAITE  &  Co. 

1900. 


Vv/3 


M0FFITT 


COPYRIGHT  1900 

BY 
CHARGES 


PREFACE. 

The  character  of  this  work,  so  far  as  it  con- 
sists of  extracts  from  the  writings  of  others,  will 
be  seen  from  the  following  letter  from  one  who 
is  well  known  in  the  Jiterary  world,  and  who 
himself  maintained  a  discussion  with  Mr.  Spen- 
cer, carried  on  on  both  sides  with  great  brill- 
iancy and  power: 

38  WESTBOURNE  TERRACE,  LONDON,  W., 

Fernhurst,  Sussex,  Aug.  20, 1898. 
DEAR  SIR:  I  beg  to  thank  you  for  your  courtesy  in 
forwarding  to  me  the  series  of  papers  in  the  Boston 
Investigator,  which  I  should  have  acknowledged  much 
sooner  but  for  the  fact  that  it  was  sent  to  the  pub- 
lishers whilst  I  was  away  from  home  and  about  the 
country. 

The  extracts  you  have  so  carefully  prepared  seem  to 
me  to  have  been  made  with  great  accuracy  and  intel- 
ligence, and  I  think  they  should  be  satisfactory  to  Mr. 
Spencer,  as  they  are  to  myself. 
I  am  yours  faithfully, 

FREDERIC  HARRISON. 

Interspersed  with  and  following  the  extracts 
here  referred  to,  the  author  has  made  criticisms 
of  his  own,  which,  it  is  hoped,  will  at  least  be 
found  worthy  of  thoughtful  consideration. 


1 05637 


CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

CHAPTER  I.. ..The  New  Philosophy  —  Doctrine  of 

the  Unknowable 1 

"          II.. ..The   New    Philosophy   continued- 
Doctrine  of  the  Knowable  8 

"        HE.. ..The  New    Philosophy    continued—  ^ 

Doctrine  of  Evolution 12 

"         IV.. ..The  New    Philosophy   continued- 
Spencer's  Biology 20 

"          V....The   New   Philosophy  continued — 

Spencer's  Psychology 27 

"         VI.. ..The   New   Philosophy    continued — 

Subjective  Psychology 84 

"       VII.  ..The   New   Philosophy    continued — 

Spencer's  Sociology 41 

VIII.. ..The  New  Philosophy  continued- 
Principles  of  Ethics— Work  on 

Education — Essays,  etc 49 

IX.. ..Criticism  by  Malcolm  Guthrie 58 

X.... Spencer  and  John  Stuart  Mill 66 

XI...  Spencer  and  Frederic  Harrison 72 

XI I.... Criticisms  and  Eulogiums— Watson- 
Bo  wne — Robertson 80 

XIII.. ..Criticisms  continued— Mansel— Caird 
—Hodgson  — Max  Mueller— Sidg- 
wick— James  Martineau  — Moul- 

ton — Professor  Green 87 

XIV.. ..Criticisms  continued — Mears,  Atwa- 

ter— Wynn— Stebbins— Alger 94 

XV.. ..Criticisms  continued — Bascom — Lil- 
ly—Barry—The Quarterly  — Fair- 
bairn..,  ...101 


PAGE 

CHAP.    XVI.... Criticisms   continued  —  Review   by 

Orestes  A.  Brownson 108 

"   XVII... .Criticisms  by  Professor  Birks  and 

Mons.  Littrg 114 

"  XVI1L... Criticisms  concluded-Wilfred  Ward 
—St.  George  Mivart— A.  J.  Bal 
four 121 

"      XIX.. ..Space  and  Time— Consciousness 128 

"       XX.. ..The  Unknowable.— First  Cause 137 

v-^?"     XXL... Doctrine  of  the  Unknowable — Crea- 
tion— Atheism — Agnosticism 144 

"   XXII.... Doctrine  of  the  Unknowable— Dim 

or  Vague  Consciousness 153 

"  XXIII.. ..Doctrine  of  the  Unknowable— An- 
tithesis of  Thought 161 

"  XXIV..  .Doctrine  of  the  Unknowable— Ideal- 
ism  169 

•7"    XXV.. ..Reconciliation  between  Science  and 

Religion 177 


INDEX    OF   AUTHORS. 


Alger,  W.  R.,  99,  100. 
Atwater,  T.  H.,  96. 
Bain,  Prof.,  97,  158, 159. 
Balfour,  A.  J.,  57,  123-127, 

181. 

Barry,  Wm.,  103,104. 
Bascom,  John,  Dr.,  101, 102. 
Berkeley,  Bishop,  36, 174. 
Birks,Thos.B.,  114-118,174. 
Bowne,  B.  P.,  80-84. 
Brownson,  O.  A.,  105,  108- 

113, 148. 

Caird,  Principal,  88. 
Comte,  Auguste,  9,  56,  70, 

76,  78,  79,  83,  164,  168. 
Cousin,  81,  82,  165. 
Darwin,  Charles,  97, 121. 
Descartes,  83. 
Fairbairn,  A.  M.,  105-107. 
Fiske,  John,  Prof.,  97,  183. 
Green,  Prof.,  93. 
Guthrie,  Malcolm,  68-65. 
Hamilton,  Sir  Wm.,  64,  82, 

87,  88,  130, 155,  156,  164, 

165,  167, 168. 
Harrison,   Frederic,  72,79, 

121, 122. 

Hodgson,  S.  H.,  88,  89. 
Hume,  David,  36, 174. 
Kant,  Emanuel,  89,  90. 
Kepler,  17. 
Larousse,  63. 


Laugel,  Mons.,  118, 119. 
Lilly,  W.  S.,  102, 103. 
Littre,  E.,  Mons.,  118-120. 
Locke,  90. 

Malebranche,  144, 146. 
Mansel,  Henry  L.,  87,  88, 

155,  156, 164, 168. 
Martineau,  James,  81,  91, 

92,  133, 163. 

Mears,  John  W.,  94-96. 
Mill,  John  Stuart,  63,  66-71, 

82,  94,  115,  123,  124,  129, 

148, 149,  163. 

Mivart,  St.  George,  122, 123. 
Moulton,  J.  F.,  92,  93. 
Mueller,  Max,  90. 
Newton,  68. 
Pestalozzi,  54. 
Quarterly,  The,  writer  in, 

104,  105. 

Robertson,  John  M.,  84-86. 
Scaliger,  159. 
Sidgwick,  H.,  90,  91, 132. 
Stebbins,  Ruf  us  P.,  99. 
Tyndall,  John,  11. 
Voltaire,  83,  84, 163. 
Von  Baer,  24. 
Ward,  Wilfred,  121,122. 
Watson,  R.  A.,  80. 
Whewell,  Dr.,  67. 
Wynn,  W.  H.,  Prof.,  97-99. 
Youmans,  Prof.,  79,  97. 


CHAPTER    I. 

THE  NEW    PHILOSOPHY — DOCTRINE    OF    THE    UN- 
KNOWABLE. 

No  writer  of  the  Nineteenth  Century  has  had 
greater  influence  in  the  world  of  thought  than 
Herbert  Spencer.  At  the  same  time  no  one  has 
been  more  severely  and  unsparingly  criticised. 

These  criticisms,  with  his  replies,  have  exhib- 
ited an  intellectual  gladiatorship  such  as  has 
seldom  been  witnessed;  one  which  has  had  the 
effect  to  arouse  discussion  and  to  stimulate 
thought  and  inquiry  all  along  the  lines  of  his 
philosophy.  His  works  are  now  complete. 
The  labors  of  a  life-time  have  been  brought  to  a 
close. 

Spencer,  as  a  scientist,  is  one  of  the  deepest 
thinkers  and  one  of  the  ablest  and  most  forcible 
writers  of  this  or  any  other  age.  As  a  scientist, 
studying  the  laws  of  Nature,  and  tracing  those 
laws  in  the  changing  phenomena  of  the  uni- 
verse, his  greatness  will  be  acknowledged  by  all. 
But  his  ambition  had  a  broader  scope.  He  as- 
pired to  co-ordinate  and  combine  science  with 
philosophy;  not  merely  with  that  positive  or 
(1) 


practical  philosophy  which  consists  of  the  high- 
est generalizations  of  science,  but  with  meta- 
physical and  speculative  philosophy  as  well. 
Through  such  co-ordination  and  combination, 
he  not  only  sought  to  unify  all  knowledge,  but, 
confessedly  going  beyond  the  boundaries  of  sci- 
ence— venturing  into  unknown  regions — he  un- 
dertook to  establish  unknowable  existence. 

Nor  did  he  stop  here.  This  combined  system 
of  philosophical  science  he  now  essayed  to  co- 
ordinate and  combine  with  theology.  His  doc- 
trine of  the  Unknowable  he  himself  calls  a  "met- 
aphysico-theological  doctrine."  Proposing  to 
identify  the  unknowable  of  science  and  philoso- 
phy with  the  highest  conception  of  Deity,  he  at- 
tempted a  reconciliation  between  science  and 
religion. 

To  this  vast  scheme — this  combined  system 
of  science,  philosophy,  metaphysics  and  theolo- 
gy, he  gave  the  name  of 

THE   NEW   PHILOSOPHY. 

So  far  as  the  system  is  new — so  far  as  it  is  a 
departure  from  the  landmarks  hitherto  estab- 
lished in  the  fields  of  science  and  philosophy- 
it  has  undergone  the  critical  examination  of  ma- 
ny thinkers,  and  must  still  be  subjected  to  the 
crucial  test  of  the  sober  second  thought.  It  is 
worthy  of  note  that  some  of  the  most  trenchant 
criticisms  have  been  on  the  speculative  side  of 
the  New  Philosophy.  That  they  have  not  all 
been  without  effect,  has  been  made  manifest  by 


such  occasional  change  in  the  text  of  Mr.  Spen- 
cer's works   as  seemed  necessary. 

In  this  work  I  purpose,  first,  to  give  a  brief 
but  complete  view  of  the  New  Philosophy;  sec- 
ondly, to  state  the  salient  points  of  the  principal 
criticisms  which  have  been  made  upon  it;  giv- 
ing such  extracts  as  may  best  elucidate  the 
points  made;  and  finally,  to  examine  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Unknowable ;  especially  in  reference 
to  the  claim  that  is  made,  that  this  doctrine  is 
sufficient  to  effect  a  reconciliation  between  sci- 
ence and  religion. 

THE    SPENCERIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

In  giving  a  synopsis  of  the  New  Philosophy, 
let  us  commence  with  that  which,  by  the  author 
himself,  is  ever  put  foremost: 

DOCTRINE   OP   THE   UNKNOWABLE. 

The  Unknowable  of  Spencer  is  not  the  mere 
negation  of  the  knowable.  He  posits  the  abso- 
lute and  independent  existence  of  the  Infinite  as 
Ultimate  Being,  and  First  Cause. 

Though  Ultimate  Being  is  conceded  to  be 
both  unknowable  and  unthinkable,  at  the  same 
time  he  maintains  that  it  is  "  known  with  abso- 
lute certainty  as  existing." 

To  this  Unknowable  he  gives  many  names: 

Cause — First  Cause — Unknown  Cause — Ulti- 
mate Cause — Incomprehensible  Cause — Uncon- 
ditioned Cause — Absolute  Cause — Force — Un- 
known Force — Pure  Force — Absolute  Force — 
Power — Unknown  Power — Unknowable  Power 


4 

— Incomprehensible  Power — Creating  Power — 
Sustaining  Power — Universal  Power — Inscruta- 
ble Power — Existence — Keal  Existence — Abso- 
lute Existence — Ultimate  Existence — Being — 
Absolute  Being — Ultimate  Being  —  Uncondi- 
tioned Being  —  Reality — Unknown  Reality — 
Absolute  Reality — Unseen  Reality — Uncondi- 
tioned Reality — Ultimate  Fact — Noumerion— 
The  Unknowable— The  Infinite—The  Absolute 
—The  Actual — The  Creating — The  Inexplicable 
-  The  Unconditioned  —  The  Unlimited  —  The 
Non-relative  —  The  Unformed— The  Incompre- 
hensible—The Omnipresent— The  Unaccounta- 
ble— The  Inconceivable — The  Unthinkable— The 
Supernatural. 

Spencer  does  not  claim  to  arrive  at  the  exist- 
ence of  the  Unknowable  by  any  process  of  logic. 
On  the  contrary,  he  shows  in  the  clearest  man- 
ner, that  it  cannot  be  reached  by  any  logical  pro- 
cess. He  first  undertakes  to  prove  the  existence 
of  a  First  Cause.  But  he  immediately  cautions 
his  reader  against  adopting  the  conclusion ;  stat- 
ing that  the  reasoning  is  illusive  and  fallacious, 
because  one  of  the  terms  in  the  proposition  in 
each  stage  of  the  argument,  is  unthinkable. 
The  Unknowable  cannot  be  made  the  subject  of 
logical  deduction,  because,  when  logic  is  em- 
ployed for  the  ascertainment  of  truth,  both 
terms  of  every  proposition  must  be  such  as  can 
be  formulated  in  thought. 

How,  then,  is  the  existence  of  the  Infinite  to 
be  posited? 


It  is  to  be  done  in  three  ways: 
First,  from  a  vague  or  dim  consciousness. 
"  Besides  that  definite  consciousness  of  which  Logic 
formulates  the  laws,  there  is  also  an  indefinite  con- 
sciousness which  cannot  be  formulated."  "  To  say 
that  we  cannot  know  the  Absolute,  is  by  implication 
to  affirm  that  there  is  an  Absolute.  In  the  very  denial 
of  our  power  to  learn  what  the  Absolute  is,  there  lies 
hidden  the  assumption  that  it  is;  and  the  making  of 
this  assumption  proves  that  the  Absolute  has  been 
present  to  the  mind,  not  as  a  nothing,  but  as  a  some- 
thing."—[First  Principles,  Sec.  26. 

Spencer  holds  that  we  are  obliged  to  form  a 
positive  though  vague  consciousness  of  that 
which  transcends  distinct  consciousness. 

"  Our  consciousness  of  the  unconditioned  being  lit- 
erally the  unconditioned  consciousness,  or  raw  mate- 
rial of  thought  to  which  in  thinking  we  give  definite 
forms,  it  follows  that  an  ever-present  sense  of  real  ex- 
istence is  the  very  basis  of  our  intelligence.  As  we 
can  in  successive  mental  acts  get  rid  of  all  particular 
conditions  and  replace  them  by  others,  but  cannot  get 
rid  of  that  undifferentiated  substance  of  consciousness 
which  is  conditioned  anew  in  every  thought;  there  ever 
remains  with  us  a  sense  of  that  which  exists  persistently 
and  independently  of  conditions.  At  the  same  time 
that  by  the  laws  of  thought  we  are  rigorously  prevent- 
ed from  forming  a  conception  of  absolute  existence; 
we  are  by  the  laws  of  thought  equally  prevented  from 
ridding  ourselves  of  the  consciousness  of  absolute  ex- 
istence; this  consciousness  being,  as  we  have  seen,  th« 
obverse  of  our  self-consciousness.  And  since  the  only 
possible  measure  of  relative  validity  among  our  be- 
liefs, is  the  degree  of  their  persistence  in  opposition  to 
the  efforts  made  to  change  them,  it  follows  that  this, 
which  persists  at  all  times,  under  all  circumstances, 


6 

and  cannot  cease  until  consciousness  ceases,  has  the 
highest  validity  of  any."— [Ibid. 

Hence  the  existence  of  the  Unknowable  is 
considered  by  Mr.  Spencer  the  most  certain  of 
all  truths. 

Another  mode  in  which  he  posits  the  Un- 
knowable, is  by  the  antithesis  of  thought: 

"  From  the  very  necessity  of  thinking  in  relations,  it 
follows  that  the  Eelative  itself  is  inconceivable,  except 
as  related  to  a  real  Non-relative.  We  have  seen  that 
unless  a  real  Non-relative  or  Absolute  be  postulated, 
the  Relative  itself  becomes  absolute,  and  so  brings  the 
argument  to  a  contradiction."  "  In  the  very  assertion 
that  all  our  knowledge,  properly  so  called,  is  Eelative, 
there  is  involved  the  assertion  that  there  exists  a  Non- 
relative." — [Ibid. 

Hence  the  Non-relative  is  posited  as  the  an- 
tithesis and  correlative  of  the  Kelative — the  Un- 
limited and  Unconditioned  is  posited  as  the  an- 
tithesis and  correlative  of  the  limited  and  con- 
ditioned, and  the  Infinite  as  the  antithesis  and 
correlative  of  the  finite. 

The  third  mode  of  arriving  at  the  Unknowa- 
ble, is  by  postulating  it  as  the  highest  generali- 
zation of  science. 

Since  the  highest  generalization  of  science  is 
the  persistence  of  force,  and  since  the  nature  of 
this  force  is  unknown,  it  is  assumed  to  be  the 
Inscrutable  Power  behind  all  phenomena,  which 
is  manifested  in  matter  and  motion. 

This  Unknown  Force  is  the  Incomprehensible 
Power  manifested  in  all  phenomena.  The 
highest  idea  in  religion,  also,  is  the  acknowl- 


7 

edgment  of  the  existence  of  an  Inscrutable 
Power.  Thus  science  and  religion  are  brought 
together,  and  the  conflict  which  has  lasted  for 
ages,  is  brought  to  an  end. 

This  is  the  reconciliation  of  religion  with  sci- 
ence. 


CHAPTER    II. 

THE  NEW  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED — DOCTRINE  OF 
THE    KNOWABLE. 

Coming  into  the  region  of  the  Knowable,  Mr. 
Spencer  defines  Philosophy  as  knowledge  of  the 
highest  generality.  This  is  by  some  writers  des- 
ignated as  practical  or  positive  philosophy,  as 
distinguished  from  speculative  philosophy.  But 
he  prefers  simply  the  term  Philosophy. 

41  Science,"  he  says,  "consists  of  truths  existing  more 
or  less  separated;  and  does  not  recognize  these  truths 
as  entirely  integrated."— [First  Principles,  Sec.  37.]  "As 
each  widest  generalization  of  Science  comprehends  and 
consolidates  the  narrower  generalizations  of  its  own 
division,  so  the  generalizations  of  Philosophy  compre- 
hend and  consolidate  the  widest  generalizations  of  Sci- 
ence  Knowledge  of  the  lowest  kind  is  un-unified 

knowledge;   Science  is  partially-unified  knowledge; 
Philosophy  is  completely-unified  knowledge." — [Ibid. 

Again:  We  have  this  statement  of  the  scope 
and  province  of  science : 

"  Science  concerns  itself  with  the  co-existences  and 
sequences  among  phenomena;  grouping  these  at  first 
into  generalizations  of  a  simple  or  low  order,  and  ris- 
ing gradually  to  higher  and  more  extended  generaliza- 
tions."—[Ibid. 

(8) 


9 

Having  thus  established  the  boundary  line  be- 
tween science  and  philosophy,  the  next  step  is  to 
find  some  data  of  philosophy;  some  means  by 
which  the  student  of  philosophy  may  know 
when  he  is  making  any  advance.  This  data  is 
found  in  the  assumption  that  the  congruities 
and  incongruities  of  phenomena,  which  are  at- 
tested by  our  consciousness,  do  really  exist. 

"  The  assumption  that  a  congruity  or  an  incongrui- 
ty exists  when  consciousness  testifies  to  it,  is  an  inevit- 
able assumption." — [First  Prin.,  Sec.  41. 

This  is  one  of  the  data  of  philosophy;  but  this 
is  in  the  process  of  thought.  There  must  also 
be  a  datum  in  the  product  of  thought. 

Auguste  Comte  thinks  it  impossible  to  sub- 
ject to  a  critical  analysis  the  relation  between 
subject  and  object.  Mr.  Spencer,  however, 
thinks  otherwise ;  and  undertakes  to  analyze  this 
relation.  The  conclusion  is, 

"That  the  manifestations  of  the  Unknowable  fall 
into  the  two  separate  aggregates  constituting  the 
world  of  consciousness  and  the  world  beyond  con- 
sciousness."- [First  Prin.,  Sec.  45. 

"  The  manifestations  of  the  Unknowable,  separated 
into  the  two  divisions  of  self  and  not-self,  are  re-divis- 
ible into  certain  most  general  forms,  the  reality  of 
which  Science,  as  well  as  Common  Sense,  from  moment 
to  moment  assumes."— [Ibid. 

SPACE,    TIME,    MATTER,    MOTION,   AND   FORCE. 

"  Our  consciousness  of  Space  is  a  consciousness  of 
co-existent  positions."— [First  Prin.,  Sec.  47. 

"And  since  a  position  is  not  an  entity — since  the  con- 
geries of  positions  which  constitute  any  conceived 


10 

portion  of  space,  and  mark  its  bounds,  are  not  sensible 
existences,  it  follows  that  the  co-existent  positions 
which  make  up  our  consciousness  of  Space,  are  not  co- 
existences in  the  full  sense  of  the  word,  (which  implies 
realities  as  their  terms,)  but  are  the  blank  forms  of  co- 
existences left  behind  when  the  realities  are  absent; 
that  is,  are  the  abstracts  of  co-existences."— [Ibid. 

Space  is  purely  relative. 

"  Is  there  an  absolute  Space  which  relative  Space  in 
some  sort  represents  ?  Is  Space  in  itself  a  form  or 
condition  of  absolute  existence,  producing  in  our 
minds  a  corresponding  form  or  condition  of  relative 
existence?  These  are  unanswerable  questions."- 
[Ibid. 

Parallel  remarks  are  made  concerning  time. 

"  Our  conception  of  Matter,  reduced  to  its  simplest 
shape,  is  that  of  co-existent  positions  that  offer  resist- 
ance, as  contrasted  with  our  conception  of  Space,  in 
which  the  co-existent  positions  offer  no  resistance."- 
[First  Prin.,  Sec.  48. 

"  The  conception  of  Motion,  as  presented  or  repre- 
sented in  the  developed,  consciousness,  involves  the 
conceptions  of  Space,  of  Time,  and  of  Matter.  A 
something  that  moves;  a  series  of  positions  occupied 
in  succession;  and  a  group  of  co-existent  positions, 
united  in  thought  with  the  successive  ones — these  are 
the  constituents  of  the  idea."— [Ibid. 

Force  is  the  ultimate  of  ultimates. 

"  Though  Space,  Time,  Matter,  and  Motion  are  ap- 
parently all  necessary  data  of  intelligence,  yet  a  psy- 
chological analysis  (here  indicated  only  in  rude  out- 
line) shows  us  that  these  are  either  built  up  of,  or  ab- 
stracted from,  experiences  of  force.  Matter  and  Mo- 
tion, as  we  know  them,  are  differently  conditioned 
manifestations  of  Force.  Space  and  Time,  as  we  know 
them,  are  disclosed  along  with  these  different  mani- 


11 

festations  of  Force  as  the  conditions   under  which 
they  are  presented."— [First  Prin.,  Sec.  50. 

Our  author  next  proceeds  to  comment  on  the 
indestructibility  of  Matter,  the  continuity  of 
Motion,  and  the  persistence  of  Force. 

The  persistence  of  the  relations  among  forces, 
ordinarily  called  uniformity  of  law,  is  a  necessa- 
ry implication  from  the  fact  that  Force  can 
neither  arise  out  of  nothing  nor  lapse  into  no- 
thing. 

The  Rhythm  of  Motion  forms  the  subject  of 
a  chapter,  in  which  Mr.  Spencer  claims  that  all 
motion  is  rhythmical.  In  this  doctrine  he  was 
supported  by  Professor  Tyndall. 


CHAPTER   III. 

THE  NEW   PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED— DOCTRINE  OF 
EVOLUTION. 

"An  entire  history  of  any  thing  must  include  its  ap- 
pearance out  of  the  imperceptible  and  its  disappear- 
ance into  the  imperceptible."— [First  Prin.,  Sec.  93. 

The  sphere  of  knowledge  is  co-extensive  with 
the  phenomenal.  Whenever  any  thing  acts  upon 
our  senses  under  a  sensible  form,  unless  it  ac- 
quired its  form  at  the  moment  of  perception, 
and  lost  its  sensible  form  the  moment  after  per- 
ception, 

"  It  must  have  had  an  antecedent  existence  under 
this  sensible  form,  and  will  have  a  subsequent  exist- 
ence under  this  sensible  form.  These  preceding  and 
succeeding  existences  under  sensible  forms,  are  possi- 
ble subjects  of  knowledge;  and  knowledge  has  obvi- 
ously not  reached  its  limits  until  it  has  united  the 
past,  present,  and  future  histories  into  a  whole." — [Ibid. 
"  Setting  out  abruptly  as  we  do  with  some  substance 
which  already  had  a  concrete  form,  our  history  is  in- 
complete; the  thing  had  a  history  preceding  the  state 
with  which  we  started.  Hence  our  theory  of  things, 
considered  individually  or  in  their  totality,  is  confess- 
edly imperfect  so  long  as  any  past  or  future  portions 
of  their  sensible  existences  are  unaccounted  for."- 
[Ibid. 

(12) 


13 

Philosophy  has  to  formulate  this  passage 
from  the  imperceptible  into  the  perceptible,  and 
again  from  the  perceptible  into  the  impercepti- 
ble. 

The  general  law  of  the  redistribution  of  mat- 
ter and  motion,  which  is  required  to  unify  the 
various  kinds  of  changes, 

"  Must  also  be  one  that  unifies  the  successive  changes 
which  sensible  existences,  separately  and  together, 
pass  through." — [Ibid. 

In  recognizing  the  fact  that  Science,  tracing 
back  the  genealogies  of  various  objects,  finds 
their  components  were  once  in  diffused  states, 
and  pursuing  their  histories  forwards,  finds  dif- 
fused states  will  again  be  assumed  by  them,  we 
have  recognized  the  fact  that  the  formula  re- 
quired for  reducing  knowledge  to  a  coherent 
whole,  mnst  be  one  comprehending  the  two  op- 
posite processes  of  concentration  and  diffusion. 

"The  change  from  a  diffused,  imperceptible  state,  to 
a  concentrated,  perceptible  state,  is  an  integration  of 
matter  and  concomitant  dissipation  of  motion;  and  the 
change  from  a  concentrated,  perceptible  state,  to  a  dif- 
fused, imperceptible  state,  is  an  absorption  of  motion 
and  concomitant  disintegration  of  matter."— [First 
Prin.,  Sec.  94. 

"  When  taken  together,  the  two  opposite  processes 
thus  formulated  constitute  the  history  of  every  sensi- 
ble existence,  under  its  simplest  form." — [Ibid. 

But  neither  of  these  processes  is  ever  wholly 
unqualified  by  the  other: 

"  For  each  aggregate  is  at  all  times  both  gaining  mo- 
tion and  losing  motion."— [First  Prin.,  Sec.  96, 


14 

Evolution,  then, 

"  Under  its  simplest  and  most  general  aspect,  is  the  in- 
tegration of  matter  and  concomitant  dissipation  of 
motion;  while  dissolution  is  the  absorption  of  motion, 
and  concomitant  disintegration  of  matter." — [First 
Prin.,  Sec.  97. 

Simple  Evolution  may  also  be  stated  to  be,  a 
change  from  a  less  coherent  form  to  a  more  co- 
herent form,  consequent  on  the  dissipation  of 
motion  and  integration  of  matter. —  [Ibid. 

This  is  the  simplest  form  of  Evolution.  But 
there  is  not  only  a  primary  but  a  secondary  re- 
distribution of  matter  in  the  parts  of  an  aggre- 
gate; and  this  brings  us  to  compound  Evolu- 
tion. 

This  compound  Evolution  may  be  stated  thus : 

"  The  primary  redistribution  ends  in  forming  aggre- 
gates which  are  simple  where  it  is  rapid,  but  which  be- 
come compound  in  proportion  as  its  slowness  allows 
the  effects  of  secondary  redistributions  to  accumulate." 
—[First  Prin.,  Sec.  105. 

"To  say  that  the  primary  redistribution  is  accompa- 
nied by  secondary  redistributions,  is  to  say  that  along 
with  the  change  from  a  diffused  to  a  concentrated 
state,  there  goes  on  a  change  from  a  homogeneous 
state  to  a  heterogeneous  state.  The  components  of  the 
mass  while  they  become  integrated  also  become  differ- 
entiated."—[First  Prin.,  Sec.  116. 

This  is  the  second  aspect  under  which  to  study 
Evolution.  While  the  first  is  progressive  inte- 
gration, this  is  progressive  differentiation. 

Both  of  these  forms  of  Evolution  are  ex- 
plained by  illustrations  drawn  from  the  various 
sciences:  From  astronomy,  from  geology,  psy- 


15 

chology,  biology,  sociology,  philology.  Also 
from  the  arts:  painting,  sculpture,  architecture, 
etc.,  poetry,  and  music. 

Evolution  may  now  be  defined  as  a 
"  Change  from  an  incoherent  homogeneity  to  a  coher- 
ent heterogeneity,  accompanying  the  dissipation  of 
motion  and  integration  of  matter."— [First  Prin.,  Sec. 
127. 

But  there  is  another  phase  to  the  doctrine. 

"At  the  same  time  that  Evolution  is  a  change  from 
the  homogeneous  to  the  heterogeneous,  it  is  a  change 
from  the  indefinite  to  the  definite.  Along  with  an  ad- 
vance from  simplicity  to-  complexity,  there  is  an  ad- 
vance from  confusion  to  order — from  undetermined 
arrangement  to  determined  arrangement.  Develop- 
ment, no  matter  of  what  kind,  exhibits  not  only  a  mul- 
tiplication of  unlike  parts,  but  an  increase  in  the  dis- 
tinctness with  which  these  parts  are  marked  off  from 
one  another."-  [First  Prin.,  Sec.  129. 

Here  again,  many  illustrations  are  given, 
drawn  from  the  various  sciences.  In  illustra- 
tions from  the  solar  system,  references  are  con- 
stantly made  to  the  nebular  theory  as  probable. 
In  every  instance  it  is  found  to  accord  with  the 
doctrine  of  Evolution.  Though  the  nebular  the- 
ory is  not  here  adopted,  it  should  be  stated  that 
in  his  Essay  on  the  Nebular  Hypothesis,  as  re- 
vised in  1890,  Mr.  Spencer  says:  "Practically 
demonstrated  as  this  process  now  is,  we  may  say 
that  the  doctrine  of  nebular  genesis  has  passed 
from  the  region  of  hypothesis  into  the  region  of 
established  truth." 

"  The  more  specific  idea  of  Evolution  now  reached 
is — a  change  from  an  indefinite,  incoherent  homogene- 


16 

ity,  to  a  definite,  coherent  heterogeneity,  accompanying 
the  dissipation  of  motion  and  integration  of  matter." 
—[First  Prin.,  Sec.  138. 

This  is  the  third  phase  of  Evolution. 

But  the  synthesis  is  not  yet  complete. 

Thus  far,  only  the  redistribution  of  matter  has 
been  attended  to;  the  accompanying  redistribu- 
tion of  motion  having  been  neglected. 

"  In  proportion  as  Evolution  becomes  compound — 
in  proportion  as  an  aggregate  retains,  for  a  considera- 
ble time,  such  a  quantity  of  motion  as  permits  sec- 
ondary redistributions  of  its  component  matter,  there 
necessarily  arise  secondary  redistributions  of  its  re- 
tained motion.  As  fast  as  the  parts  are  transformed 
there  goes  on  a  transformation  of  the  sensible  or  in- 
sensible motion  possessed  by  the  parts.  The  parts 
cannot  become  progressively  integrated,  either  individ- 
ually or  as  a  combination,  without  their  motions,  in- 
dividually or  combined,  becoming  more  integrated. 
There  cannot  arise  among  the  parts  heterogeneities  of 
size,  of  form,  of  quality,  without  there  also  arising 
heterogeneities  in  the  amounts  and  directions  of  their 
motions,  or  the  motions  of  their  molecules.  And  in- 
creasing definiteness  of  the  parts  implies  increasing 
defmiteness  of  their  motions. 

"In  short,  the  rhythmical  actions  going  on  in  each 
aggregate,  must  differentiate  and  integrate  at  the 
same  time  that  the  structure  does  so." — [First  Prin., 
Sec.  139. 

This  is  the  fourth  and  final  phase  of  the  doc- 
trine of  Evolution,  which  must  now  be  stated  as 
follows : 

"Evolution  is  an  integration  of  matter  and  concom- 
itant dissipation  of  motion;  during  which  the  matter 
passes  from  an  indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity  to 


17 

a  definite,  coherent  heterogeneity;  and  daring  which 
the  retained  motion  undergoes  a  parallel  transforma- 
tion."—fFirst  Prin.,  Sec.  145. 

Having  thus  completed  the  synthesis,  and 
having  stated  the  doctrine  of  Evolution  in  its 
ultimate  form,  we  must  now  look  for  some  all- 
pervading  principle  which  underlies  this  all-per- 
vading process. 

"Just  as  it  was  possible  to  interpret  the  empirical 
generalizations  called  Kepler's  laws,  as  necessary  con- 
sequences of  the  law  of  gravitation;  so  it  may  be  pos- 
sible to  interpret  the  foregoing  empirical  generaliza- 
tions as  necessary  consequences  of  some  deeper  law." 
—[First  Prin.,  Sec.  146. 

This  law  is  found  to  be  the  persistence  of 
force. —  [First  Prin.,  Sec.  155. 

There  is  another  cause  of  increasing  complex- 
ity— another  cause  which  necessitates  a  change 
from  the  homogeneous  to  the  heterogeneous; 
and  which,  when  joined  to  the  first,  makes  the 
change  more  rapid  and  more  involved.  This  is 
the  multiplicity  of  effects  following  from  a  sin- 
gle force. 

The  general  interpretation  of  Evolution  is  not 
yet  complete. 

The  laws  set  forth  furnish  a  key  to  the  re-ar- 
rangement of  parts  which  Evolution  exhibits,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  an  advance  from  the  uniform  to 
the  multiform.  We  must  now  have  a  key  to  this 
re-arrangement  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  advance  from 
the  indefinite  to  the  definite.  This  key  is  found 
in  the  law  by  virtue  of  which  such  portions  of 
the  permanently  effective  forces  acting  on  any 


18 

aggregate,  as  produced  sensible  motions  in  its 
parts,  work  a  segregation  of  those  parts.  This 
is  called  the  law  of  segregation. 

The  redistributions  of  matter  going  on  around 
us,  are  ever  being  brought  to  conclusions  by  the 
dissipation  of  the  motions  which  affect  them. 
In  all  cases,  there  is  a  process  toward  equilibra- 
tion. This  law  of  equilibration  is  deducible 
from  the  persistence  of  force. 

There  is  a  gradual  advance  toward  harmony 
between  man's  mental  nature  and  the  conditions 
of  his  existence.  Hence  we  have  a  warrant  for 
the  belief  that  Evolution  can  end  only  in  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  greatest  perfection  and  the 
most  complete  happiness. 

Dissolution  is  a  process  the  reverse  of  that 
traced  in  the  history  and  genesis  of  Evolution. 
The  law  of  equilibration  and  the  law  of  the 
rhythm  of  motion  render  probable  alternate  eras 
of  Evolution  and  Dissolution. 

There  is  no  guaranty  for  the  permanent  exist- 
ence of  the  race.  The  outcome  of  the  processes 
of  equilibration  constantly  going  on,  not  only  on 
the  surface  of  the  earth  but  in  the  solar  system, 
must  be  omnipresent  death. —  [First  Prin.,  Sec. 
176. 

Carrying  the  argument  still  further,  based  up- 
on what  may  be  called  the  rhythm  of  the  uni- 
verse, we  are  led  to  infer  a  subsequent  universal 
life. 

"And  thus  there  is  suggested  the  conception  of  a 
past  during  which  there  have  been  successive  Evolu- 


19 

tions  analogous  to  that  which  is  now  going  on;  and  a 
future  during  which  successive  other  such  Evolutions 
may  go  on — ever  the  same  in  principle  but  never  the 
same  in  concrete  result."— [First  Prin.,  Sec.  183. 

In  closing  a  summary  of  the  New  Philosophy, 
it  is  claimed  that  it  is  neither  materialistic  nor 
spiritualistic;  or  rather,  that  it  is  as  much  the 
one  as  the  other. 

"  Though  the  relation  of  subject  and  object  renders 
necessary  to  us  these  antithetical  conceptions  of  spirit 
and  matter;  the  one  is  no  less  than  the  other  to  be  re- 
garded as  but  a  sign  of  the  Unknown  Reality  which 
underlies  both." — [First  Prin.,  Sec.  194. 

The  foregoing  outline  of  the  New  Philosophy 
must  now  be  filled  up  with  a  summary  of  Spen- 
cer's Biology,  Psychology,  and  Sociology:  also 
of  his  "Data  of  Ethics";  with  a  glance  at  his 
other  writings. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

THE  NEW  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED — SPENCER'S  BI- 
OLOGY. 

In  the  first  volume,  the  author  treats  of  the 
general  principles  of  the  science,  as  connected 
with  the  doctrine  of  Evolution. 

The  four  chief  elements  which,  in  various  com- 
binations, make  up  living  bodies,  are  oxygen,  hy- 
drogen, nitrogen  and  carbon.  Three  are  gaseous, 
and  are  known  only  in  the  aeriform  state,  while 
carbon  is  known  only  as  a  solid. 

There  is  a  certain  significance  in  this,  when  we 
take  into  account  the  fact  that  the  phenomena 
of  Evolution  imply  motions  in  the  units  that  are 
involved  in  the  redistribution  of  matter  and  mo- 
tion. There  is  a  probable  meaning  in  the  fact 
that  organic  bodies,  which  exhibit  the  phenom- 
ena of  Evolution  in  so  high  a  degree,  are  mainly 
composed  of  ultimate  units  having  extreme  mo- 
bility. 

A  portion  of  organic  matter  of  a  living  organ- 
ism, contains  several  of  these  elements,  and  their 
mobility  is  an  aid  to  the  vital  processes. 

Mechanical  forces  produce  important  changes 
(20) 


21 

in  organic  bodies;  but  the  agency  of  chief  im- 
portance is  chemical  affinity. 

LIFE. — Life  is  the  continuous  adjustment  of 
internal  relations  to  external  relations.  The 
degree  of  life  varies  as  the  degree  of  correspond- 
ence. 

INDUCTIONS  OF  BIOLOGY. — These  are:  Growth 
—Development — Function — Waste  and  Repair 
— Adaptation — Individuality — Genesis — Hered- 
ity— Variation — Classification — Distribution. 

GROWTH  is  dependent  on  the  available  supply 
of  such  environing  matters  as  are  of  like  nature 
with  the  matters  composing  the  organism.  The 
available  supply  of  assimilable  matter  being  the 
same,  and  other  conditions  not  dissimilar,  the 
degree  of  growth  varies  according  to  the  surplus 
of  nutrition  over  expenditure.  This  surplus  of 
nutrition  over  expenditure,  is  a  variable  quanti- 
ty; and,  other  things  being  equal,  upon  it  de- 
pends the  limit  of  growth. 

DEVELOPMENT  is  primarily  central.  All  or- 
ganic forms  of  which  the  entire  history  is  known, 
set  out  with  a  symmetrical  arrangement  of  parts 
round  a  center.  This  central  development  may 
be  distinguished  into  unicentral,  where  the  pro- 
duct of  the  original  germ  develops  symmetri- 
cally round  one  center;  or  multicentral,  where 
the  development  is  in  subordination  to  many 
centers. 

STRUCTURE  AND  FUNCTION. — Does  Structure 
originate  Function,  or  does  Function  originate 


22 

Structure?  The  answer  is  not  easy;  but  the  au- 
thor considers  that  Function  must  be  regarded 
as  taking  precedence  of  Structure.  Both  Struc- 
ture and  Function  progress  from  the  homogene- 
neous,  indefinite  and  incoherent,  to  the  hetero- 
geneous, definite  and  coherent. 

In  discussing  the  question  of  WASTE  and  RE- 
PAIR, the  author  comes  to  the  conclusion  that 
there  are  certain  physiological  units  which  are 
concerned  in  this  process,  and  which  possess  an 
organic  polarity  not  possessed  by  chemical  units 
nor  by  morphological  units. 

ADAPTATION  requires  that  organic  types 
should  be  comparatively  stable.  The  structure 
of  any  organism  being  a  product  of  the  almost 
infinite  series  of  actions  and  re-actions  to  which 
all  ancestral  organisms  have  been  exposed,  it 
follows  that  any  unusual  actions  and  re-actions 
brought  to  bear  on  an  individual,  can  have  but 
an  infinitessimal  effect  in  permanently  changing 
the  structure  of  the  organism  as  a  whole. 

INDIVIDUALITY. — We  may  consider  as  an  indi- 
vidual, any  center  or  axis  that  is  capable  of  in- 
dependently carrying  on  that  continuous  adjust- 
ment of  inner  to  outer  relations  which  consti- 
tutes Life. 

GENESIS. — There  is  homogenesis,  and  hetero- 
genesis.  Homogenesis,  in  which  successive  gen- 
erations are  alike,  is  by  sexual  genesis,  or  gamo- 
genesis.  But  in  heterogenesis,  which  is  char- 
acterized by  unlikeness  of  the  successive  genera- 


23 

tions,  there  is  agamogenesis  occasionally  recur- 
ring with  gamogenesis. 

HEREDITY  AND  VARIATION. — The  phenome- 
na of  heredity  assimilate  with  other  phenomena. 
We  must  conclude  that  the  likeness  of  any  or- 
ganism to  either  parent,  is  conveyed  by  the  spe- 
cial tendencies  of  the  physiological  units  derived 
from  the  parent.  Homogeneity  being  an  unsta- 
ble state,  variations  must  occur. 

The  biological  CLASSIFICATION  is  based  upon 
natural  differences  between  individuals,  species, 
genera,  orders,  and  classes. 

The  subject  of  DISTRIBUTION  is  treated  in  ref- 
erence to  the  distribution  of  organisms  through 
space  and  time. 

Coming  to  the  EVOLUTION  OF  LIFE,  the  subject 
is  considered  under  the  Special  Creation  hypoth- 
esis, and  under  the  hypothesis  of  Evolution. 
The  arguments  from  Classification,  the  argu- 
ments from  Embryology,  from  Morphology,  and 
from  Distribution,  are  all  considered. 

The  question  is  treated  with  reference  to  the 
external  factors  and  the  internal  factors— in  ref- 
erence to  direct  and  indirect  equilibration. 

The  theory  of  Special  Creation  originated  in 
an  era  of  darkness,  is  unsupported  by  facts,  and 
cannot  be  definitely  formulated  in  thought.  The 
Evolution  hypothesis  has  the  opposite  character- 
istics. In  regard  to  Classification,  the  kinship 
of  groups  through  their  lowest  members,  is  just 
the  kinship  which  the  philosophy  of  Evolution 
implies. 


24 

EMBRYOLOGY.— Von  Baer  set  forth  this  re- 
markable induction : 

In  its  earliest  stage,  every  organism  has  the 
greatest  number  of  characters  in  common  with 
all  other  organisms  in  their  earliest  stages.  At 
a  stage  somewhat  later,  its  structure  is  like  the 
structures  displayed  at  corresponding  phases  by 
a  less  extensive  multitude  of  organisms.  At 
each  subsequent  stage,  traits  are  acquired  which 
successively  distinguish  the  developing  embryo 
from  groups  of  embryos  that  it  previously  re- 
sembled— thus  step  by  step  diminishing  the 
class  of  embryos  which  it  still  resembles.  Thus 
the  class  of  similar  forms  is  finally  narrowed  to 
the  species  of  which  it  is  a  member. 

This  induction  is  adopted  by  Mr.  Spencer, 
and  made  the  basis  of  an  argument  in  favor  of 
the  production  of  organic  forms  by  a  process  of 
Evolution. 

From  Morphology  an  analogous  argument  is 
drawn;  while  arguments  are  found  also  in  the 
distribution  of  Flora  and  Fauna  over  the  globe. 

In  the  second  volume  of  his  Biology,  Mr. 
Spencer  treats  of  the  problems  of  Morphology 
(structure) ,  and  of  Physiology  (function) ,  and 
of  the  Laws  of  Multiplication  as  applied  to  or- 
ganisms. 

MORPHOLOGY. — Evolution  implies  insensible 
modifications  and  gradual  transitions,  which  ren- 
der definition  difficult — which  make  it  impossi- 
ble to  separate  absolutely  the  phases  of  organi- 
zation from  one  another.  The  doctrine  that  all 


25 

organisms  are  built  up  of  cells,  or  that  cells  are 
the  elements  out  of  which  every  tissue  is  devel- 
oped, is  but  approximately  true. 

In  the  course  of  development,  both  animals 
and  plants  display  not  only  progressive  integra- 
tions, but  progressive  differentiations  of  the  re- 
sulting aggregates,  both  as  wholes  and  in  their 
parts. 

PHYSIOLOGY — FUNCTION.  —  The  author  next 
proceeds  to  consider  those  differentiations  and 
integrations  of  organic  functions  which  have 
simultaneously  arisen  with  the  processes  of  inte- 
gration and  differentiation  of  organic  form; — 
how  heterogeneities  of  action  have  progressed 
along  with  heterogeneities  of  structure. 

The  author  holds  that  there  must  be  a  contin- 
ual adaptation  of  structure,  such  as  opposes  to 
new  outer  forces  equal  inner  forces,  and  that 
such  re-adjustment  is  inheritable. 

LAWS  OF  MULTIPLICATION. — If  organisms  have 
been  evolved,  their  respective  powers  of  multi- 
plication must  have  been  determined  by  natural 
causes.  Grant  that  the  countless  specialities  of 
structure  and  function  in  plants  and  animals, 
have  arisen  from  the  actions  and  re-actions  be- 
tween them  and  their  environments,  continued 
from  generation  to  generation,  and  it  follows 
that  from  these  actions  and  re-actions  have  also 
arisen  those  countless  degrees  of  fertility  which 
we  see  among  them. 

The  forces  preservative  of  race  are  two:  abil- 


26 

ity  in  each  member  of  the  race  to  preserve  it- 
self, and  ability  to  produce  other  members. 

There  is  an  opposition  in  organisms  between 
self-maintenance  and  maintenance  of  the  race. 
Assuming  other  things  to  remain  the  same — as- 
suming that  environing  conditions  as  to  climate, 
food,  enemies,  etc.,  continue  constant;  then,  in- 
evitably, every  higher  degree  of  individual  evo- 
lution is  followed  by  a  lower  degree  of  race-mul- 
tiplication, and  vice  versa. 

The  author  concludes  that  in  man  the  tenden- 
cy is  to  a  condition  when  there  will  be  a  sub- 
stantial balance  between  the  mortality  and  the 
number  of  births  in  a  generation. 


CHAPTER   V. 

THE     NEW      PHILOSOPHY     CONTINUED — SPENCER'S 
PSYCHOLOGY. 

The  first  volume  deals  with  what  is  designat- 
ed, in  the  closing  paragraph,  as  Objective  Psy- 
chology, in  contradistinction  to  Subjective  Psy- 
chology, which  is  treated  in  the  second  volume. 

In  considering  the  data  of  Psychology,  the 
nervous  system  is  described,  first,  in  its  struc- 
ture, and  secondly,  in  its  functions. 

The  most  striking  contrast  between  the  lowest 
animals  and  the  highest,  is  that  which  exists 
between  the  small  self -mobility  of  the  one  and 
the  great  self-mobility  of  the  other.  This  is  il- 
lustrated by  reference  to  various  animals,  and 
leads  to  an  examination  of  the  internal  differ- 
ences. Where  activity  begins  to  show  itself  a 
nervous  system  begins  to  be  visible.  And  when 
the  power  of  self-government  is  great,  the  nerv- 
ous system  is  comparatively  well  developed. 
There  is  also  an  increment  of  nervous  endow- 
ment, corresponding  with  each  increment  of  com- 
plexity. 

These  psychological  phenomena,  under  their 
(27) 


28 

objective  aspect,  when  reduced  to  their  lowest 
terms,  are  incidents  in  the  continuous  redistri- 
bution of  matter  and  motion. 

STRUCTURE   OF  THE  NERVOUS   SYSTEM. 

The  nervous  system  is  composed  of  two  tis- 
sues, which  both  differ  considerably  from  those 
composing  the  rest  of  the  organism.  They  are 
usually  distinguished  from  one  another  by  their 
colors,  as  gray  and  white,  and  by  their  minute 
structures,  as  vesicular  and  fibrous.  Chemical 
analyses  have  not  at  present  thrown  more  than  a 
flickering  light  on  the  constitution  of  nerve- 
matter  in  general,  or  on  the  constitution  of  one 
kind  of  nerve-matter,  as  contrasted  with  the  oth- 
er. All  that  can  be  asserted  with  safety  is,  that 
each  kind  contains  phosphatic  fats  and  protein 
substances;  but  that  these  components  are  both 
differently  distributed  and  in  different  states  in 
the  two  tissues. 

The  gray  tissue  consists  of  nerve-cells,  the 
white  of  nerve-fibers.  Nerve-tubes  with  their 
contained  protein  threads,  and  nerve-cells  with 
their  contained  and  surrounding  masses  of 
changing  protein  substance,  are  the  histologic 
elements  of  which  the  nervous  system  is  built 
up.  These  elements  are  put  together  by  means 
of  the  peripheral  terminations  of  the  nerve- tubes 
— plexuses  of  fibres,  formed  of  the  essential 
nerve-substance,  that  are  continuous  with  one 
another,  and  nerve-centers,  or  ganglions.  This 
arrangement  of  the  nervous  system  is  minutely 
described;  also  the  position  and  office  of  the 


29 

"medulla  oblongata,"  or  enlarged  termination  of 
the  spinal  cord,  lying  within  the  skull;  also  the 
two  great  bi-lobed  ganglia,  which  in  man  form 
the  chief  mass  of  the  brain — the  "cerebellum" 
and  the  "cerebrum." 

FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  NERVOUS  SYSTEM. 

The  initial  inquiry  is,  how  the  nervous  sys- 
tem serves  as  at  once  the  agent  by  which  mo- 
tions are  liberated  and  the  agent  by  which  mo- 
tions are  co-ordinated.  Three  things  have  to  be 
explained:  1.  What  are  the  causes  which  on 
appropriate  occasions  determine  the  nervous 
system  to  set  up  motion?  2.  By  what  process 
does  it  liberate  the  insensible  motion  locked  up 
in  certain  tissues,  and  cause  its  transformation 
into  sensible  motion?  3.  How  does  it  adjust 
sensible  motions  into  those  combinations,  sim- 
ultaneous and  successive,  needful  for  efficient 
action  on  the  external  world?  These  questions 
cover  the  whole  of  the  functions  of  the  nerv- 
ous system  with  which  we  are  directly  con- 
cerned. 

The  functions  of  the  nervous  centers  may  be 
classified,  approximately,  as  co-ordinations  that 
are  simple,  compound  and  doubly  compound. 

The  centers  in  which  molecular  motion  is  lib- 
erated, are  also  the  centers  in  which  it  is  co-or- 
dinated; and  the  successively  higher  and  larger 
centers  which  evolve  successively  larger  quanti- 
ties of  molecular  motion,  are  also  centers  in 
which  successively  more  complex  co-ordinations 
are  effected. 


ip 


30 

There  are  conditions  essential  to  nervous  action, 
one  of  which  is,  continuity  of  nerve-substance. 
Hence,  one  of  the  conditions  to  nervous  action 
is,  absence  of  much  pressure.  It  is  a  familiar 
truth,  also,  that  nerves  and  nerve- centers  act 
only  so  long  as  they  are  furnished  with  those 
needful  materials  which  the  blood  vessels  bring 
them. 

The  author  then  treats  of  nervous  phenomena 
as  phenomena  of  consciousness.  Feeling  is  the 
subjective  correlate  of  that  which  we  know  ob- 
jectively as  nervous  action. 

The  more  complex  feelings  conform  to  the 
same  general  laws  to  which  the  simpler  feelings 
conform.  In  this  regard,  emotions  come  in  the 
same  category  with  sensations,  except  that  emo- 
tions are  of  far  more  involved  natures  than  sen- 
sations, and  imply  the  co-operation  of  extremely 
intricate  nervous  structures. 

That  which  distinguishes  Psychology  from 
the  sciences  on  which  it  rests,  is,  that  each  of  its 
propositions  takes  account  both  of  the  connect- 
ed internal  phenomena  and  of  the  connected  ex- 
ternal phenomena  to  which  they  refer. 

Of  the  substance  of  mind,  considered  as  the 
something  of  which  all  particular  states  of  mind 
are  modifications,  we  are  in  absolute  ignorance. 

The  proximate  components  of  mind  are  of  two 
broadly  contrasted  kinds — feelings,  and  the  re- 
lations between  feelings.  Feelings  of  different 
orders  cohere  with  one  another  less  strongly 
than  do  feelings  of  the  same  order. 


31 

Discussing  the  relativity  of  the  relations  be- 
tween feelings,  Mr.  Spencer,  after  dwelling  upon 
the  many  cases  in  which  the  ideas  and  mental 
impressions  concerning  external  objects  differ 
from  each  other,  comes  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  relations  of  co-existence,  of  sequence,  and  of 
difference,  as  we  know  them,  do  not  obtain  be- 
yond consciousness. 

In  the  General  Synthesis,  the  author  treats  of 
the  correspondence  between  life  and  mind.  The 
lowest  life  is  found  in  environments  of  unusual 
simplicity.  The  correspondence  between  the  in- 
ternal changes  and  external  relations  is  at  once 
direct  and  homogeneous.  The  correspondence 
extends  in  space  and  time,  and  increases  in  spe- 
ciality, in  generality,  and  in  complexity.  These 
correspondences  must  also  be  co-ordinated  and 
integrated. 

In  the  Special  Synthesis,  the  nature  of  intel- 
ligence is  considered. 

The  two  great  classes  of  vital  actions,  called 
Physiology  and  Psychology,  are  broadly  distin- 
guished in  this,  that  while  the  one  includes  both 
simultaneous  and  successive  changes,  the  other 
includes  successive  changes  only.  The  briefest 
introspection  makes  it  clear  that  the  actions 
constituting  thought  occur,  not  together,  but 
one  after  another. 

As  the  external  phenomena  responded  to  be- 
come greater  in  number  and  more  complicated 
in  kind,  the  variety  and  rapidity  of  the  changes 
to  which  the  common  center  of  communication 


82 

is  subject,  must  increase — there  must  result  an 
unbroken  series  of  these  nervous  changes,  the 
subjective  face  of  which  is  what  we  call  a  coher- 
ent consciousness. 

Hence  the  progress  of  the  correspondence  be- 
tween the  organism  and  its  environment  neces- 
sitates a  gradual  reduction  of  the  sensorial 
changes  to  a  succession;  and,  by  so  doing, 
evolves  a  distinct  consciousness — a  conscious- 
ness that  becomes  higher  as  the  .succession  be- 
comes more  rapid  and  the  correspondence  more 
complete. 

All  life,  whether  physical  or  psychical,  being 
the  combination  of  changes  in  correspondence 
with  external  co-existences  and  sequences,  it  re- 
sults that  if  the  changes  constituting  psychical 
life  occur  in  succession,  the  law  of  their  succes- 
sion must  be  the  law  of  their  correspondence. 

Reflex  action,  under  its  simplest  form,  is  the 
sequence  of  a  single  contraction  upon  a  single 
irritation. 

In  instinct  the  correspondence  is  between  in- 
ner and  outer  relations  that  are  very  simple  or 
general;  in  reason  the  correspondence  is  between 
inner  and  outer  relations  that  are  complex,  or 
special,  or  abstract,  or  infrequent. 

The  experience  hypothesis  furnishes  an  ade- 
quate solution.  The  genesis  of  instinct,  the  de- 
velopment of  memory  and  of  reason  out  of  it, 
and  the  consolidation  of  rational  actions  and  in- 
ferences into  instinctive  ones,  are  alike  explica- 
ble on  the  single  principle,  that  the  cohesion  be- 


33 

tween  psychical  states  is  proportionate  to  the 
frequency  with  which  the  relation  between  the 
answering  external  phenomena  has  been  repeat- 
ed in  experience. 

THE  WILL. — The  development  of  what  we  call 
Will  is  but  another  aspect  of  the  general  pro- 
cess which  has  been  considered.  Memory,  rea- 
son, and  feeling  simultaneously  arise  as  the  au- 
tomatic actions  become  complex,  infrequent,  and 
hesitating;  and  Will,  arising  at  the  same  time, 
is  necessitated  by  the  same  conditions. 

In  Part  V,  entitled  "  Physical  Synthesis,"  a 
more  elaborate  statement  is  made  of  the  genesis 
and  function  of  the  nervous  structures. 


CHAPTEK   VI. 

THE  NEW    PHILOSOPHY    CONTINUED— SUBJECTIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY. 

The  author  begins  with  the  most  highly  in- 
volved intellectual  phenomena;  those  involved  in 
compound,  quantitive  reasoning;  proceeding 
thence  to  the  less  complex  processes — imperfect 
and  simple  quantitive  reasoning;  quantitive  rea- 
soning in  general:  perfect  qualitative  reasoning; 
imperfect  qualitative  reasoning;  and  reasoning 
in  general. 

The  conclusion  arrived  at  is,  that  reasoning, 
whether  exhibited  in  a  simple  inference  or  in  a 
chain  of  such  inferences,  is  the  indirect  estab- 
lishment of  a  definite  relation  between  two 
things;  and  that  the  achievement  of  this  is  by 
one  or  many  steps,  each  of  which  consists  in  the 
establishment  of  a  definite  relation  between  two 
definite  relations. 

Reasoning  presupposes  classification,  and  clas- 
sification presupposes  reasoning.  They  are  dif- 
ferent sides  of  the  same  thing — the  necessary 
complements  of  each  other.  The  idea  underly- 
ing all  classification  is  that  of  similarity. 
(34) 


35 

Likeness  of  relations  is  the  intuition  common 
to  reasoning  and  classification. 

PERCEPTION.— Perception  is  an  establishment 
of  specific  relations  among  states  of  conscious- 
ness.—  [Principles  of  Psychology,  Sec.  354  A. 

The  perception  by  which  any  object  is  known 
as  such  or  such,  is  always  an  acquired  percep- 
tion. Most  of  the  elements  contained  in  the 
cognition  of  an  observed  object,  are  not  known 
immediately  through  the  senses,  but  are  medi- 
ately known  by  instantaneous  ratiocination. 
Before  a  visual  impression  can  become  a  percep- 
tion of  the  thing  causing  it,  there  must  be  add- 
ed in  thought  those  attributes  in  size,  solidity, 
quality  of  surface,  etc.,  which,  when  united,  con- 
stitute the  nature  of  the  thing  as  it  is  known  to 
us.  Though  these  seem  to  be  given  in  the  vis- 
ual impression,  it  is  demonstrable  that  they  are 
not  so,  but  have  to  be  reached  by  inference. 
And  the  act  of  knowing  them  is  termed  acquired 
perception,  to  signify  the  fact  that  while  really 
mediate,  it  appears  to  be  immediate. 

The  laws  relating  to  the  perception  of  space, 
time,  motion,  and  resistance  are  examined,  as 
well  as  the  law  of  perception  in  general. 

Perception  is  more  fully  defined  as  a  discerning 
of  the  relation  or  relations  between  states  of  con- 
sciousness, partly  presentative  and  partly  repre- 
sentative ;  which  states  of  consciousness  must  be 
themselves  known  to  the  extent  involved  in  the 
knowledge  of  their  relations.  Under  its  sim- 
plest form  (a  form,  however,  of  which  the  adult 


36 

mind  has  few,  if  any,  examples)   perception  is 
the  consciousness  of  a  single  relation. 

As  a  final  result  of  this  analysis  of  the  intel- 
lectual faculties,  it  is  found  that  all  mental  action 
whatever  is  definable  as  the  continuous  differen- 
tiation and  integration  of  states  of  consciousness. 

Passing  from  the  foregoing  special  analysis  to 
a  general  analysis,  the  laws  relating  to  the  con- 
nection of  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  or 
the  eg?  and  the  non-ego ,  are  next  examined. 

The  author  here  enters  into  an.  elaborate  and 
exhaustive  examination  of  the  various  phases  of 
idealism,  as  advocated  by  Berkeley,  Hume,  and 
others.  These  he  directly  antagonizes.  He 
does  not,  however,  indorse  the  common  or  "vul- 
gar" conception  in  regard  to  the  external  world, 
which  he  calls  "Crude  Realism."  He  advocates 
a  compromise  system,  which  he  designates 
"Transfigured  Realism." 

"  While  some  objective  existence,  manifested  under 
some  conditions,  remains  as  the  final  necessity  of 
thought,  there  does  not  remain  the  implication  that 
this  existence  and  these  conditions  are  more  to  us  than 
the  unknown  correlatives  of  our  feelings  and  the  rela- 
tions among  our  feelings.  The  Realism  we  are  com- 
mitted to  is  one  which  simply  asserts  objective  exist- 
ence as*separate  from,  and  independent  of,  subjective 
existence.  But  it  affirms  neither  that  any  one  mode 
of  this  objective  existence  is  in  reality  that  which  it 
seems,  nor  that  the  connections  among  its  modes  are 
objectively  what  they  seem."-[Ibid.,  Sec.  472. 

It  is  stated  elsewhere  (Sec.  470) ,  that  the  ego 
is  the  principle  of  continuity  forming  into  a 


37 

whole  the  faint  states  of  consciousness,  mould- 
ing and  modifying  them  by  some  unknown  en- 
ergy, while  the  u on- ego  is  the  principle  of  conti- 
nuity holding  together  the  independent  aggre- 
gate of  vivid  states  of  consciousness. 

Certain  corollaries  follow  from  this  general 
analysis. 

Before  proceeding  to  these,  a  distinction  is 
taken  between  cognitions  and  feelings,  and  both 
are  classified. 

COGNITIONS  into  presentative  cognitions,  pre- 
sentative-representative  cognitions,  representa- 
tive, and  re- representative  cognitions. 

In  like  manner,  FEELINGS  are  classified  into 
presentative,  presentative-representative,  repre- 
sentative, and  re-representative. 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  CONCEPTIONS. — Only  after 
there  have  been  received  many  experiences 
which  differ  in  their  kinds  but  present  some  re- 
lation in  common,  can  the  first  step  be  taken 
toward  the  conception  of  a  truth  higher  in  gen- 
erality than  these  different  experiences  them- 
selves. 

In  the  course  of  human  progress  general  ideas 
can  arise  only  as  fast  as  social  conditions  render 
experiences  more  multitudinous  and  varied; 
while  at  the  same  time  these  social  conditions 
themselves  presuppose  some  general  ideas. 
Each  step  toward  more  general  ideas  is  instru- 
mental in  bringing  about  better  and  wider  social 
co-operations ;  so  rendering  the  experiences  still 
more  numerous  and  varied,  more  complex,  and 


38 

derived  from  a  wider  area.  And  then,  when  the 
correlative  experiences  have  become  organized, 
there  arises  the  possibility  of  ideas  yet  higher 
in  generality,  and  a  further  social  evolution. 

The  primitive  man  has  little  experience  which 
cultivates  the  consciousness  of  what  we  call 
truth.  Credulity  is  the  inevitable  concomitant 
of  such  a  state. 

Criticism  can  obtain  only  as  fast  as  the  intel- 
lectual powers  in  general  develop. 

In  the  lower  stages  of  mental  evolution  imag- 
ination is  feeble. 

The  belief  that  superstition  implies  active  im- 
agination, and  that  the  decline  of  superstition 
results  when  the  nights  of  imagination  become 
restrained,  shows  a  confusion  of  thought.  This 
confusion  has  been  fostered  by  the  habitual  an- 
tithesis of  prose  and  poetry,  fact  and  fiction. 
The  mental  evolution  which  accompanies  civili- 
zation, makes  imagination  more  vivid,  more  ex- 
act, more  comprehensive,  and  more  excursive. 

A  distinction  is  made  between  reminiscent  im- 
agination and  constructive  imagination. 

LANGUAGE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS. — Every  feeling, 
peripheral  or  central — sensational  or  emotional 
— is  the  concomitant  of  a  nervous  disturbance 
and  resulting  nervous  discharge,  that  has  on  the 
body  both  a  special  effect  and  a  general  effect. 
The  general  effect  is  this: 

"  The  molecular  motion  disengaged  in  any  nerve- 
centre  by  any  stimulus,  tends  ever  to  flow  along  lines 
of  least  resistance  throughout  the  nervous  system,  ex- 


39 

citing  other  nerve-centres,  and  setting  up  other  dis- 
charges. The  feelings  of  all  orders,  moderate  as  well 
as  strong,  which  from  instant  to  instant  arise  in  con- 
sciousness, are  the  correlatives  of  nerve- waves  contin- 
ually being  generated  and  continually  reverberating 
throughout  the  nervous  system — the  perpetual  nervous 
discharge  constituted  by  these  perpetually  generated 
waves,  affecting  both  the  viscera  and  the  muscles,  vol- 
untary and  involuntary." 

Every  particular  kind  of  feeling,  sensational 
or  emotional,  being  located  in  a  specialized  ner- 
vous structure  that  has  relations  to  special  parts 
of  the  body,  tends  to  produce  on  the  body  an  ef- 
fect that  is  special. 

SOCIALITY  AND  SYMPATHY. — The  social  in- 
stinct  is  observed  in  the  lower  orders  of  exist- 
ence. 

When  to  the  general  sociality  of  gregarious 
creatures  there  come  to  be  added  the  special  so- 
cialities of  a  permanent  sexual  relation,  and  of 
a  double  parental  relation,  sympathy  develops 
more  rapidly. 

The  genesis  and  explanation  of  egoistic  senti- 
ments is  given,  and  of  altruistic  sentiments,  as 
connected  with  the  social  system.  The  egoistic 
sentiment  is  partly  inherited,  partly  acquired, 
being  associated  with  the  ideas  of  possession 
and  enjoyment. 

The  altruistic  sentiments  are  the  feelings 
which  find  satisfaction  in  the  well-being  of  all, 
and  which  are  adjusted  to  a  fundamental  un- 
changing condition  to  social  welfare. 

There  can  be  no  altruistic  feeling  but   what 


40 

arises  by  sympathetic   excitement   of   a  corre- 
sponding egoistic  feeling. 

The  volume  closes  with  a  chapter  on  the  aes- 
thetic sentiments. 

The  aesthetic  activities  in  general  may  be  ex- 
pected to  play  an  increasing  part  in  human  life 
as  evolution  advances.  While  the  forms  of  art 
will  be  such  as  yield  pleasurable  exercise  to  the 
simpler  faculties,  they  will  in  a  greater  degree 
than  now,  appeal  to  the  higher  emotions. 

In  the  later  editions  of  Spencer's  Psychology, 
the  work  has  been  not  only  enlarged,  but  in  some 
respects  re- cast;  so  that,  as  he  himself  says  in 
one  of  his  prefaces,  it  may  be  said  it  is 
more  a  new  work  than  a  new  edition;  being 
more  than  twice  as  large  as  its  predecessor. 
How  far  these  changes  and  additions  may  have 
been  made  for  the  purpose  of  obviating  the  force 
of  adverse  criticisms,  it  is  not  easy  to  determine; 
but  that  some  of  them  were,  is  sufficiently  man- 
ifest. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

THE  NEW  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED — SPENCER'S  SO- 
CIOLOGY. 

Having  treated  of  Organic  Evolution,  Mr. 
Spencer  now  comes  to  what  he  terms  Super-Or- 
ganic Evolution. 

That  form  of  Super-Organic  Evolution  which 
human  societies  exhibit  in  their  growths,  struc- 
tures, functions  and  products,  is  now  to  be  con- 
sidered. The  phenomena  to  be  dealt  with  are 
grouped  under  the  general  title  of  Sociology. 

"  Every  society  displays  phenomena  that  are  ascrib- 
able  to  the  characters  of  its  units  and  to  the  conditions 
under  which  they  exist." 

These  factors  or  conditions  are  extrinsic,  or 
external,  and  intrinsic,  or  internal. 

The  extrinsic  factors  are  climate,  surface,  con- 
figuration of  surface,  vegetal  productions,  Flora 
and  Fauna,  etc. 

The  intrinsic  factors  are  the  physical  charac- 
ters, the  degree  of  intelligence,  and  the  tenden- 
cies of  thought,  etc.,  of  the  individual. 

In  addition  to  these,  there  are  the  progressive 
modifications  of  the  environment. 
(41) 


42 

The  average  primitive  man  was  somewhat  in- 
ferior  to  the  average  civilized  man  in  size  and 
physical  structure. 

The  primitive  intellect,  relatively  simpler,  de- 
velops more  rapidly  and  earlier  reaches  its 
limit.  It  is  characterized  by  an  absence  of  gen- 
eralized knowledge,  and  a  readiness  to  accept 
any  explanation,  however  absurd,  of  surround- 
ing phenomena. 

In  examining  the  ideas  of  the  primitive  man, 
it  is  seen  that 

"  By  minds  beginning  to  generalize,  shadows  must  be 
conceived  as  existences  appended  to,  but  capable  of 
separation  from,  material  things." 

The  echo  was  supposed  to  come  from  an  invis- 
ible man  who  dwelt  in  the  place  from  which  the 
echo  came;  from  one  who  had  passed  into  an  in- 
visible state,  or  who  would  become  invisible 
when  sought. 

GHOSTS. — These  originated  from  experiences 
in  dreams.  Dream-activities  were  accepted  as 
real  activities.  The  dreamer  had  seen  his  other 
self,  or  double,  and  he  had  seen  the  doubles  of 
his  companions. 

"This  belief  in  another  self  belonging  to  him,  har- 
monizes with  all  those  illustrations  of  duality  fur- 
nished by  things  around,  and  equally  harmonizes  with 
those  multitudinous  cases  in  which  things  pass  from 
visible  to  invisible  states,  and  back  again." 

The  other  self,  or  double,  was  supposed  to 
have  departed  in  cases  of  swoon,  apoplexy,  cata- 
lepsy, ecstasy,  and  other  forms  of  insensibility. 


43 

In  death,  the  double  had  gone  away  for  a  longer 
time,  but  still  was  expected  back.  This  was  the 
origin  of  the  beliefs  in  resurrection. 

"  Let  us  note  the  still  existing  form  of  this  belief. 
It  differs  from  the  primitive  belief  less  than  we  sup- 
pose." 

The  author  refers  to  the  saying  in  the  creed: 
"  By  one  man  sin  entered  into  the  world  and 
death  by  sin,"  as  implying  that  death  is  not  a 
natural  event, 

"Just  as  clearly  as  do  the  savage  creeds  which  ascribe 
death  to  some  difference  of  opinion  among  the  gods, 
or  disregard  of  their  injunctions." 

The  facts  are  referred  to  that  in  the  English 
state  prayer-book, 

"Bodily  resurrection  is  unhesitatingly  asserted,  and 
poems  of  more  modern  date  contain  detailed  descrip- 
tions of  the  dead  rising  again." 

Also  that  a  prominent  English  bishop  had  re- 
cently preached  against  cremation  as  tending  to 
undermine  the  faith  of  mankind  in  a  bodily  res- 
urrection.—  [Principles  of  Sociology,  Sec.  90. 

"And  now  observe,  finally,  the  kind  of  modification 
through  which  the  civilized  belief  in  resurrection  is 
made  partially  unlike  the  savage  belief.  There  is  no 
abandonment  of  it;  the  anticipated  event  is  simply 
postponed.  Supernaturalism,  gradually  discredited  by 
science,  transfers  its  supernatural  occurrences  to  re- 
moter places  in  time  or  space.  As  believers  in  special 
creations  suppose  them  to  happen,  not  where  we  are, 
but  in  distant  parts  of  the  world;  as  miracles,  admitted 
not  to  take  place  now,  are  said  to  have  taken  place 
during  a  past  dispensation;  so  reanimation  of  the  body, 
no  longer  expected  as  immediate,  is  expected  at  an  in- 


44 

definitely  far  off  time.  The  idea  of  death  differentiates 
slowly  from  the  idea  of  temporary  insensibility.  At 
first,  revival  is  looked  for  in  a  few  hours,  or  in  a  few 
days,  or  in  a  few  years;  and  gradually,  as  death  be- 
comes more  definitely  conceived,  revival  is  not  looked 
for  till  the  end  of  all  things."— [Ibid. 

Among  savage  races  the  implication  beyond 
doubt  is,  that  the  duplicate  is  at  first  conceived 
as  no  less  material  than  its  original.  The  Greek 
conception  of  ghosts  seems  to  have  been  of  an 
allied  kind. 

"  Nor  do  the  conceptions  which  prevailed  among  the 
Hebrews  appear  to  have  been  different.  We  find  as- 
cribed, now  substantiality,  now  insubstantiality,  and 
now  something  between  the  two.  The  resuscitated 
Christ  was  described  as  having  wounds  that  admitted 
of  tactual  examination,  and  yet  as  passing  unimpeded 
through  a  closed  door  or  through  walls." — [Prin.  of  So- 
ciology, Sec.  93. 

"Belief  in  reanimation  implies  belief  in  a  subse- 
quent life.  The  primitive  man,  incapable  of  deliberate 
thought,  and  without  language  fit  for  deliberate  think- 
ing, has  to  conceive  this  as  best  he  may.  Hence  a  cha- 
os of  ideas  concerning  the  after-state  of  the  dead."- 
[Prin.of  Soc.,Sec.  99. 

The  second  life  is  originally  conceived  as  re- 
peating the  first  in  conduct,  sentiments,  and 
ethical  code. 

Such  traits  as  we  may  perceive  of  the  after- 
life of  the  departed  Greeks,  under  its  ethical  as- 
pect, conform  to  those  of  Greek  daily  life. 

"  Nor  in  the  ascribed  moral  standard  of  the  Hebrew 
other-life  do  we  fail  to  see  a  kindred  similarity,  if  a  less 
complete  one.  Subordination  is  still  the  supreme  vir- 
tue. If  this  is  displayed,  wrong  acts  are  condoned,  or 


45 

are  not  supposed  to  be  wrong.  The  obedient  Abraham 
is  applauded  for  his  readiness  to  sacrifice  Isaac.  There 
is  no  sign  of  blame  for  so  readily  accepting  the  mur- 
derous suggestion  of  his  dream  as  a  dictate  from 
heaven."— [Prin.  of  Soc.,  Sec.  107. 

The  genesis  of  the  ideas  of  the  other  world, 
and  of  heaven  and  hell,  is  traced  from  the  ideas 
of  another  life  and  of  the  condition  of  departed 
spirits. 

From  ghosts  to  gods  the  transition  is  natural 
and  easy.  Ancestor-worship  preceded,  or  rather 
accompanied,  this  transition.  Much  attention 
is  given  to  idol- worship  and  fetichism,  which,  by 
mythological  writers  generally,  is  thought  to  be 
the  earliest  form  of  religion.  Mr.  Spencer,  how- 
ever, holds  ghost  and  ancestor- worship  to  be  the 
first  stage,  and  fetichism  the  second. 

Akin  to  these  forms  of  superstition,  is  the 
worship  of  Nature;  particularly  in  the  form  of 
sun,  moon  and  stars. 

The  foregoing  is  given  as  the  data  of  Sociolo- 
gy. The  author  now  comes  to  what  he  terms 
the  inductions  of  Sociology. 

The  question  is  asked,  What  is  Society?  And 
the  answer  is,  a  Society  is  an  organism. 

Analogies  are  traced  between  Societies  and 
other  organic  structures.  These  analogies  are 
found  in  Social  Growth,  Social  Structures,  So- 
cial Functions,  Systems  of  Organs,  the  Sustain- 
ing System,  the  Distributing  System,  and  the 
Regulating  System. 

The  growth  of  Societies  reminds  us,  by  its 
degree,  of  growth  in  living  bodies. 


46 

."  The  implication  is,  that  by  integrations,  direct  and 
indirect,  there  have  in  course  of  time  been  produced 
social  aggregates  a  million  times  in  size  the  aggregates 
which  alone  existed  in  the  remote  past." — [Prin.  of 
Soc.,  Sec.  224, 

Scattered  over  many  regions  there  are  minute 
hordes — still  extant  samples  of  the  primordial 
type  of  society. 

"  In  Societies  as  in  living  bodies,  increase  of  mass  is 
habitually  accompanied  by  increase  of  structure.  .  .  . 
Changes  of  structure  cannot  occur  without  changes  of 
functions." 

Ceremonial  and  Political  Institutions  are  con- 
sidered. 

The  earliest  kind  of  government,  the  most 
general  kind  of  government,  and  the  government 
which  is  ever  spontaneously  recommencing,  is 
the  government  of  ceremonial  observance. 

"  That  ceremonial  restraint,  preceding  other  forms 
of  restraint,  continues  ever  to  be  the  most  widely  dif- 
fused form  of  restraint,  we  are  shown  by  such  facts  as 
that  in  all  intercourse  between  members  of  each  socie- 
ty, the  decisively  governmental  actions  are  usually 
prefaced  by  this  government  of  observances." — [Prin. 
of  Soc.,  Sec.  343. 

POLITICAL  INSTITUTIONS  are  preceded  by  po- 
litical organization. 

"  The  mere  gathering  of  individuals  into  a  group 
does  not  constitute  them  a  Society.  A  Society,  in  the 
sociological  sense,  is  formed  only  when,  besides  juxta- 
position, there  is  co-operation.  .  .  .  But  co-operation 
implies  organization.  .  .  .  There  is  a  spontaneous  co- 
operation which  grows  up  without  thought  during  the 
pursuit  of  private  ends;  and  there  is  a  co-operation 


47 

which,  consciously  devised,  implies  distinct  recogni- 
tion of  public  ends."— [Prin.  of  Soc.,  Sec.  440,  441. 

The  origin  and  growth  of  political  organiza- 
tions are  traced,  as  illustrative  of  the  doctrine  of 
evolution.  Social  types  and  constitutions  and 
social  metamorphoses  are  examined;  also  the  do- 
mestic relations. 

The  primitive  relations  of  the  sexes — Exoga- 
my, Endogamy,  Promiscuity,  Polyandry,  Polygy- 
ny, Monogamy,  are  all  carefully  considered. 
Mr.  Spencer's  convictions  appear  to  be  in  favor 
of  monogamy. 

ECCLESIASTICAL    INSTITUTIONS. 

THE  RELIGIOUS  IDEA. — "  Rightly  to  trace  the  evo- 
lution of  Ecclesiastical  Institutions,  we  must  know 
whence  came  the  ideas  and  sentiments  implied  by 
them.  Are  these  innate,  or  are  they  derived? 

"  There  is  clear  proof  that  minds  which  have  from 
infancy  been  cut  off  by  bodily  defects  from  intercourse 
with  the  minds  of  adults,  are  devoid  of  religious  ideas. 
The  implication  is  that  civilized  men  have  no  in- 
nate tendency  to  form  religious  ideas;  and  this  impli- 
cation is  supported  by  proofs  that  among  various  sav- 
age tribes  religious  ideas  do  not  exist."— [Prin.  of  Soc., 
Sec.  583. 

Since,  then,  religious  ideas  have  not  that  su- 
pernatural origin  commonly  alleged,  how  do  they 
originate? 

Mr.  Spencer  thinks  they  originate  in  ancestor- 
worship;  giving  many  illustrations  in  support  of 
his  theory.  The  belief  in  ghosts  is  considered, 
also,  as  having  originated  at  or  about  the  same 
time,  and  as  accompanying  ancestor-worship. 
Among  savage  races,  the  functions  of  the  medi- 


48 

cine-man  and  priest  were  closely  related.  The 
eldest  male  descendant  was  originally  the  quasi- 
priest,  upon  whom  devolved  the  duty  of  propi- 
tiating the  ghosts  of  ancestors  and  of  prominent 
chiefs.  This  priest  was  frequently,  also,  the 
ruler.  Thus  arose  the  first  connection  of  Church 
and  State. 

As  society  developed  the  priests  became  segre- 
gated and  co-ordinated  into  a  separate  class. 
They  contributed  in  forming  the  social  bond, 
and  sometimes  exercised  functions  of  a  civil  and 
military  character. 

Thus,  by  a  continuous  process  of  evolution, 
we  arrive  at  the  ecclesiastical  institutions  of  the 
present  day. 


CHAPTER    VIII. 

THE    NEW    PHILOSOPHY    CONTINUED — PRINCIPLES 
OF   ETHICS — WORK   ON   EDUCATION- 
ESSAYS,    ETC. 

PRINCIPLES     OF     ETHICS. 

The  original  work,  "  Data  of  Ethics,"-  was  af- 
terward enlarged  into  "  Principles  of  Ethics," 
consisting  of 

Part  I.  The  Data  of  Ethics; 

Part  II.  The  Inductions  of  Ethics; 

Part  III.  The  Ethics  of  Individual  Life. 

PART  I.— THE   DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

CONDUCT  IN  GENERAL,  AND  THE  EVOLUTION  or 
CONDUCT. — Conduct  is  a  whole;  and,  in  a  sense, 
it  is  an  organic  whole — an  aggregate  of  interde- 
pendent actions  performed  by  an  organism. 
That  division  or  aspect  of  conduct  with  which 
Ethics  deals,  is  a  part  of  this  organic  whole — a 
part  having  its  components  inextricably  bound 
up  with  the  rest. 

Conduct,  in  its  full  acceptation,  comprehends 
all  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends.  A  large  part  of 
ordinary  conduct  is  ethically  indifferent- —  [Prin- 
ciples of  Ethics,  Sec.  1. 

(49) 


50 

"  Ethics  has  for  its  subject  matter,  that  form  which 
universal  conduct  assumes  during  the  last  stages  of  its 
evolution — stages  displayed  by  the  highest  type  of  be- 
ing when  he  is  forced,  by  increase  of  numbers,  to  live 
more  and  more  in  presence  of  his  fellows." — [Prin.  of 
Ethics,  Sec.  7. 

GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT.— "The  entanglement  of 
social  relations  is  such,  that  men's  actions  often  sim- 
ultaneously affect  the  welfares  of  self,  of  offspring, 
and  of  fellow-citizens.  Hence  results  confusion  in 
judging  of  actions  as  good  and  bad;  since  actions  well 
fitted  to  achieve  ends  of  one  order,  may  prevent  ends 
of  the  other  orders  from  being  achieved." — [Prin.  of 
Ethics,  Sec  8. 

Always  acts  are  called  good  or  bad  according 
as  they  are  well  or  ill  adjusted  to  ends.  Leav- 
ing other  ends  aside,  we  regard  as  good  the  con- 
duct furthering  self-preservation,  and  as  bad  the 
conduct  tending  to  self-destruction.  Parental 
conduct  is  called  good  or  bad  as  it  approaches  or 
falls  short  of  the  ideal  result,  of  a  progeny,  need- 
ful in  number  and  preserved  to  maturity,  who 
are  then  fit  for  a  life  that  is  complete  in  fullness 
and  duration.  Lastly,  in  an  associated  state, 
that  form  of  conduct  is  most  emphatically 
termed  good,  which  is  such  that  life  may  be  com- 
pleted in  each  and  in  his  offspring,  not  only 
without  preventing  completion  of  it  in  others, 
but  with  furtherance  of  it  in  others. —  [Ibid. 

Taking  into  account  immediate  and  remote 
effects  on  all  persons,  the  good  is  universally  the 
pleasurable. —  [Ibid.,  Sec.  10. 

WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT — THE  PHYSICAL 
— THE  BIOLOGICAL— THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL— THE 


51 

SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW. — Mr.  Spencer  claims  that 
all  the  various  ethical  theories  are  characterized 
either  by  entire  absence  of  the  idea  of  causa- 
tion, or  by  inadequate  presence  of  it. —  [Prin.  of 
Ethics,  Sec.  17. 

"The  school  of  morals  properly  to  be  considered  as 
the  still  extant  representative  of  the  most  ancient 
school,  is  that  which  recognizes  no  other  rule  of  con- 
duct than  the  alleged  will  of  God.  It  originates  with 
the  savage,  whose  only  restraint  beyond  fear  of  his 
fellow-man  is  fear  of  an  ancestral  spirit;  and  whose 
notion  of  moral  duty,  as  distinguished  from  his  no- 
tion of  social  prudence,  arises  from  this  fear."— [Ibid. 
Sec.  18. 

The  pure  intuitionists  hold  that  moral  percep- 
tions are  innate  in  the  original  sense — that  men 
have  been  divinely  endowed  with  moral  facul- 
ties. Even  the  utilitarian  school  is  very  far 
from  complete  recognition  of  natural  causation. 
Conduct,  according  to  its  theory,  is  to  be  esti- 
mated by  observation  of  results. —  [Ibid.,  Sec.  21. 
L.  The  PHYSICAL  view  is,  that  there  is  an  entire 
correspondence  between  evolution  as  physically 
denned  and  moral  evolution. 

The  BIOLOGICAL  view  is,  that  the  moral  man 
is  one  whose  functions  are  all  discharged  in  de- 
grees duly  adjusted  to  the  conditions  of  exist- 
ence. The  performance  of  every  function  is,  in 
a  sense,  a  moral  obligation. —  [Prin.  of  Ethics, 
Sees.  80,  31. 

The  PSYCHOLOGICAL  view  is,  that 
"The  pleasures  and  pains  which  the  moral  sentiments 
originate,  will,  like  bodily  pleasures  and  pains,  become 
incentives  and  deterrants  so  adjusted  in  their  strengths 


52 

to  the  needs,  that  the  moral  conduct  will  be  the  nat- 
ural conduct."' — [Ibid.,  Sec.  47. 

The  SOCIOLOGICAL  view  is,  that  the  highest 
life  is  reached  only  when,  besides  helping  to 
complete  one  another's  lives  by  specified  reci- 
procities of  aid,  men  otherwise  help  to  com- 
plete one  another's  lives. —  [Prin.  of  Ethics,  Sec. 
55. 

EGOISM  AND  ALTRUISM. — Egoism  comes  before 
Altruism.  The  acts  required  for  continued  self- 
preservation,  including  the  enjoyment  of  benefits 
achieved  by  such  acts,  are  the  first  requisites  to 
universal  welfare. 

Altruism,  defined  as  being  all  action  which,  in 
the  normal  course  of  things,  benefits  others  in- 
stead of  benefiting  self,  is  no  less  essential  than 
egoism.  Self-sacrifice  is  no  less  primordial  than 
self-preservation. 

Though  the  principles  are  seemingly  in  con- 
flict, yet  there  is  a  mode  of  conciliation. 

"In  its  ultimate  form,  altruism  will  be  the  achieve- 
ment of  gratification  through  sympathy  with  those 
gratifications  of  others  which  are  mainly  produced  by 
their  activities  of  all  kinds  successively  carried  on- 
sympathetic  gratification  which  costs  the  receiver  no- 
thing, but  is  a  gratis  addition  to  his  egoistic  gratifica- 
tions."—[Prin.  of  Ethics,  Sec.  97. 

Such  a  view  as  has  been  set  forth 
"  Will  not  be  agreeable  to  those  who  lament  the 
spreading  disbelief  in  eternal  damnation;  nor  to  those 
who  follow  the  apostle  of  brute  force  in  thinking  that 
because  the  rule  of  the  strong  hand  was  once  good,  it 
is  good  for  all  time  to  come;  nor  to  those  whose  rever- 


53 

ence  for  one  \vho  told  them  to  put  up  the  sword,  is 
shown  by  using  the  sword  to  spread  his  doctrine 
among  heathens. 

"From  the  ten  thousand  priests  of  the  religion  of 
love,  who  are  silent  when  the  nation  is  moved  by  the 
religion  of  hate,  will  come  no  sign  of  assent."— [Ibid., 
Sec.  1)8. 

Nevertheless,  the  author  does  not  think  it 
unreasonable  to  believe  that  it  will  eventually 
be  acted  upon.* 

SPENCER'S    WORK    ON    EDUCATION. 

WHAT  KNOWLEDGE  is  MOST  WORTH? — The 
ornamental  comes  before  the  useful.  The  com- 
parative worths  of  different  kinds  of  knowledge 
have  been  as  yet  scarcely  even  discussed — much 
less  discussed  in  a  methodic  way,  with  definite 
results. 

The  ultimate  test  of  value  of  any  branch  of 
knowledge,  is,  of  whatuse  is  it  in  teaching  how 
to  live? — how  to  rninisteTio  seltzpres^rvation— 
how  ru  secure  the  necessaries  of  life — how  to 
rear  and  disciplimTclr^pring-^hTT^  to  maintain 
proper  social  and  political  relations,  and  how 
to  be  best  fitted  for  the  leisure  part  of  life,  to  be 
devoted  to^fhe^gratincation  of  the  tastes  and 
feelings. 

For  all  these  purposes  Mr.  Spencer  deems 
cultivation  of  the  sciences  indispensable.  He 
does  not  concede  that  mental  discipline  requires 

*NOTE.— This  synopsis  is  confined  to  that  part  of  the 
"  Principles  of  Ethics"  entitled  "  Data  of  Ethics,"  the 
fundamental  principles  of  his  doctrine  of  morals 
having  been  therein  stated. 


54 

any  different  course  of  study  from  that  necessary 
to  prepare  for  the  activities  of  life. 

INTELLECTUAL  EDUCATION. — The  once  univer- 
sal practice  of  learning  by  rote,  is  daily  falling 
more  into  discredit.  Also,  the  nearly  allied 
teaching  by  rules.  The  particulars  first,  and 
then  the  generalization,  is  the  new  method. 
The  characteristic  of  the  new  method  is,  an  in- 
creasing conformity  to  the  methods  of  Nature. 
Alike  in  its  order  and  in  its  methods,  as  Pesta- 
lozzi  annunciated,  education  must  conform  to 
the  natural  process  of  mental  evolution.  We 
should  proceed  from  the  simple  to  the  complex, 
from  concrete  to  abstract,  and  from  the  empir- 
ical to  the  rational.  Furthermore,  education 
should  be  a  process  of  self -instruction. 

MORAL  EDUCATION.  —  Right  conceptions  of 
cause  and  effect  are  early  formed;  and  by  fre- 
quent and  constant  experience  are  eventually 
rendered  definite  and  complete.  Proper  conduct 
in  life  is  much  better  guaranteed  when  the  good 
and  evil  consequences  of  actions  are  rationally 
understood,  than  when  they  are  merely  believed 
on  authority. 

PHYSICAL  EDUCATION. — To  conform  the  regi- 
men of  the  nursery  and  the  school  to  the  estab- 
lished truths  of  modern  science — this  is  the  de- 
sideratum. 

SPENCER'S  ESSAYS  AND  OTHER  WRITINGS. 

Mr.  Spencer's  writings  have  been  very  volumi- 
nous. Besides  his  philosophical  and  miscella- 


55 

neous  works,  lie  1ms  made  contributions, 
from  time  to  time,  to  various  English  maga- 
zines. 

It  is  not  within  the  purview  of  these  articles 
to  speak  of  his  writings,  other  than  those  of 
which  a  synopsis  has  been  given. 

Suffice  it  to  say,  that  no  one  will  for  a  mo- 
ment hesitate  to  accord  to  him  the  highest  rank 
among  those  who  have  contributed  to  the  ad- 
vancement of  science  and  have  enlarged  the  field 
of  philosophic  thought. 

Mr.  Spencer  appears  to  have  passed  through, 
and  to  have  exemplified  in  his  own  person,  the 
three  stages  of  mental  evolution  described  by 
Comte  as  the  theological,  the  metaphysical,  and 
the  positive. 

The  first  stage  is  to  be  seen  in  "  Social  Stat- 
ics," written  when  Mr.  Spencer  was  thirty  years 
of  age.  In  this  work  he  writes  of  ''God's  World," 
of  the  "Divine  Idea,"  of  the  "Divine  Rule,"  of 
the  "Divine  Arrangements,"  of  the  "creative 
purpose,"  of  the  "Creator's  silent  command," 
etc.,  etc.  He  refers  in  high  terms  to  the  Christ- 
ian religion,  using  language  in  marked  contrast 
with  that  employed  in  his  later  writings.  He 
has  also  an  entire  chapter  on  "The  Moral  Sense"; 
something  which  appears  strangely  to  have 
dropped  out  of  the  "Data  of  Ethics." 

In  Social  Statics  he  speaks  of  the  moral  sense 
as  generating  moral  intuitions  [p.  39] .  In  the 
Data  of  Ethics  he  antagonizes  the  intuitionists, 
who  "hold  that  moral  perceptions  are  innate — • 


56 

that  men  have  been  divinely  endowed  with  moral 
faculties." 

In  Social  Statics,  human  rights  are  primarily 
derived  from  the  axiom  that  human  happiness 
is  the  divine  will  [p.  173],  and  that  the  duty  of 
man  is  to  conform  to  the  will  of  God.  In  the  Data 
of  Ethics,  the  author,  speaking  of  the  ancient 
school  of  morals,"  that  which  recognizes  no  oth- 
er rule  of  conduct  than  the  alleged  will  of  God," 
says  it  originates  with  the  savage. 

In  the  first,  the  theologicaL^tate,  God  was 
ruling  the  world  in  accordance  with  divine  ar- 
rangements. 

In  the  second,  the  metaphysical  state,  we  have 
the  Unknowable  as  the  Unknown  Force,  the  In- 
scrutable Power,  behind  all  phenomena. 

In  the  third,  the  positive-siate.  the  Unknowa- 
ble is  an  abstract,  philosophical  conception. 

The  "Unknowable"  was  the  entity  of  the  met- 
aphysical state,  which  was  substituted  for  the 
divinity  of  the  theological  state.  It  was  the  "in- 
termediaire"  spoken  of  by  Comte,  which  con- 
ducts one  from  the  theological  state  to  the  posi- 
tive state. 

In  the  positive  state  of  thought,  Mr.  Spencer 
uses  the  term  "Nature"  to  designate  the  "Un- 
knowable" or  "Ultimate  Cause  of  things."  Na- 
ture is  now  the  great  Artificer,  and  the  philos- 
opher deems  it  sufficient  to  study  her  manifesta- 
tions. 

The  progressive  character  of  Mr.  Spencer's 
thought  is  further  illustrated  by  one  of  his  very 


57 

latest  utterances — his  reply  to  Mr.  Balfour's 
"Foundations  of  Belief  [1895].  Mr.  Spencer 
there  speaks  of  the  Universe  as  being  without 
conceivable  beginning  or  end,  and  without  intel- 
ligible purpose. 

This  is  his  last  and  most  positive  state  of 
thought. 

In  the  theological  state,  intelligence  was  as- 
cribed to  the  Power  behind  phenomena. 

In  the  metaphysical  state,  we  were  cautioned 
against  ascribing  to  that  Power  either  intelli- 
gence or  the  want  of  intelligence. 

In  the  positive  state,  it  is  clearly  implied  that 
the  same  Power  is  without  intelligible  purpose. 
In  this  state,  there  is  no  Divine  Will,  conformity 
to  which  was  so  strongly  enjoined  in  "  Social 
Statics." 


Having  thus  taken  a  complete  survey  of  the 
philosophy  of  Mr.  Spencer,  we  are  now  prepared 
for  an  interview  with  his  critics. 


CHAPTER    IX. 

CRITICISM   BY   MALCOLM   GUTHRIE. 

The  most  elaborate  criticism  of  Mr.  Spencer's 
philosophy  was  made  by  Malcolm  Guthrie,  in  a 
volume  of  nearly  500  closely  printed  pages,  enti- 
tled "On  Mr.  Spencer's  Unification  of  Knowl- 
edge." [London,  Truebner  &  Co.,  1882. 

In  his  preface  Mr.  Guthrie  says: 

"  In  so  far  as  Mr.  Spencer's  work  is  viewed  as  an  at- 
tempt to  show  the  a  priori  reasonableness  of  evolution 
by  gradual  development,  already  established  in  various 
departments  of  science  by  a  posteriori  methods,  it  may 
be  held  to  have  accomplished  its  object;  but  in  so  far 
as  it  claims  to  have  put  together  a  framework  of 
thought  commensurate  with  all  the  sequences  of  the 
cosmos,  it  must  be  considered  a  disjointed  structure, 
from  which  as  yet  several  connected  parts  are  missing. 
And  it  will  be  found  that  the  deductive  system  which 
Mr.  Spencer  attempts  is  so  mystical  in  its  fundamental 
ideas,  as  well  as  so  incomplete  in  its  logical  connec- 
tions, that,  regarded  as  a  system  of  philosophy,  it  is  as 
vague  as  it  is  ill-constructed  .... 

"The  attempt  to  outrun  the  gradual  growth  of 
knowledge  by  filling  in  every  hiatus  with  theoretical 
(58) 


59 

explanations,  is  a  positive  obstruction  to  the  progress 

of  science 

"The  writer  is  not  in  accord  with  Mr.  Spencer  in 
supposing  that  mysticism  completes  explanations  par- 
tially effected  by  intelligible  methods." 

Mr.  Spencer  has,  according  to  Mr.  Guthrie, 
six  different  methods  for  the  unification  of  knowl- 
edge: the  Mystical  method,  the  Psychological 
method,  the  Physical  method,  the  Metaphysical, 
the  Supraphysical  method,  and  the  Symbolical 
method. 

1.  Commenting   on   tne  MYSTICAL  METHOD, 
Mr.  Guthrie  says: 

"In  the  book  on  the  Knowable,  the  Unknowable  is 
always  presenting  itself.  It  meets  one  at  every  turn, 
and  each  important  term  is  a  back-door  into  the  Un- 
knowable." 

"The  unification  must  be  accomplished  within  the 
bounds  of  knowledge.  If  the  unknowable  is  mixed  up 
in  it,  over  and  beyond  the  known  conditions— as  a  fac- 
tor, but  a  factor  of  unknown  value — then,  the  whole 
organization  or  co-ordination  of  the  sciences  is  vitiated 
and  comes  to  naught." 

2.  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  METHOD. — The  criti- 
cism on  this  portion  of  Mr.  Spencer's  endeavor 
to  unify   knowledge,    is    that  it  is    vague  and 
meaningless. 

3.  THE  METAPHYSICAL  METHOD. — Comment- 
ing on  Mr.  Spencer's  illustration  of  the  piano, 
Mr.  Guthrie  says : 

"It  seems  to  us  that  the  process  which  Mr.  Spencer 
here  proposes,  is  not  possible.  ...  The  only  way  to 
fuse  the  various  ideas  connected  with  a  piano  into  the 


60 

required  indefiniteness  of  general  existence  would  be 
by  fusing  the  piano  itself  into  general  existence  by 
grinding  it  into  dust,  and  then  we  have  no  idea  of  a  pi- 
ano at  all." 

The  remarkable  passage  in  Spencer  referred 
to  by  Mr.  Guthrie  will  here  be  given  in  full, 
with  so  much  of  the  context  as  is  essential. 

"How,  then,  must  the  sense  of  this  something  [that 
is  conditioned  in  every  thought]  be  constituted?  Evi- 
dently by  combining  successive  concepts  deprived  of 
their  limits  and  conditions 

"On  thinking  of  a  piano,  there  first  rises  in  the  im- 
agination its  visual  appearance,  to  which  are  in- 
stantly added  [though  by  separate  mental  acts]  the 
ideas  of  its  remote  sides  and  of  its  solid  substance.  A 
complete  conception,  however,  involves  the  strings,  the 
hammers,  the  pedals;  and  while  successively  adding 
these  to  the  conception,  the  attributes  first  thought  of 
lapse  more  or  less  completely  out  of  consciousness. 
Nevertheless,  the  whole  group  constitutes  a  repre- 
sentation of  the  piano.  Now,  as  in  this  case  we  form 
a  definite  concept  of  a  special  existence,  by  imposing 
limits  and  conditions  in  successive  acts;  so,  in  the  con- 
verse case,  by  taking  away  the  limits  and  conditions  in 
successive  acts,  we  form  an  indefinite  notion  of  gen- 
eral existence.  By  fusing  a  series  of  states  of  con- 
sciousness, in  each  of  which,  as  it  arises,  the  limita- 
tions and  conditions  are  abolished,  there  is  produced  a 
consciousness  of  something  unconditioned."  —  [First 
Prin.,  Sec.  26. 

Elsewhere  Mr.  Spencer  tells  us  that  the  Un- 
knowable is  unthinkable;  but  here  he  shows  us 
how  to  think  of  something  unknowable,  giving 
full  directions.  Taking  the  piano  as  an  illus- 
tration, he  explains  that  after  having  formed  a 


61 

complete  concept  of  the  piano,  in  order  to  get 
the  idea  of  its  general  existence — the  idea  of  an 
unconditioned  piano — we  must  take  away  one  by 
one  its  limits  and  conditions.  Very  well;  let  us 
remove  from  thought  first  the  pedals,  then  the 
hammers,  strings  and  dampers.  Going  further, 
let  us  remove  from  thought  the  solid  substance 
of  the  piano,  and,  as  a  last  step  in  the  process, 
its  visual  appearance.  What  now  remains  of 
the  piano?  One  would  say,  nothing  whatever. 
But  according  to  the  author  of  First  Principles, 
there  still  remains  to  be  thought  of,  an  indefi- 
nitely existing — an  unconditioned  piano. 

The  pedals,  the  strings,  the  hammers,  etc.,  are 
parts  of  the  piano;  and  that  all  the  parts  of  the 
instrument,  as  well  as  the  solid  substance  of 
which  it  is  composed,  can  be  taken  away,  and 
any  thing  be  left,  is  a  doctrine  to  which  I  cannot 
subscribe.  All  the  parts  are  equal  to  the  whole. 
When,  therefore,  all  the  parts  are  taken  away, 
the  entire  object  is  gone. 

Much  has  been  said  concerning  the  "noume- 
non," as  distinguished  from  the  phenomenon; 
and  since  the  noumenon  is  one  of  the  many 
names  which  Mr.  Spencer  gives  to  the  Unknow- 
able, it  is  manifest  that  the  noumenal  piano  is 
what  he  supposes  to  remain  after  the  phenome- 
nal piano  is  gone.  The  doctrine  of  the  noume- 
non is  that  the  real  object,  the  "Ding  an  sich," 
is  the  noumenon,  of  which  phenomenon  is  the 
manifestation. 

Let  us  look  into  this: 


62 

Take  a  piece  of  ice.  There  is  the  phenomenon 
ice,  and,  we  will  say,  the  noumenon  ice.  Now, 
let  the  ice  be  melted  into  water.  The  phenome- 
non ice  is  gone.  It  exists  no  longer.  What  has 
become  of  the  noumenon  ice?  Will  it  be  said 
it  has  gone  into  the  water?  But  water  is  a  phe- 
nomenon itself,  and  must  have  its  own  noume- 
non. If  the  noumenon  ice  has  gone  into  the 
noumenon  water,  then  the  water  has,  in  this 
case,  two  noumena,  or  a  double  noumenon. 

Again:  Let  the  water  be  decomposed  into  oxy- 
gen and  hydrogen  gas.  Where,  now,  is  or  are  the 
noumenon  or  noumena  of  the  water?  Has  it  or 
have  they  been  cut  in  two,  and  has  part  gone  in- 
to the  one  gas  and  part  into  the  other?  But 
each  of  these  gases  is  supposed  to  have  its  own 
noumenon. 

Take  another  illustration: 

Take  the  case  of  a  tree:  It  has,  let  us  say,  its 
noumenon.  Now  let  the  tree  be  felled,  the  top 
cut  into  fuel  and  burned,  and  the  trunk  sawed 
into  boards,  and  used  in  the  construction  of  a 
house.  Where,  now,  is  the  noumenon  of  the 
tree,  or  the  noumenal  tree?  Was  it  divided,  and 
did  a  part  go  into  the  fuel  and  thence  into  ashes, 
and  the  other  part  into  the  boards  and  thence 
into  the  house?  Does  every  board  have  its 
nonmenon?  Does  also  each  of  the  nails  that 
fasten  the  boards  have  its  noumenon?  The 
house,  also,  must  it  not  have  its  own  noumenon? 

Is  the  noumenon  a  reality,  or  is  it  a  figment 
of  the  imagination — a  mere  philosophico-meta- 


G3 

physical  abstraction — a  term  without  significa- 
tion? 

If  the  noumenon  does  not  continue  to  exist  af- 
ter the  phenomenon  has  disappeared,  then  what 
use  has  the  noumenon  subserved  during  its 
existence?  Will  it  be  said  that  it  formed  the 
base  or  substratum  of  the  phenomenon?  But 
if  the  phenomenon  could  disappear  without  the 
aid  of  the  noumenon,  why  could  it  not  appear 
and  continue  to  exist  without  the  aid  of  the  nou- 
menon? 

There  is  in  the  "  Dictionnaire  Universel"  of 
Larousse,  a  beautiful  passage  describing  the 
heaven  (the  firmament)  of  the  peasant  and  the 
heaven  of  the  astronomer;  and  closing  with  the 
statement  that  while  the  heaven  of  the  peasant 
is  phenomenal,  the  heaven  of  the  astronomer  is 
noumenal.  ("Le  ciel  de  1'astronome  est  le  ciel 
noumenal.") 

It  is  a  fine  piece  of  rhetoric,  but  as  an  illus- 
tration it  is  entirely  inapplicable.  The  heaven 
of  the  astronomer  is  also  a  phenomenon ;  it  is,  in 
fact,  the  same  as  the  heaven  of  the  peasant;  on- 
ly, better  known. 

The  noumenon  is  not  the  phenomenon  better 
known.  Neither  is  it  matter;  nor  is  it  claimed 
to  be  such.  Matter,  in  its  various  forms,  makes 
itself  known  to  our  senses,  and  becomes  the  sub- 
ject of  scientific  investigation.  But  the  noume- 
non is  conceded  to  be  unknowable.  Matter  is 
something — the  noumenon  is  nothing. 

John  Stuart  Mill  says: 


64 

"Noumena,  if  they  exist,  are  wholly  unknowable  by 
us  except  phenomenally,  through  their  effects  on  us."— 
[Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy, 
Vol.  II,  p.  181. 

To  return  to  our  critic.  Mr.  Guthrie  contin- 
ues his  criticism  as  follows: 

4.  THE  PHYSICAL     METHOD. — After  examin- 
ing this  method  somewhat  in  detail,  he  concludes 
that  "from  the  Conservation  of  Energy,  and  from 
the  doctrine  of  the  Conservation  of  the  Attract- 
ive Forces,  and  of  the  Indestructibility  of  Mat- 
ter (whatever  that  is) ,  we  are  unable  to  read  off 
the  history  of  the  cosmos;"  much  less  can  we 
attain  to  an  explanation  of  biological  processes. 

5.  THE  SUPRAPHYSICAL  METHOD. — By  this  is 
meant  a  method,  not  beyond  the  physical  exact- 
ly, but  superimposed  upon  it; 

"The  explanation  of  all  the  modes  of  physical  combi- 
nations and  histories,  and  all  their  associated  develop- 
ments." 

6.  THE  SYMBOLIC  METHOD. — It  is 

"The  peculiarity  of  Mr.  Spencer's  system  that  his  unifir 
cation  of  knowedge  is  effected  by  means  of  the  dis- 
cernment of  the  relation  of  unknowable  entities;  which 
entities  cannot  be  represented  in  thought,  and  have  to 
be  symbolized  by  certain  signs." 

Mr.  Guthrie  thinks  knowledge  cannot  be  uni- 
fied in  this  way. 

The  pith  and  point  of  an  extensive  criticism 
of  Mr.  Guthrie  on  Spencer's  Biology  is,  that  he 
has  ignored  feeling  as  a  factor  in  the  explanation 
of  the  processes  of  life. 

The  final  estimate  of  Mr.  Spencer's  work  is 
given  by  Mr.  Guthrie  as  follows: 


65 

"With  regard  to  Mr.  Spencer's  system  of  philosophy, 
taken  as  a  whole,  we  come  to  the  conclusion  that,  ad- 
mirable as  is  the  boldness,  magnificent  as  is  the  sweep, 
extraordinary  as  is  the  connectiveness  of  his  reason- 
ings, he  nevertheless  fails  in  his  vast  attempt.  At  the 
same  time  we  must  admire  the  grandeur  of  the  outline 
he  has  sketched,  acknowledge  the  greater  breadth  of 
view  he  has  given  to  human  speculation,  and  appre- 
ciate the  abounding  wealth  of  suggestion  displayed 
throughout  the  work,  which  not  only  enriches  human 
knowledge,  but  is  sure  to  give  rise  to  further  earnest, 
bold  and  penetrating  research  into  the  mysteries  of 
Nature. 

"At  the  same  time  we  feel  that,  although  deduction 
may  give  unity  and  consolidation  to  science,  it  must 
be  mainly  to  experience  and  induction  that  we  are  to 
look  for  the  solid  increment  of  knowledge;  and  if  ever 
we  arrive  at  a  final  unification,  which  is  doubtful,  it 
must  be  by  the  patient  labor  of  the  human  race 
through  ages  yet  unborn." 


CHAPTER  X. 

SPENCER  AND  JOHN  STUART  MILL. 

Mr.  Mill,  who  always  appreciated  genius,  had 
great  admiration  for  Spencer.  This  feeling  was 
fully  reciprocated  by  Mr.  Spencer,  who,  in  a 
note  to  the  second  volume  of  his  Psychology, 
speaks  of  Mill  as  one  whose  agreement  he  should 
value  more  than  that  of  any  other  thinker.  And 
yet  these  great  thinkers,  thus  highly  regarding 
each  other,  and  both  having  the  benefit  of  the 
best  thought  of  ancient  and  modern  times,  could 
not,  as  metaphysicians,  think  alike. 

Without  stopping  to  consider  whether  or  not 
this  has  a  tendency  to  place  metaphysics  under 
suspicion,  let  us  briefly  glance,  at  some  of  the 
points  wherein  these  philosophers  differ. 

Spencer,  taking  an  abstruse  and  metaphysical 
view  of  space  and  time,  considers  them  wholly  in- 
comprehensible. Mill,  on  the  other  hand,  saw 
no  difficulty  in  comprehending  a  definite  portion 
of  space,  or  even  in  forming  by  comparison  a 
tolerably  correct  notion  of  infinite  space;  though 
infinity  in  itself  is,  of  course,  incomprehensible. 

And  so  of  time. 

(66) 


G7 

Mill  and  Spencer  differed,  also,  in  some  of  the 
fundamentals  of  logic. 

According  to  Spencer,  the  essential  test  of  the 
validity  of  every  proposition — that  which  deter- 
mines it  as  having  the  highest  possible  certainty 
—is,  that  its  negation  is  inconceivable.  This  Mr. 
Mill  denied.  The  views  of  Mr.  Spencer  were 
put  forth  in  an  article  published  in  the  West- 
minster Review  for  October,  1853.  This  was,  in 
part,  a  criticism  on  the  controversy  between  Mr. 
Mill  and  Dr.  Whewell,  respecting  the  nature  of 
necessary  truths.  Mr.  Mill  answered  in  the  next 
edition  of  his  "Logic";  a  reply  from  Spencer 
was  afterward  published  in  the  Fortnightly  Re- 
view; and  a  rejoinder  from  Mill  in  the  later  edi- 
tions of  his  Logic.  The  final  argument  of  Spen- 
cer is  given  in  the  eleventh  chapter  of  Part  VII 
of  his  Psychology. 

The  arguments  on  both  sides,  as  they  appear 
in  the  respective  writings,  may  be  summarized 
thus: 

SPENCER. — To  ascertain  whether,  along  with  a  cer- 
tain subject,  a  certain  predicate  invariably  exists,  we 
have  no  other  way  than  to  seek  for  a  case  in  which 
the  subject  exists  without  it.  We  conduct  the  search 
by  trying  to  replace  this  invariably  existing  predicate 
by  some  other,  or  by  trying  to  suppress  it  altogether 
without  replacing  it.  The  failure  to  conceive  the  ne- 
gation is  the  discovery  that  along  with  the  subject 
there  invariably  exists  the  predicate.  Hence  the  in- 
conceivableness  of  its  negation  is  that  which  shows  a 
cognition  to  possess  the  highest  rank— is  the  criterion 
by  which  its  unsurpassable  validity  is  known. 


68 

MILL.— This  cannot  be  a  correct  test,  because  propo- 
sitions once  accepted  as  true  because  they  withstood 
this  test,  have  since  been  proved  false.  There  was  a 
time  when  men  of  the  most  cultivated  intellects,  and 
the  most  emancipated  from  the  dominion  of  early  pre- 
judice, could  not  credit  the  existence  of  antipodes; 
were  unable  to  conceive,  in  opposition  to  old  associa- 
tion, the  force  of  gravity  acting  upwards  instead  of 
downwards.  Newton  held  an  etherial  medium  to  be 
a  necessary  implication  of  observed  facts;  but  it  is  not 
now  held  to  be  a  necessary  implication. 

SPENCER. — The  propositions  erroneously  accepted 
because  they  seemed  to  withstand  the  test,  were  com- 
plex propositions  to  which  the  test  was  inapplicable. 
No  errors  arising  from  its  illegitimate  application  can 
be  held  to  tell  against  its  legitimate  application. 

MILL. — How  are  we  to  decide  what  is  a  legitimate 
application  of  the  test  ? 

SPENCER. — By  restricting  its  application  to  proposi- 
tions which  are  not  further  decomposable.  In  respect 
of  those  questions  legitimately  brought  to  judgment 
by  this  test,  there  is  no  dispute  about  the  answer. 
From  the  earliest  times  on  record  down  to  our  own, 
men  have  not  changed  their  beliefs  concerning  the 
truths  of  number.  The  axiom  that  if  equals  be  added 
to  unequals  the  sums  are  unequal,  was  held  by  the 
Greeks,  no  less  than  by  ourselves,  as  a  direct  verdict 
of  consciousness  from  which  there  is  no  appeal.  Each 
step  in  each  demonstration  of  Euclid  we  accept  as  they 
accepted  it,  because  we  immediately  see  that  the  al- 
leged relation  is  as  alleged;  and  that  it  is  impossible 
to  conceive  it  otherwise. 

MILL. — But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  these  axi- 
omatic truths  of  which  you  speak  are  inductions  from 
experience.  When  we  have  often  seen  and  thought  of 
two  things  together,  and  have  never  in  any  one  in- 
stance seen  or  thought  of  them  separately,  there  is  by 


(59 

the  primary  law  of  association  an  increasing  difficulty, 
which  may  in  the  end  become  insuperable,  of  conceiv- 
ing the  two  things  apart.  These  inseparable  associa- 
tions, which  constitute  necessities  of  thought,  and  are 
regarded  as  axioms,  are  the  result  of  experience. 

SPENCKR.— This  view  of  the  matter  I  accept  in  part 
— but  I  regard  these  data  of  Intelligence  as  a  priori 
for  the  individual,  but  a  posteriori  for  that  entire  se- 
ries of  individuals  of  which  he  forms  the  last  term. 
The  best  warrant  men  can  have  for  a  belief  is  the  per- 
fect agreement  of  all  preceding  experience  in  support 
of  it;  and  as,  at  any  given  time,  a  cognition  of  which 
the  negation  remains  inconceivable  is,  by  the  hypoth- 
esis, one  that  has  been  verified  by  all  experiences  up 
to  that  time;  it  follows,  that  at  any  time  the  incon- 
ceivableness  of  its  negation  is  the  strongest  justifica- 
tion a  cognition  can  have. 

MILL. — Even  if  it  were  true  that  inconceivableness 
represents  the  "net  result"  of  all  past  experience,  why 
should  we  stop  at  the  representative  when  we  can  get 
at  the  thing  represented?  If  our  incapacity  to  con- 
ceive the  negation  of  a  given  supposition  is  proof  of  its 
truth,  because  proving  that  our  experience  has  hitherto 
been  uniform  in  its  favor,  the  real  evidence  for  the 
supposition  is  not  the  inconceivableness,  but  the  uni- 
formity of  experience.  Now  this,  which  is  the  sub- 
stantial and  only  proof,  is  directly  accessible.  We  are 
not  obliged  to  presume  it  from  an  incidental  conse- 
quence. Jf  all  past  experience  is  in  favor  of  a  belief, 
let  this  be  stated,  and  the  belief  be  openly  rested  on 
that  ground;  after  which  the  question  arises,  what  that 
fact  may  be  worth  as  evidence  of  its  truth. 

SPENCER.— For  the  great  mass  of  our  cognitions  we 
cannot  employ  such  a  method  of  verification,  for  sev- 
eral reasons:  First,  the  implied  enumeration  of  experi- 
ences, if  possible,  would  postpone  indefinitely  the  es- 
tablishment of  any  conclusion  as  valid;  second,  no  such 
enumeration  of  experiences  is  possible;  and  third,  if 


70 

possible  the  warrant  gained  for  the  conclusion,  could 
never  be  as  great  as  that  of  the  test  objected  to.  In  each 
successive  step  of  an  argument  the  dependence  of  the 
conclusion  upon  its  premises  is  a  truth  of  which  we 
have  no  other  proof  than  that  the  reverse  is  inconceiv- 
able. And  if  this  be  an  insufficient  warrant  for  as- 
serting the  necessity  of  the  axiomatic  premises,  it  is  an 
insufficient  warrant  for  asserting  the  necessity  of  any 
link  in  the  argument.  Logical  necessity  and  mathe- 
matical necessity  must  stand  or  fall  together. 


Whatever  may  be  thought  of  this  discussion, 
it  has  at  least  the  merit  of  presenting  an  issue 
which  is  well  defined  and  fully  understood,  and 
understood  alike  by  the  contending  parties. 
This  is  more  than  can  be  said  of  some  of  the 
other  discussions  between  the  same  parties — dis- 
cussions on  logical  distinctions  which  turn  to 
some  extent  upon  the  meaning  of  the  terms 
used. 

Mr.  Mill  was  a  more  logical  writer  than  Spen- 
cer, because  lie  looked  closely  to  the  mean- 
ing of  terms,  and  to  the  sense  in  which  they  are 
used;  something  which  logic  imperatively  re- 
quires, but  which  Mr.  Spencer,  as  will  be  seen 
hereafter,  does  not  always  do.  Mr.  Mill  was  an 
acute  metaphysician;  so  is  Mr.  Spencer;  and  in 
both,  as  we  follow  the  metaphysical  train  of 
thought,  we  see  more  than  a  mere  tendency  to 
idealism.  This  is  owing  to  the  attempt  to  sub- 
ject processes  of  thought  to  the  same  rigid  analy- 
sis that  is  applied  to  the  phenomena  of  the  phys- 
ical world.  Auguste  Comte  prudently  declines 
the  attempt.  Mill,  in  his  analysis  of  mind  and 


71 

matter,  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  matter  is 
nothing  but  the  permanent  possibility  of  sensa- 
tions; and  refuses  to  recognize  the  existence  of 
matter,  except  under  this  definition.  The  con- 
clusion of  Mr.  Spencer  is  not  far  different.  His 
idealism  is,  however,  more  decided,  since  he  dis- 
tinctly asserts  that  the  relations  of  co-existence, 
of  sequence,  and  of  difference,  as  we  know  them, 
do  not  obtain  beyond  consciousness. 

While  the  mind  is  directed  to  the  objective 
— to  the  investigation  of  the  phenomena  in  the 
world  about  us — great  thinkers  substantially 
agree;  but  when  it  is  directed  to  the  subjective 
—to  the  world  within — the  ego — they  disagree 
with  each  other  in  nearly  every  thing  except  in 
their  doubts  whether  there  is  any  other  world 
than  that  which  they  are  investigating. 


CHAPTER    XI. 

SPENCER   AND   FREDERIC   HARRISON. 

In  the  Popular  Science  Monthly  for  January, 
1884,  appeared  an  article,  republished  from  the 
Nineteenth  Century,  written  by  Herbert  Spen- 
cer, entitled  "Religion,  a  Retrospect  and  Pros- 
pect." 

Tracing  the  origin  of  religion  to  the  belief  in 
ghosts,  Mr.  Spencer  distinctly  recognizes  the 
fact,  that  in  the  primitive  human  mind  there  ex- 
ists neither  religious  idea  nor  religious  senti- 
ment. 

Inquiring  what  may  be  inferred  as  to  the  evo- 
lution of  religion  in  the  future,  he  concludes 
that  the  religious  idea  will  not  disappear,  but 
that  it  will  continue  to  undergo  changes. 

Commenting  on  the  changes  which  religious 
thought  is  undergoing  and  must  still  undergo, 
he  says: 

"The  cruelty  of  a  Fijian  god,  who,  represented  as  de- 
vouring the  souls  of  the  dead,  may  be  supposed  to  in- 
flict torture  during  the  process,  is  small  compared  with 
the  cruelty  of  a  god  who  condemns  men  to  tortures 
(72) 


73 

which  are  eternal Clearly,  this  change  can- 
not cease  until  the  beliefs  in  hell  and  damnation  disap- 
pear. Disappearance  of  them  will  be  aided  by  an  in- 
creasing repugnance  to  injustice.  The  visiting  on  Ad- 
am's descendants  through  hundreds  of  generations 
dreadful  penalties  for  a  small  transgression  which 
they  did  not  commit;  the  damning  of  all  men  who  do 
not  avail  themselves  of  an  alleged  mode  of  obtaining 
forgiveness,  which  most  men  have  never  heard  of,  and 
the  effecting  a  reconciliation  by  sacrificing  a  son  who 
was  perfectly  innocent,  to  satisfy  the  assumed  necessi- 
ty for  a  propitiatory  victim,  are  modes  of  action  which, 
ascribed  to  a  human  ruler,  would  call  forth  expressions 
of  abhorrence;  and  the  ascription  of  them  to  the  Ulti- 
mate Cause  of  things,  even  now  felt  to  be  full  of  diffi- 
culties, must  become  impossible.  So,  too,  must  die  out 
the  belief  that  a  Power  present  in  innumerable  worlds 
through  infinite  space,  and  who,  during  millions  of 
years  of  the  earth's  earlier  existence,  needed  no  hon- 
oring by  its  inhabitants,  should  be  seized  with  a  craving 
for  praise;  and  having  created  mankind,  should  be  an- 
gry with  them  if  they  do  not  perpetually  tell  him  how 
great  he  is." 

Mr.  Spencer's  conclusion  is,  that  the  concep- 
tion of  the  Deity  will  continue  to  enlarge  until 
it  finally  becomes  merged  in  the  consciousness 
of  an  Unknowable  First  Cause. 

The  article  closes  thus: 

"Amid  the  mysteries  which  become  more  mysterious 
the  more  they  are  thought  about,  there  will  remain  the 
one  absolute  certainty,  that  he  is  ever  in  presence  of 
an  Infinite  and  Eternal  Energy  from  which  all  things 
proceed." 

HARRISON. — Upon  this  article  Frederic  Harri- 
son wrote  a  criticism  entitled  "The  Ghost  of  Re- 
ligion," which  was  published  in  the  Nineteenth 


74 

Century,  and  republished  in  the  Popular  Sci. 
ence  Monthly.     He  begins  thus: 

"  In  the  January  number  of  this  review  is  to  be 
found  an  article  on  'Religion,'  which  has  justly  awak- 
ened a  profound  and  sustained  interest.  The  creed  of 
Agnosticism  was  there  formulated  anew  by  the  ac- 
knowledged head  of  the  evolution  philosophy,  with  a 
definiteness  such  as  perhaps  it  never  wore  before.  To 
my  mind  there  is  nothing  in  the  whole  range  of 
modern  religious  discussion  more  cogent  and  more 
suggestive  than  the  array  of  conclusions  the  final  out- 
come of  which  is  marshaled  in  these  twelve  pages.  It 
is  the  last  word  of  the  Agnostic  philosophy  in  its  long 
controversy  with  theology.  That  word  is  decisive; 
and  it  is  hard  to  conceive  how  theology  can  rally  for 
another  bout  from  such  a  sorites  of  dilemma  as  is 
there  presented." 

He  disclaims  any  attempt  to  criticise  further 
than  to  add  a  word  concerning  the  "Religion"  of 
the  Unknowable.  "To  me,"  he  says,  "it  is  rath- 
er the  Ghost  of  Religion." 

He  thinks  the  phrase  "Infinite  and  Eternal 
Energy  from  which  all  things  proceed"  savors 
too  much  of  theology.  In  the  Athanasian  Creed 
the  Third  Person  "proceeds"  from  the  First  and 
Second. 

Mr.  Harrison  differs  from  MrL_S]3eji£er,  some- 
what, as  toTnVorigin  o"TTeIIgioii.  He  thinks 
that  fetichism,  7^rl^rt.inT^^nfsnTpt  prpp.pHpd  the 
belie?  in  gfiostsT 

His^stroTig^st  attack,  however,  is  on  the  Doc- 
trine of  the  Unknowable: 

"Let  us  take  each  one  of  these  three  elements  of  re- 
ligion— belief,  worship,  conduct,  and  try  them  all  in 
turn,  as  applicable  to  the  Unknowable.  How  mere  a 


75 

phrase  must  any  religion  be  of  which  neither  belief, 
nor  worship,  nor  conduct  can  be  spoken!  .  .  .  Im- 
agine a  religion  which  excludes  the  idea  of  worship  be- 
cause its  sole  dogma  is  the  infinity  of  nothingness. 

"Although  the  Unknowable  is  logically  said  to  be 
Something,  yet  the  something  of  which  we  neither 
know  nor  conceive  anything  is  practically  nothing.  .  .  . 
It  would  hardly  be  sane  to  make  a  religion  out  of  the 
Equator  or  the  Binomial  Theorem.  But  to  make  a  re- 
ligion out  of  the  Unknowable  is  far  more  extravagant 
than  to  make  it  out  of  the  Equator.  We  know  some- 
thing about  the  Equator." 

Mr.  Harrison  advocates  the  Religion  of  Hu- 
manity. 

"Humanity  is  the  grandest  object  of  reverence  with- 
in the  region  of  the  real  and  the  known;  Humanity, 
with  the  world  on  which  it  rests,  as  its  base  and  envi- 
ronment." 

SPENCER. — To  this  Mr.  Spencer  replies,  in  an 
an  article  entitled  "Retrogressive  Religion." 

"  In  days  when  dueling  was  common,"  says  Mr.  Spen- 
cer, "  and  its  code  of  ceremonial  well  elaborated,  a 
deadly  encounter  was  preceded  by  a  polite  salute. 
Having  by  his  obeisance  professed  to  be  his  antago- 
nist's very  humble  servant,  each  forthwith  did  his  best 
to  run  him  through  the  body.  This  usage  is  recalled 
to  me  by  the  contrast  between  the  compliments  with 
which  Mr.  Harrison  begins  his  article,  'The  Ghost  of 
Religion,'  and  the  efforts  he  afterwards  makes  to  de- 
stroy, in  the  brilliant  style  habitual  with  him,  all  but 
the  negative  part  of  that  which  he  applauds.  After 
speaking  with  too  flattering  eulogy  of  the  mode  in 
which  I  have  dealt  with  current  theological  doctrines, 
he  does  his  best,  amid  flashes  of  wit  coming  from  its 
polished  surface,  to  pass  the  sword  of  his  logic  through 
the  ribs  of  my  argument,  and  let  out  its  vital  principle." 


76 

Mr.  Spencer  defends  his  doctrine  of  the  Un- 
knowable, and  accuses  Mr,  Harrison  of  not  be- 
ing entirely  fair  in  his  representation  of  the 
doctrine. 

He  also  defends  the  ghost- theory  as  to  the  or- 
igin of  religion.  Then,  treating  Harrison  as  an 
avowed  advocate  of  Positivism,  he  makes  an  at- 
tack on  the  system  of  Comte,  ridiculing  Comte's 
ritual  in  the  worship  of  Humanity. 

HARRISON. — The  next  article  of  Mr.  Harrison 
is  entitled  "Agnostic  Metaphysics." 

He  states  the  positions  of  Mr.  Spencer  in  re- 
gard to  Religion,  positions  which  he,  Harrison, 
regards  as  constituting  a  "gigantic  paradox." 
These  are: 

That  the  proper  object  of  Religion  is  a  Some- 
thing which  never  can  be  known  or  conceived, 
or  understood;  to  which  we  cannot  apply  the 
terms  emotion,  will,  intelligence;  of  which  we 
cannot  affirm  or  deny  personality — an  Inscruta- 
ble Existence  or  Unknowable  Cause,  the  Ulti- 
mate Cause,  the  All-Being,  the  Creative  Power. 
That  the  essential  business  of  Religion  is  to  keep 
alive  the  consciousness  of  a  mystery  that  cannot 
be  fathomed;  and  that  we  are  not  concerned  to 
know  what  effect  this  Religion  will  have  as  a 
moral  agent. 

"Mr.  Spencer  says  to  the  theologians:  'I  cannot  al- 
low you  to  speak  of  a  First  Cause,  or  a  Creator,  or  an 
All  Being,  or  an  Absolute  Existence,  because  you 
mean  something  intelligible  and  conceivable  by  these 
terms;  and  I  tell  you  that  they  stand  for  ideas  that  are 


77 

unthinkable  and  inconceivable.  But,'  he  adds,  'I  havo 
a  perfect  right  to  talk  of  an  Ultimate  Cause,  and  a 
Creative  Power,  and  an  Absolute  Existence,  and  an 
All  Being,  because  I  mean  nothing  by  these  terms— at 
least  nothing  that  can  be  either  thought  of  or  con- 
ceived of;  and  I  know  that  I  am  not  talking  of  any 
thing  intelligible  or  conceivable.'  " 

Quoting  what  Mr.  Spencer  writes  in  regard  to 
"a  consciousness  of  a  Mystery  that  cannot  be 
fathomed,"  Mr.  Harrison  says: 

"It  would  be  idle  to  find  for  Religion  a  lower  and 
more  idle  part  to  play  in  human  life,  than  that  of  con- 
tinually presenting  to  man  a  conundrum  which  he  is 
told  he  must  continually  give  up." 

After  again  combating  the  ghost-theory  as  to 
the  origin  of  all  religion,  Mr.  Harrison  closes 
his  article  with  an  elaborate  vindication  of  Au- 
guste  Comte. 

SPENCER. — In  his  reply,  entitled  "Last  Words 
About  Agnosticism  and  the  Religion  of  Hu- 
manity," Mr.  Spencer  says: 

"Those  who  expected  from  Mr.  Harrison  an  interest- 
ing rejoinder  to  my  reply,  will  not  be  disappointed. 
Those  who  looked  for  points  skillfully  made  which  ei- 
ther are  or  seem  to  be  telling,  will  be  fully  satisfied. 
Those  who  sought  pleasure  from  witnessing  the  dis- 
play of  literary  power,  will  close  his  article  gratified 
with  the  hour  they  have  spent  over  it." 

Mr.  Spencer  still  further  maintains  his  theory 
with  regard  to  the  ghost  origin  of  religion.  He 
complains  of  having  been  misrepresented  by  Mr. 
Harrison,  closing  thus: 

"I  end  by  pointing  out,  as  I  pointed  out  before,  that 
while  the  things  I  have  said  have  not  been  disproved, 


78 

the  things  which  have  been  disproved  are  things  I  have 
not  said." 

HARRISON,  SUPPLEMENTARY.  —  Mr.  Harrison 
announces  that  lie  does  not  intend  to  continue 
the  discussion  and  accepts  Mr.  Spencer's  third 
paper  as  closing  the  debate.  Nevertheless,  in  a 
short  article,  he  takes  the  last  word. 

He  had  charged  Mr.  Spencer  with  knowing 
nothing  about  the  philosophy  of  AugusteComte; 
a  charge  which  Mr.  Spencer  had  repelled.  In 
support  of  this  charge,  Mr.  Harrison  now  states 
that  Comte's  writings  consist  of  eight  principal 
works,  from  1830  to  1856.  That  in  1864,  many 
years  after  Comte's  death,  and  twelve  years  after 
Comte  had  finally  settled  his  classification  of  the 
sciences,  Mr.  Spencer  wrote  a  work  on  "The 
Classification  of  the  Sciences;  and  Reasons  for 
Dissenting  from  the  Philosophy  of  M.  Comte," 
throughout  which  work  Mr.  Spencer  speaks  of 
Comte  as  making  six  sciences. 

"Now,  in  all  Comte's  works  except  the  first,  he 
makes  seven  sciences.  The  seven  sciences  are  the  A 
B  C  of  Positivism.  In  Newton  Hall,  or  any  other  Pos- 
itivist  school,  tables  of  the  seven  sciences  may  be  seen, 
and  they  occur  in  tens  of  thousands  of  Positivist  pub- 
lications, English  and  French.  Yet  for  twenty  years 
Mr.  Spencer  has  gone  on  reprinting  his  'Reasons  for 
dissenting  from  the  Philosophy  of  M.  Comte,'  without 
an  inkling  of  the  fact  that  for  thirty-two  years  Comte's 
works  speak  of  seven,  not  six,  sciences  as  the  founda- 
tion of  his  Philosophy.  Mr.  Spencer  reprints  the  work 
last  October,  still  with  the  same  blunder.  It  is  as  if  a 
writer  on  the  British  constitution  persisted  in  talking 
about  the  four  estates  of  the  realm,  or  as  if  a  man 


79 

should  dissent  from  the  Church  of  England  on  the 
ground  of  her  having  forty  nine  Articles  of  Religion." 

This  discussion  attracted  much  attention,  both 
in  England  and  in  this  country.  Prof.  Youmans 
spoke  of  the  brilliant  manner  in  which  it  had 
been  conducted  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Harrison, 
and  gave  this  as  a  reason  why  it  ought  to  be 
published  by  Mr.  Spencer's  friends  in  this  coun- 
try previous  to  an  anticipated  publication  by  the 
Positivists.  It  was  feared  that  such  a  publica- 
tion on  their  part  would  give  an  impetus  to  the 
Positive  cause. 

Had  Mr.  Harrison  confined  himself  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  Unknowable,  and  to  the  attempt 
to  make  it  the  basis  of  a  religion,  his  superiority 
in  the  argument  would  have  been  unquestiona- 
ble. By  espousing  the  Religion  of  Humanity, 
he  gave  Mr.  Spencer  an  opportunity,  which  he 
did  not  fail  to  improve,  to  attack  and  ridicule  the 
worship  of  Humanity  as  it  had  been  advocated 
and  prescribed  by  Comte.  It  enabled  Mr.  Spen- 
cer to  make  use  of  the  "argumentum  ad  homi- 
nem,"  and  thus  to  divert  attention  from  the  se- 
vere attack  which  had  been  made  upon  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Unknowable,  as  a  theological  dog- 
ma. 

NOTE.— Comte's  seventh  science  was  "Morals," 
which  he  had  carved  put  of  "Sociology."  It  was  care- 
less in  Spencer  to  omit  it.  The  omission  did  not,  how- 
ever, materially  affect  his  criticism,  which  was  found- 
ed on  Comte's  arrangement  of  the  sciences,  commenc- 
ing with  Mathematics,  and  ending  with  Sociology. 


CHAPTER    XII. 

CRITICISMS   AND  EULOGIUMS — WATSON — BOWNE— 
ROBEETSON. 

"GOSPELS  OF  YESTERDAY  — DRUMMOND;  SPENCER; 
ARNOLD.  BY  ROBERT  A.  WATSON,  M.  A.,  London, 

1888." 

The  criticism  of  Mr.  Watson,  as  far  as  Mr. 
Spencer  is  concerned,  is  directed  entirely  against 
the  "Data  of  Ethics." 

It  is  contended  that  the  Data  of  Ethics  fails 
to  present  a  system  of  morals  adapted  to  man- 
kind, especially  in  its  present  condition;  that 
the  intense  struggle  for  existence  renders  it  im- 
possible to  adopt  a  cool,  calculating  scheme  of 
mixed  egoism  and  altruism  such  as  that  offered 
by  Mr.  Spencer. 

"TiiE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HERBERT  SPENCER.  BEING 
AN  EXAMINATION  OF  THE  FIRST  PRINCIPLES  OF 
HIS  SYSTEM.  BY  B.  P.  BOWNE,  A.  B.,  New  York, 
1874." 

This  book  is  based  upon  several  essays  which 
appeared  in  the  "New  Englander."  These  are 

the  titles  discussed: 

(80) 


81 

What  is  Evolution? 

Laws  of  the  Unknowable; 

Laws  of  the  Knowable; 

Principles  of  Psychology; 

The  Theistic  Argument. 

The  subjects  are  handled  with  a  good  deal  of 
ability.  But  the  work  is  in  style  highly  contro- 
versial, and  is  marred  by  constant  invective  and 
numerous  attempts  at  satire. 

In  summing  up  the  doctrine  of  the  Unknowa- 
ble, the  following  points  are  taken : 

"Spencer  says,  religion  is  impossible,  because  it  in- 
volves unthinkable  ideas. 

"  Science  is  possible,  though  it  involves  the  same  un- 
thinkable ideas. 

"God  must  be  conceived  as  self-existent,  and  is, 
therefore,  an  untenable  hypothesis." 

"  The  fundamental  Reality  must  be  conceived  as 
self -existent,  and  is  not  an  untenable  hypothesis." 

"  To  deny  a  thing  to  thought,"  says  Mr. 
Bowne,  "and  save  it  to  existence,  is  impossible;" 
but  this  had  been  said  before  by  James  Marti- 
neau. 

This  saying  of  Martineau  is  full  of  meaning, 
and  goes  to  the  foundation  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  Unknowable.  If  we  cannot  think  of  any 
thing  as  existing,  then,  surely,  we  have  no  right 
to  assert  its  existence.  The  "Absolute,"  the 
"  First  Cause"  of  the  New  Philosophy  is  pro- 
nounced not  only  unknowable,  but  also  unthink- 
able. 

Cousin  held  that  we  have  an  immediate,  intui- 
tive knowledge  of  God. 


83 

This  v/as  antagonized  by  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton, who  admitted  only  the  finite  element  in 
consciousness.  In  this,  John  Stuart  Mill  agreed 
with  Hamilton.  But  Mill,  while  he  held  with 
Hamilton  that  the  abstract  idea  of  the  Absolute 
and  of  the  Infinite  is  only  the  negation  of  the 
relative  and  of  the  finite,  yet  maintained  that 
"something"  infinite  can  be  conceived;  as  infi- 
nite space  and  infinite  time. 

Mill  did  not,  like  Spencer,  claim  to  arrive  at 
the  existence  of  Infinite  Being  by  the  scientific 
method. 

Hamilton  accepted  the  existence  of  God  as  at- 
tested by  a  faculty  of  the  human  mind  called  be- 
lief, which  he  placed  above  reason.  Spencer 
antagonized  this  theory.  He,  however,  by  an- 
other method,  arrives  at  a  First  Cause,  but  does 
not  call  it  God. 

Such  is  the  result  of  metaphysical  specula- 
tion. 

Now,  if  there  is  any  such  thing  as  a  science 
of  metaphysics,  how  is  it  that  no  two  of  four  of 
the  greatest  thinkers  of  modern  times  can  agree 
upon  its  first  principles? 

Cousin,  Hamilton,  Mill  and  Spencer  all  agree 
upon  the  multiplication  table,  from  beginning  to 
end.  They  agree  upon  all  the  demonstrations 
of  Euclid.  They  agree  upon  the  distance  of  the 
sun  and  moon  from  the  earth,  upon  the  consti- 
tution and  arrangement  of  the  solar  system,  and 
upon  the  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies. 
They  agree  upon  the  elements  in  chemistry,  and 


83 

upon  the  laws  that  govern  animal  life.  They 
agree  upon  the  first  principles  of  all  the  sciences. 
But  in  metaphysics  they  disagree  upon  every 
thing  which  is  most  material. 

When  Descartes  said  "Cogito,  ergo  sum,"  ("I 
think,  therefore  I  am,")  that  was  science;  but 
metaphysics,  as  a  science,  has  never  been  able 
to  get  any  further.  We  can  assert  that  we  ex- 
ist, because  we  think.  But  the  moment  we  ask 
how  we  think,  and  what  it  is  possible  to  think 
of,  we  are  lost  in  the  mazes  of  metaphysical  spec- 
ulations. 

So  long  as  the  most  eminent  thinkers  of  the 
age  cannot  agree  upon  the  first  principles  to  be 
applied  to  the  thinking  process — so  long  as  they 
cannot  agree  upon  the  fundamental  laws  of 
thought — are  we  not  justified  in  saying  that 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  science  of  metaphys- 
ics? 

"For  two  thousand  years,"  says  Comte,  "during 
which  which  the  metaphysicians  have  thus  cultivated 
psychology,  they  have  not  been  able  to  arrive  at  a  sin- 
gle proposition  intelligible  and  firmly  fixed.  They  are, 
even  to-day,  divided  into  a  multitude  of  schools  which 
dispute  without  ceasing  concerning  the  first  elements 
of  their  doctrines."  (Depuis  deux  mille  ans  que  les 
metaphysiciens  cultivent  ainsi  la  psychologic,  ils  n'ont 
pu  encore  convenir  d'une  seule  proposition  intelligible 
et  solidement  arretee.  Ils  sont,  meme  aujourd'hui, 
partages  en  line  multitude  d'ecoles  qui  disputent  sans 
cesse  sur  les  premiers  elements  de  leurs  doctrines.) — 
[Cours  de  la  Philosophie  Positive,  3me  Edition,  Paris, 
1869,  Vol.  I,  p  32. 

"What,"  asks  Voltaire,  "have  all  the  philosophers, 


84 

ancient  and  modern,  taught  us?  A  child  is  wiser 
than  they.  It  does  not  think  about  that  which  it  can- 
not comprehend." — (Un  enfant  est  plus  sage  qu'eux;  il 
ne  pense  pas  a  ce  qu'il  ne  peut  concevoir.) — [Diction- 
naire  Philosophique,  Article  " Ame." 

Voltaire  thinks  that  the  great  difficulty  lies  in 
comprehending  how  a  being,  whatever  it  may  be, 
has  thoughts;  (de  comprendre  comment  un  etre, 
quel  qu'il  soit,  a  des  pensees.) 

In  another  place,  writing  in  that  inimitable 
vein  of  irony  for  which  he  was  so  distinguished, 
he  suggests  that  in  every  thing  relating  to  met- 
aphysics, we  should  commence  by  a  sincere  sub- 
mission to  the  indubitable  dogmas  of  the  Church. 

(Tous  les  articles  qui  tiennent  a  la  metaphysique 
doivent  commencer  par  une  soumission  sincere  aux 
dogmes  indubitables  de  1'Eglise.) 


"MODERN  HUMANISTS.  BY  JOHN  M.  ROBERTSON, 
AUTHOR  OF  '  ESSAYS  TOWARDS  A  CRITICAL  METH- 
OD;' 'CHRIST  AND  KRISHNA,'  &c.  London,  1891." 

"Mr.  Spencer  undertakes  to  establish  a  final  recon- 
ciliation between  Religion  and  Science.  .  .  .  The 
so-called  reconciliation  borders  very  closely  on  the  gro- 
tesque. Religion  and  Science  are  to  be  finally  recon- 
ciled when  Religion  has  abandoned  every  dogma  and 
every  positive  belief,  and  takes  the  shape  of  a  final 
negative  proposition  that  Science  never  rejected,  and 
has  long  affirmed.  .  .  .  What  good  has  Religion, as 
such,  ever  done  to  Science?  Forced  it  to  admit  the 
final  mystery  of  things?  Why,  Science  never  denied 
that  at  any  stage,  and  has  been  affirming  it  for  centu- 
ries  

"  The  one  thing  left  to  religion  is,  identification  of 
itself  with  the  final  negative  proposition  of  Science. 


85 

That  is  to  say,  the  reconciliation  of  Religion  and  Sci- 
ence consists  in  Religion,  as  such,  disappearing.  The 
'permanent  peace'  is  attained  when  one  combatant  has 
eaten  the  other  up,  leaving  not  even  the  tail.  ...  I 
object  to  adopting  consciously  the  grim  irony  of  the 
Spencerian  formula  to  the  effect  that  Religion,  thus 
reduced  to  the  mummy  state,  has  been  blissfully  'rec 
onciled'  with  its  surviving  rival.  The  phrase  recalls 
the  rhyme  about  the 

'  Young  lady  of  Riga, 
Who  went  for  a  ride  on  a  tiger: 

They  returned  from  that  ride 

With  the  lady  inside, 
And  a  smile  on  the  face  of  the  tiger.' 

"You  would  hardly  say  in  her  epitaph — if  you  set  up 
a  symbolic  gravestone — that  the  lady  and  the  tiger 
were  reconciled." 

Mr.  Robertson  severely  criticizes  Mr.  Spencer 
for  his  political  conservatism,  and  his  refusal  to 
advocate  any  of  the  reforms  of  the  day.  He  then 
closes  with  the  following  eulogy: 

"And  yet  again,  when  all  is  said,  how  shall  we 
measure  our  debt  to  the  man  whose  wide  achievement 
has  laid  the  enduring  foundation  for  this  new  art  [the 
study  of  the  order  of  Nature],  and  whose  deeper  and 
sounder  teaching  has  given  us  the  light  which  his 
mere  temperamental  bias  would  now  shut  out  ?  Who 
has  in  our  day  widened  and  consolidated  our  knowl- 
edge as  he  has  done?  And  what  surer  contribution 
is  there  than  that  to  the  reconstruction  of  our  life? 
So  imperishable  is  the  service  that  our  last  words 
must  needs  be  the  acknowledgment  of  it.  In  the  name 
of  those  who  indorse  all  the  criticism  we  have  passed 
on  what  we  reckon  the  perishable  part  of  the  thinker's 
work,  do  we  finally  turn  and  say: 

"Hail,  spiritual  Father  and  honored  Master,  who  first 
trained  us  to  shape  our  path  through  the  forest  by  the 
eternal  guidance  of  sun  and  stars!  Though  we  now 


86 

must  needs  turn  against  the  barriers  you  have  raised, 
the  gymnastic  you  yourself  have  given,  and  the  wood- 
craft you  yourself  have  taught,  yet  would  we  claim  to 
hold  ourselves  of  your  great  lineage  still;  and  when  we 
in  turn  grow  'wan  with  many  memories,'  it  is  your 
name  and  not  another's  that  we  shall  hand  to  our 
children  as  that  of  the  foremost  founder  of  the  new 
line,  the  greatest  herald  of  the  new  age." 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

CRITICISMS   CONTINUED— HANSEL— CAIRD— HODG- 
SON—MAX    MUELLER— SIDGWICK— JAMES 
MARTINEAU — MOULTON — PROFES- 
SOR  GREEN. 

Most  of  the  criticisms  of  these  writers  ap- 
peared, from  time  to  time,  in  the  British  maga- 
zines, and  were  replied  to  by  Mr.  Spencer  in  his 
Essays. 

DR.  HENRY  L.  MANSEL. — In  his  ''Philosophy 
of  the  Conditioned"  (p.  39),  Dr.  Mansel  says: 

"Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  in  his  work  on  'First  Princi- 
ples,' endeavors  to  press  Sir  W.  Hamilton  into  the  ser- 
vice of  Pantheism  and  Positivism  together,  by  adopt- 
ing the  negative  portion  only  of  his  philosophy— in 
which,  in  common  with  many  other  writers,  he  de- 
clares the  absolute  to  be  inconceivable  by  the  mere  in- 
tellect,—and  rejecting  the  positive  portions,  in  which  he 
most  emphatically  maintains  that  the  belief  in  a'  per- 
sonal God  is  imperatively  demanded  by  the  facts  of 
our  moral  and  emotional  consciousness.  .  .  .  Mr. 
Spencer  takes  these  negative  inferences  as  the  only  ba- 
sis of  religion,  and  abandons  Hamilton's  great  princi- 
ple of  the  distinction  between  knowledge  and  belief." 

Mr.  Spencer  denies  that  he  takes  the  negative 
(87) 


88 

inferences  of  Hamilton  as  the  only  basis  of  relig- 
ion, and  maintains  that  he  has  an  indestructible 
positive  basis  for  the  religious  sentiment. 

REV.  PRINCIPAL  CAIRD. — Dr.  Caird  says: 
"His  thesis  is  that  the  provinces  of  science  and  re- 
ligion are  distinguished  from  each  other  as  the  known 
from  the  unknown  and  unknowable." 

Dr.  Caird  inquires  whether  the  knowledge  of 
a  limit  does  not  imply  already  the  power  to 
transcend  it? 

Mr.  Spencer  admits  that  he  had  himself 
raised  that  objection,  and  repeats  what  he  had 
once  said  in  an  unpublished  note : 

"Instead  of  positively  saying  that  the  Absolute  is 
unknowable,  we  must  say  that  we  cannot  tell  whether 
it  is  unknowable  or  not." 


SHADWORTH  H.  HODGSON. — "The  Future  of 
Metaphysics";  published  in  the  Contemporary 
Review  for  November,  1872. 

Dr.  Hodgson,  who  is  acknowledged  by  Mr. 
Spencer  to  be  "a  thinker  of  subtlety  and  inde- 
pendence," while  he  speaks  in  the  highest  terms 
of  Spencer's  science,  criticizes  somewhat  sharply 
his  metaphysics.  After  commenting  on  the 
Spencerian  doctrine  as  to  the  incomprehensibil- 
ity of  space  and  time,  he  says: 

"It  is  bad  enough  to  be  told  by  theologians  or  by 
popular  philosophers  that  there  are  Noumena  behind 
phenomena;  but  at  least  there  is  work  for  the  Noume- 
natodo;  they  are  reservoirs  of  force  for  interfering 
with  the  laws  of  Nature.  But  to  be  told  that  there  is 
a  Noumenon  behind  phenomena,  and  that  this  Nou- 


89 

menon  is  entirely  unknowable— this  is  a  hyperbole  of 
mysticism,  a  negation  of  negation,  which  it  would  re- 
quire a  greater  than  Hegel  to  comprehend." 

Mr.  Hodgson  holds  that  the  notion  of  an  Un- 
knowable Substrate  or  Cause,  is  an  attenuated 
empirical  notion,  "doing  duty  as  a  metaphysical 
one,  and  occupying  the  field  of  metaphysic." 

"Why,"  he  asks,  "should  Mr.  Spencer,  with  all  his 
wealth  in  science,  and  particularly  in  psychology,  cov- 
et the  Naboth's  vineyard  of  the  metaphysicians  ?" 

After  discussing  at  some  length  the  doctrines 
of  Kant  and  Spencer  in  regard  to  space  and 
time,  etc.,  he  says: 

"Yet  Mr.  Spencer  proceeds  to  use  these  inconceiva- 
ble ideas  as  the  basis  of  his  philosophy.  For  mark,  it 
is  space  and  time  as  we  know  them,  the  actual  and  , 
phenomenal  space  and  time,  to  which  all  these  incon- 
ceivabilities attach.  Mr.  Spencer's  result  ought,  there- 
fore, logically  to  be,  skepticism.  What  is  his  actual  re- 
sult? Ontology.  And  how  so?  Why,  instead  of  re- 
jecting space  and  time  as  the  inconceivable  things  he 
has  tried  to  demonstrate  them  to  be,  he  substitutes  for 
them  an  unknowable — a  something  which  they  really 
are,  though  we  cannot  know  it — and  rejects  that  in- 
stead of  them  from  knowledge." 

Mr.  Spencer  thinks  it  strange  that  Dr.  Hodg- 
son should  not  be  able  to  understand  him  bet- 
ter. He  repeats  what  he  says  he  has  tried  to 
make  clear, 

"That  the  consciousness  of  an  Ultimate  Reality,  though 
not  capable  of  being  made  a  thought,  properly  so 
called,  because  not  capable  of  being  brought  within 
limits,  nevertheless  remains  as  a  consciousness  that  is 
positive ;  is  not  rendered  negative  by  the  negation  of 
limits."  


90 

MAX  MUELLER. — Professor  Mueller  thinks 
Spencer's  views  are  more  nearly  allied  to  those 
of  Kant  than  to  those  of  Locke. 

To  this  Mr.  Spencer  demurs,  and  repeats  the 
reasons  he  had  previously  given  for  dissenting 
from  Kant.  He  does  not  agree  with  Kant,  that 
space  is  the  form  of  all  external  intuition;  nor 
does  he  agree  with  him,  that  the  consciousness 
of  space  continues  when  the  consciousness  of  all 
things  contained  in  it  is  suppressed ;  nor  in  the 
inference  thence  drawn,  that  space  is  an  "a  pri- 
ori" form  of  intuition. 

SIDGWICK. — In  a  review  of  the  "Principles  of 
Psychology,"  Mr.  H.  Sidgwick,  after  quoting 
from  Spencer  his  statement  that 
"A  change  in  the  objective  reality  causes  in  the  sub- 
jective state  a  change  exactly  answering  to  it,  so  an- 
swering as  to  constitute  a  cognition  of  it" 

Bemarks: 

"Here  the  'something  beyond  consciousness'  is  no 
longer  said  to  be  unknown,  as  its  effect  in  conscious- 
ness 'constitutes  a  cognition  of  it.' " 

To  which  Mr.  Spencer  replies: 

"This  apparent  inconsistency,  marked  by  the  italics, 
would  not  have  existed  if,  instead  of  'a  cognition  of 
it,'  I  had  said,  as  I  ought  to  have  said,  'what  we  call  a 
cognition  of  it'-  that  is,  a  relative  cognition  as  distin- 
guished from  an  absolute  cognition." 

Referring  to  the  statement  of  Mr.  Spencer  that 
"our  states  of  consciousness  are  the  only  things 
we  can  know,"  Mr.  Sidgwick  claims  that  Spen- 
cer is  radically  inconsistent,  because,  in  inter- 


91 

preting  the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  he  con- 
tinually postulates,  not  an  unknown  something, 
but  a  something  of  which  he  speaks  in  ordinary 
terms,  as  though  its  ascribed  physical  characters 
really  exist  as  such,  instead  of  being,  as  Spencer 
claims  they  are,  synthetic  states  of  conscious- 
ness. 

REV.  JAMES  MARTINEAU.  —  Essay  entitled 
"Science,  Nescience,  and  Faith."  This  will  be 
found  in  the  third  volume  of  Martineau's  Essays. 

Referring  to  the  criticism  contained  in  this 
essay,  Mr.  Spencer  says: 

"I  have  reserved  to  the  last  one  of  the  first  objections 
made  to  the  metaphysico-theological  doctrine  set  forth 
in  'First  Principles,'  and  implied  in  the  several  vol- 
umes that  have  succeeded  it.  It  was  urged  by  an  able 
metaphysician,  the  Rev.  James  Martineau,  in  an  essay 
entitled  'Science,  Nescience,  and  Faith';  and,  effective 
against  my  argument  as  it  stands,  shows  the  need  for 
some  development  of  my  argument." 

In  "First  Principles"  Mr.  Spencer  had  said: 
"If  the  Non-relative  or  Absolute  is  present  in 
thought  only,  and  a  mere  negation,  then  the  relation 
between  it  and  the  Relative  becomes  unthinkable,  be- 
cause one  of  the  terms  of  the  relation  is  absent  from 
consciousness.  And  if  this  relation  is  unthinkable, 
then  is  the  Relative  itself  unthinkable,  for  want  of  its 
antithesis;  whence  results  the  disappearance  of  all 
thought  whatever." 

MR.  MARTINEAU'S  CRITICISM. 

"Take  away  its  antithetic  term,  and  the  relative, 
thrown  into  isolation,  is  set  up  as  absolute,  and  disap- 
pears from  thought.  It  is  indispensable,  therefore,  to 
uphold  the  Absolute  in  existence,  as  a  condition  of  the 


92 

relative  sphere  which  constitutes  our  whole  intellectual 
domain.  Be  it  so.  But  when  saved  on  this  plea— to 
preserve  the  balance  and  interdependence  of  two  co- 
relatives — the  Absolute  is  absolute  no  more;  it  is  re- 
duced to  a  term  of  relation;  it  loses,  therefore,  its  exile 
from  thought;  its  disqualification  is  canceled;  and  the 
alleged  nescience  is  discharged. 

"So,  the  same  law  of  thought  which  warrants  the  ex- 
istence, dissolves  the  inscrutableness  of  the  Absolute." 

"  I  admit  this,"  says  Spencer,  "to  be  a  telling  rejoin- 
der; and  one  which  can  be  met  only  when  the  mean- 
ings of  the  words,  as  I  have  used  them,  are  carefully 
discriminated,  and  the  implications  of  the  doctrine 
fully  traced  out." 

He  then  proceeds  to  restate  and  elucidate  the 
argument: 

He  does  not,  he  says,  commit  himself  to 
any  propositions  respecting  the  Absolute,  con- 
sidered as  that  which  includes  both  subject  and 
object.  He  prefers  the  term  Non-relative.  By 
that  is  to  be  understood  "the  totality  of  Be- 
ing minus  that  which  constitutes  the  individual 
consciousness  present  to  us  under  the  forms  of 
relation." 

J.  F.  MOULTON,  in  the  British  Quarterly  Re- 
view for  October,  1873,  and  January,  1874. 

In  the  first  article  Mr.  Moulton  attacks  Spen- 
cer's position,  that  the  first  and  second  laws  of 
motion  are  to  be  accepted  as  axioms  of  physical 
science.  This  position  Mr.  Spencer  defends  and 
maintains  in  an  elaborate  reply. 

In  the  second  article  in  the  British  Quarterly 
Mr.  Moulton  returns  to  the  attack,  which  draws 
another  reply. 


"Reduced  to  its  briefest  form,"  say/.  Mr.  Spencer, 
"the  argument  is  this: 

"If  definite  quantitative  relations  [of  proportionali- 
ty] between  causes  and  effects  be  assumed  a  priori, 
then  the  second  law  of  motion  is  an  immediate  corol- 
lary. If  there  are  not  definite  quantitative  relations 
[of  proportionality]  between  causes  and  effects,  all  the 
conclusions  drawn  from  physical  experiments  are  in- 
valid." 

PROFESSOR  GREEN,  in  the  Contemporary  Re- 
view for  February,  1881,  comments  on  the  posi- 
tion of  Spencer,  that  "the  object  is  constituted  by 
the  aggregate  of  vivid  states  of  consciousness." 

Spencer  denies  that  this  is  his  position;  say- 
ing the  allegation  is  made  "in  face  of  the  con- 
spicuous fact  that  I  identify  the  object  with  the 
nexus  of  this  aggregate." 

Professor  Green  says: 

"And  in  the  sequel  the  'separation  of  themselves'  on 
the  part  of  the  states  of  consciousness  'into  two  great 
aggregates,  vivid  and  faint,'  is  spoken  of  as  a  'differen- 
tiation between  the  antithetical  existences  we  call  ob- 
ject and  subject.'  If  words  mean  any  thing,  then  Mr. 
Spencer  plainly  makes  the  'object'  an  aggregate  of 
conscious  states." 

Professor  Green  points  out  that  since  Spencer 
claims  that  the  object  consists  of  states  of  con- 
sciousness, he  cannot  at  the  same  time  consist- 
ently say  that  it  exists  beyond  consciousness. 

Prof.  Green  here  touches  upon  Spencer's  sys- 
tem of  idealism;  a  system  which  the  author  de- 
nominates "Transfigured  Realism."  This  will 
be  made  the  subject  of  a  subsequent  chapter. 


CHAPTER     XIV. 

CRITICISMS      CONTINUED  —  MEAKS  —  ATWATER  - 
WYNN — STEBBINS — ALGER. 


MR.    SPENCER'S    RELIGION. 


REVIEW  IN   THE  BlBLIOTIIECA  SACRA    FOR     APRIL, 

1874,  BY  JOHN  W.  HEARS,  ALBERT  BARNES  PRO- 
FESSOR OF  INTELLECTUAL  AND  MORAL  PHILOSO- 
PHY IN  HAMILTON  COLLEGE,  N.  Y. 

"It  is  a  long  time  since  purely  English  philosophy 
has  produced  so  able,  so  comprehensive  and  so  daring 
a  thinker  as  Herbert  Spencer.  Unlike  Mr.  Mill,  he  con- 
structs rather  than  criticises 

"Theoretically,  indeed,  not  an  Atheist,  his  philosophy 
denies  the  possibility  of  all  practical  relations  between 
God  and  man,  if,  indeed,  it  be  not  fairly  chargeable 
with  denying  the  existence  of  any  thing  that  could 
properly  be  called  God 

"His  First  Principles  commences  with  an  attempted 
reconciliation  of  religion  and  science,  which  is  remark- 
able as  coming  from  the  side  of  science,  and  as  proving 
that  the  pressure  for  such  a  reconciliation  is  felt  in 
that  quarter  as  well  as  in  the  other 

"It  is  not  an  attempt  to  reconcile  science  with  a  re- 
ligion, or  with  the  true  religion,  but  with  an  ultimate 
abstraction,  void  of  all  positive  qualities,  which  Spen- 
cer chooses  to  call  the  religious  idea" 
(94) 


95 

After  enumerating  some  of  the  claims  which 
Mr.  Spencer  makes,  he  asks: 

"What  lurking  postulate  silently  shapes  and  projects 
all  these  assumptions  to  the  surface  V  This,  conscious- 
ly or  unconsciously,  but  this  certainly— that  Herbert 
Spencer  is  the  most  religious  man  that  the  world  has 
ever  seen.  In  his  view  alone,  of  all  mankind's,  the  true 
religion  is  perfectly  represented.  Not  Moses  and  the 
prophets,  not  Jesus  Christ  himself  nor  his  apostles, 
not  the  fathers  nor  the  reformers,  not  Buddha  nor 
Confucius,  not  Zoroaster  nor  Mohammed,  approached 
the  true  knowledge  of  religion,  which  now,  at  last,  has 
been  attained  by  this  modern  Englishman.  All  were 
in  error.  The  impiety  of  the  pious  is  expressly  de- 
nounced by  Mr.  Spencer.  The  results  of  what  he  calls 
science  are  more  religious  than  religion.  In  short,  the 
whole  dust-heap  of  the  world's  religions  has  been  sift- 
ed, and  its  one  inconsiderable  and  unnoticed  item  of 
value  has  been  detected;  and  he  who  recognizes  and 
holds  that,  may,  should,  cast  all  the  rest  away,  and  he 
will  be  the  real  possessor  of  religion — and  that  man  is 
Mr.  Spencer.  All  that  the  world  imperfectly  and  dim- 
ly aspired  after,  in  its  sublimest  experiences,  has  been 
clearly  disclosed  and  realized  in  the  ontology  of  Mr. 
Spencer." 

The  writer  here  comments  upon  the  attempt 
of  Mr.  Spencer  to  reduce  all  religious  ideas  to 
the  consciousness  of  unknowable  existence. 

"And  am  I  in  a  world,  and  have  I  a  nature  which, 
according  to  Mr.  Spencer  himself,  points  with  inevita- 
ble, inexorable  logic  to  a  supreme,  all-embracing  Pow- 
er, of  whom  I  yet  am  bound  by  religious  duty  to  ab- 
jure utterly  all  knowledge?  A  most  monstrous  per- 
version  

"I  cannot  but  know,  I  cannot  but  believe  that  I 
know  something  of  God  in  every  thing  I  know.  Spen- 
cer himself  calls  him  the  power  which  the  universe 


96 

manifests  to  us,  the  Ultimate  Cause,  the  Ultimate  Ex 
istence.  I  am  surrounded  on  every  hand  by  the  meth- 
ods of  his  manifestation;  my  very  existence  is  made 
up  of  them.  I  am  myself  but  one  of  these  methods  of 
the  divine  manifestation.  How  can  he  be  in  any  sense 
manifested,  if  he  is  in  every  sense  utterly  inscruta- 
ble? Nay,  all  that  is  vast,  transcendent  in  Nature, 
teaches  me  that  he  is  glorious;  all  the  objects  that 
swell  my  bosom  with  emotions  of  beauty,  grandeur, 
and  sublimity,  teach  me  that  beauty,  grandeur  and 
sublimity  belong  to  the  divine  nature;  all  that  stretches 
out  into  the  illimitable — and  what  smallest  object  does 
not?— testifies  of  his  infinity." 


T.  H.  ATWATEE,  IN  THE  PRINCETON  REVIEW. 
— In  the  Review  for  April,  1865,  appeared  an  ar- 
ticle entitled  "Herbert  Spencer's  Philosophy — 
Atheism,  Pantheism,  and  Materialism." 

The  New  Philosophy  is  antagonized  as  being 
Atheistic.  Speaking  of  the  relativity  of  knowl- 
edge, the  writer  says: 

"This  relativity  of  knowledge  is  perfectly  consistent 
with  a  true  and  genuine  knowledge  of  things  as  they  re- 
ally are.  Not  necessarily  that  we  know  all  pertaining 
to  them.  Much  remains  unknown  by  the  most  accom- 
plished botanist  about  the  merest  blade  of  grass.  But 
what  in  the  due  use  of  our  faculties  we  do  know,  we 
know  truly.  Otherwise  we  do  not  know  it  at  all.  Not 
to  know  truly,  is  not  to  know  at  all." 

The  writer  quotes  from  Spencer  the  follow- 
ing: 

"The  common  notion  that  there  is  a  line  of  demar- 
cation between  reason  and  instinct,  has  no  foundation 
whatever  in  fact." — [Psy.,  p.  572. 

Also  the  following: 


97 

"There  is  a  series  of  insensible  steps  by  which  brute 
rationality  may  pass  into  human  rationality." — [Ibid, 
p.  573. 

From  these  and  other  doctrines  contained  in 
the  New  Philosophy,  Mr.  Atwater  concludes 
that  it  is  a  system  of  Atheism. 

PROFESSOR  WYNN.  —  While  Professors  You- 
mans,  Fiske,  and  other  admirers  of  Spencer 
look  upon  his  philosophy  as  a  system  of  Theism, 
many  other  writers  consider  it  decidedly  Athe- 
istic. 

For  instance,  Professor  W.  H  Wynn,  of  the 
State  Agricultural  College  of  Ames,  Iowa,  in  the 
seventh  volume  of  the  Lutheran  Quarterly, 
writes  thus: 

"Evolution  and  correlation  are  with  him  [Spencer] 
the  key  wherewith  all  the  mysteries  of  the  universe 
are  unlocked.  With  Darwin  conveniently  on  the  one 
hand,  and  Bain  on  the  other,  he  threads  his  way 
through  the  'First  Principles'  of  things,  through  aeons 

of  world  formations,"  etc "Nor  does  he  rest 

here.  Civilization,  with  all  its  network  of  agencies 
and  institutions,  its  governments,  its  economies,  its 
arts,  its  philosophies,  its  religion,  ...  all  proceed 
in  accordance  with  the  same  inflexible  laws  which 
rolled  the  nebulous  masses  into  systems,  and  in  due 
time  will  resolve  them  again  into  their  primeval  dust. 
It  is  noticeable  that,  amid  all  these  stupendous  gener- 
alizations, Mr.  Spencer  nowhere  discovers  a  presiding 
mind.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  he  could  suppress  the 
inference,  but  it  is  the  special  feature  of  his  system, 
for  which  he  claims  the  merit  of  originality,  that  he 
has  been  able  to  build  it  all  up  without  the  hypothesis 
of  a  God."  


98 

So  far  as  these  writers  undertake  to  make  the 
Atheistic  character  of  the  New  Philosophy  a  mat- 
ter of  opprobrium,  success  can  only  be  realized 
among  their  religious  readers. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  they  are  unquestionably 
correct. 

There  is  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  what 
the  word  "religion"  means,  or  ought  to  mean. 
But  can  there  be  any  difference  as  to  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word  "God"?  Can  there  be  a  God 
without  attributes  and  without  intelligence? 
Will  it  for  a  moment  be  contended  that  there 
ever  existed  on  the  face  of  the  earth  a  people 
who  believed  in  and  worshiped  such  a  God? 

The  Agnostic  says  he  does  not  know  whether 
there  is  any  God  or  not;  that  all  he  knows  any 
thing  about,  outside  of  his  own  mind,  is  the  vis- 
ible and  tangible  universe,  and  the  actions  of  or- 
ganized beings;  in  other  words,  what  is  called 
phenomena.  He  is  content  to  study  the  laws  of 
Nature;  that  is,  the  methods  according  to  which 
these  phenomena  co-exist  and  succeed  one  an- 
other. 

Mr.  Spencer  goes  further.  He  says  he  knows 
of  the  existence  of  something  else — something 
which  originated  all  this,  and  which  holds  it  to- 
gether. He  positively  knows  that  this  some- 
thing exists.  He  is  more  certain  of  its  existence 
than  he  is  of  the  existence  of  phenomena.  He 
does  not  call  it  God,  because  he  does  not  ascribe 
to  it  the  attributes  of  a  God.  He  does  not  be- 
lieve in  a  God  unless  the  Unknowable  is  God. 


99 

But  the  Unknowable  is  not  God;  therefore  he 
does  not  believe  in  any  God  at  all. 

Mr.  Spencer  has  not  believed  in  a  God  since 
he  passed  out  of  the  theological  state  of  thought 
in  which  he  wrote  "Social  Statics." 


STEBBINS. — In  "Old  and  New"  for  October, 
1870,  Rufus  P.  Stebbins,  of  Ithaca,  N.  Y.,  makes 
two  points,  one  on  the  Unknowable,  one  on  the 
Knowable,  of  Spencer. 

1.  That  the  same  law  of  consciousness,  from  which 
Spencer    posits    the    Unknowable    Power   as   First 
Cause,  obliges  him  to  posit  it  as  an  intelligent  First 
Cause. 

2.  That  his  theory  of  Evolution  from  a  nebulous 
mist,  and  Dissolution  to  the  same,  and  again  Evolu- 
tion and  again  Dissolution,  kept  up  in  endless  succes- 
sion or  rhythm,  is  defective  in  this:  That  to  sustain 
this  theory  it  would  be  necessary  that  all  the  motion 
should  be  changed  into  heat  at  once,  and  not  in  por- 
tions and  through  vast  periods,  as  would  be  the  case. 
This  slow  process  would  counteract  and  prevent  any 
such  Dissolution  as  would  be  necessary  to  a  re-com- 
mencement of  the  process  of  Evolution. 


W.  R.  ALGER. — In  the  Christian  Examiner 
for  May,  1868,  is  a  dissertation  on  Emerson, 
Spencer  and  Martineau,  by  W.  R.  Alger. 

The  writer  makes  a  somewhat  elaborate  at- 
tempt to  show  that  the  doctrine  of  the  Unknow- 
able is  Theism  in  its  highest  form. 

The  following  paragraph  will  best  illustrate 
his  trend  of  thought: 

"There  is,  then,  no  just  ground  for  the  belief  which 


100 

alarms  so  many,  that  the  detection  of  this  sophism 
will  prove  fatal  to  morality  and  religion.  Refrain  from 
thinking  the  divine  Psychology  a  counterpart  of  the  hu- 
man. Outline  Deity  no  more  as  a  man  on  the  azure 
iniinity— paint  not  his  countenance  in  the  mirror  of 
imaginative  contemplation.  Still  he  is  the  One  without 
whom  the  Many  could  not  be.  Still,  we  have  for  our 
guidance  his  working  scheme  revealed  in  the  order 
and  laws  of  the  creation.  The  sum  of  the  conditions 
necessary  for  the  perfect  evolution  and  maintenance  of 
universal  order  and  life,  constitutes  a  symbol  of  au- 
thority and  a  body  of  rules  not  to  be  escaped.  What- 
ever else  goes  or  stays,  the  laws  of  the  whole  in  itself 
and  in  relation  to  the  parts,  and  the  Jaws  of  the  parts 
in  themselves  and  in  relation  to  each  other  and  the 
whole,  constitute  the  grounds  of  a  system  of  religion 
and  morality  whose  sanctity  and  sanctions  are  intrin^ 
sic  and  eternal." 


CHAPTER    XV. 

CRITICISMS     CONTINUED  —  BASCOM — LILLY — BAR- 
RY— THE    QUARTERLY— FAIRBAIRN. 

JOHN  BASCOM,  LL.  D.,  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNIVER- 
SITY OF  WISCONSIN,  IN  BIBLIOTHECA  SACRA  FOR 
OCTOBER,  1876. 

The  writer  holds  that  the  evolution  doctrine, 
carried  to  its  legitimate  results,  destroys  all  lib- 
erty of  thought  or  action. 

"We  grant  that  all  which  constitutes  the  dumb  show, 
the  ostensible  marks,  of  liberty,  may  be  present  to  hu- 
man action  under  the  interpretation  of  evolution. 
Motives  are  there;  action  follows  upon  them;  the  mind 
hesitates  between  them,  decides  between  them,  if  you 
will,  chooses  between  them;  no  symbol  of  a  free  action 
fails  to  appear,  and  to  be  apparently  operative  in  its 
appropriate  way.  If,  therefore,  the  power  to  use  such 
words  as  'motives,'  'devices,'  'obedience,'  'disobedience,' 
relieves  one  from  the  charge  of  fatalism,  the  evolu- 
tionist is  not  a  fatalist;  but  if  by  fatalism  is  meant 
such  an  inclosing  of  rational  with  physical  activities, 
such  a  subordination  of  both  to  immutable  laws  that 
only  one  result  ever  has  been  possible— has  been  con- 
tained in  the  forces  actually  operative—  then  the  evolu- 
tionist is,  and  must  be,  a  fatalist." 

The  doctrine  of  philosphical  necessity,  here  al- 
luded to  by  President  Bascom,  or,  to  use  a  word 
(101) 


102 

preferred  by  some  philosophers,  philosophical 
"determinism,"  a  doctrine  which  pervades  the 
writings  of  Mr.  Spencer,  and  is  a  cardinal  fea- 
ture of  his  philosophy,  is  one  to  which  no 
thoughtful  Positivist  or  Agnostic  will  object. 
Whatever  difficulty  there  may  be  in  reconciling 
the  doctrine  with  actual  individual  freedom,  can- 
not affect  the  validity  of  the  doctrine  itself, 
which  stands  on  eternal  foundations. 

Nor  can  there  be  any  reasonable  doubt  that 
this  law,  as  maintained  by  Mr.  Spencer,  applies 
equally  to  the  human  mind.  What  guaranty 
have  you  that  the  first  friend  you  meet  will  not 
thrust  a  dagger  into  your  bosom?  Only  this 
guaranty:  that  the  conduct  of  your  friend  is 
governed  by  law.  If  you  knew  all  the  laws  that 
govern  his  action,  you  could  tell  precisely  every 
thing  he  will  do.  You  do  not  know  them  all; 
but  you  know  sufficient  of  them  to  rest  assured 
that  he  will  not  do  the  act  referred  to  so  long  as 
he  remains  in  his  sane  mind. 

W.  S.  LILLY,  IN  THE  CONTEMPORARY  REVIEW 
FOR  MAY,  1889. 

"The  sentiment  of  a  First  Cause,  infinite  and  abso- 
lute, is,  according  to  Mr.  Spencer,  the  eternal  and  se- 
cure basis  of  all  religion.  The  Deity  whom,  hidden 
more  or  less  under  anthropomorphic  disguises,  the  vo- 
taries of  all  creeds  ignorantly  worship,  declares  he  un- 
to them  as  the  Unknowable. 

"Now,  if  he  is  right  in  holding  that  the  Absolute  is 
out  of  relation  to  thought,  he  is  certainly  wrong  in  af- 
firming any  consciousness  of  it Mr.  Spencer 

ingenuously  confesses,  indeed,  'the  consciousness  of 


103 

something  which  is  yet  out  of  consciousness  is  myste- 
rious.'—[Prin.  of  Psy.,  Sec.  448.]  The  mystery  is  akin 
to  one  of  which  we  read  in  the  history  of  Baron  Muen- 
chausen,  who,  upon  a  certain  occasion,  is  related  to 
have  lifted  himself  out  of  a  river  by  his  own  periwig. 
"Upon  Mr.  Spencer's  own  showing,  only  by  going 
out  of  ourselves,  only  by  transcending  what  he  over 
and  over  again  lays  down  dogmatically  as  the  impass- 
able limits  of  intellect,  can  we  attain  to  any  acquaint- 
ance with  the  Absolute.  To  aflirm  that  a  thing  is,  and 
that  it  is  unknowable,  is  a  contradiction  in  terms." 

WILLIAM  BARRY,  IN  THE  DUBLIN  REVIEW  FOR 
APRIL,  1888. — After  treating  of  what  the  writer 
calls  the  "destructive  stage"  of  Spencer's  philos- 
ophy, he  comes  to  the  "constructive  stage": 

"His  constructive  stage  opens  with  one  of  the  most 
curious  sentences  ever  penned  by  man.  'There  still  re- 
mains,' he  says,  at  page  87,  'the  final  question— what 
must  we  say  concerning  that  which  transcends  knowl- 
edge ?'  Say  ?  Why,  nothing,  of  course.  What  is  there 
to  say  except  'I  do  not  know.'  But  he  goes  on: 

"  'Are  we  to  rest  wholly  in  the  consciousness  of  phe- 
nomena? Is  the  result  of  inquiry  to  exclude  utterly 
from  our  minds  every  thing  but  the  relative  ?'  Won- 
derful words,  and  containing  some  of  the  most  'ambig- 
uous middles'  I  have  ever  seen.  Observe,  all  knowl- 
edge is  relative,  none  can  transcend  phenomena.  Yet 
it  is  now  whispered  in  our  ear  that  we  need  not  'utter- 
ly exclude  from  our  minds'  what  we  do  not  in  any  way 
know;  and  that  we  may  'believe,'  though  the  nature  of 
intelligence  forbids,  I  will  not  say  proof,  but  the  very 
conception  of  that  which  we  are  asked  to  believe.  .  .  . 

"Mr.  Spencer  is  the  one  conspicuous  thinker,  at  any 
rate,  in  our  time,  who  has  proposed  to  reconcile  relig- 
ion and  philosophy  by  means  of  an  axiom  which  makes 
both  impossible 

"Between  thought  and  being,  Mr.  Spencer  fixes  an 


104 

infinite  gulf.  That  which  is,  he  declares  to  us,  cannot 
be  known.  To  him  the  meeting-place  of  religion  and 
philosophy  is  not  a  Divine  Intuition,  but  eternal  nes- 
ecience.  Thought  can  solve  no  problems,  not  even  its 
own;  or  more  truly,  it  is  made  to  confess  that  its  own 
problem  is  forever  insoluble." 


THE  QUARTERLY. — In  the  Quarterly  for  Octo- 
ber, 1873,  was  a  review  of  Spencer's  Psycholo- 
gy, then  lately  published,  and  of  "First  Princi- 
ples," published  in  1867,  and  "Essays,"  in  1«68. 

In  this  article,  it  is  claimed  that  the  new  sys- 
tem of  philosophy  involves  the  denial  of  all 
truth. 

The  writer  says: 

"That  we  can  know  nothing  but  phenomena,  that  ev- 
ery thing  absolute  escapes  us— as  being  forever  un- 
knowable, and  beyond  the  kon  of  the  human  intellect 
— is  a  cardinal  principle  with  Mr.  Spencer,  who  dis- 
tinctly tells  us  that  all  'objective  agencies'  productive 
of  'subjective  affections'  are  not  only  'unknown,'  but 
also  'unknowable.' 

"But  every  philosophy,  every  system  of  knowledge, 
must  start  with  the  assumption  (implied  or  expressed) 
that  something  is  really  'knowable' — that  something  is 
absolutely  true.  .  .  .  Either  this  system  of  philos- 
ophy itself  is  relative  and  phenomenal  only,  or  it  is  ab- 
solutely and  objectively  true.  But  it  must  be  merely 
phenomenal  if  every  thing  known  is  merely  phenome- 
nal. Its  value,  then,  can  be  only  relative  and  phenom- 
enal—that is,  it  has  no  absolute  value,  does  not  corre- 
spond with  objective  reality,  and  is  therefore  false. 
But  if  it  is  false  that  our  knowledge  is  only  relative, 
then  some  of  our  knowledge  must  be  absolute;  but  this 
negatives  the  fundamental  position  of  the  whole  phi- 
losophy  

"  Every  assertor  of  such  a  philosophy  must  be  in  the 


105 

position  of  a  man  who  saws  across  the  branch  of  a  tree 
at  a  point  between  himself  and  the  trunk." 

This  criticism  concerning  the  relativity  of 
knowledge,  which,  as  will  be  seen  in  a  subse- 
quent article,  was  also  very  cogently  urged  by 
Mr.  Brownson,  has  reference  only  to  the  doc- 
trine of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  as  held  by 
Mr.  Spencer;  that  is,  that  all  knowledge  is  re- 
lated to  the  Unknowable  Absolute.  The  criti- 
cism has  no  application  to  the  relativity  of 
knowledge  in  the  sense  that  all  our  knowledge 
comes  through  cognizing  the  relations  between 
phenomena. 

"The  best  example,"  says  this  writer,  "  that 
can  be  adduced  of  pure,  unprejudiced,  and  yet 
learned  and  cultivated  human  reason,  is  fur- 
nished by  the  mind  of  Aristotle." 


PRINCIPAL  FAIRBAIEN  IN  THE  CONTEMPORARY 
REVIEW  FOR  JULY,  1881. — Principal  A.  M.  Fair- 
bairn,  in  criticising  the  doctrine  of  the  Unknow- 
able, speaks  of  the  consciousness  from  which 

the  Absolute  is  posited,  as  follows: 

"  For  example,  Mr.  Spencer  describes  it  as  'the  ab- 
stract of  all  thoughts,  ideas,  or  conceptions.' — [First 
Prin.,  p.  95.]  This  abstract  he  represents  as  formed  'by 
combining  successive  concepts  deprived  of  their  lim- 
its and  conditions.' 

.  "This  is  certainly  not  a  very  luminous  remark  in  the 
mouth  of  one  who  had  so  strenuously  reasoned  that 
'to  conceive  was  to  condition,  to  limit.'  But  such  as 
it  is,  there  it  stands.  What  does  it  mean?  That  by 
removing  the  conditions  or  limits  under  which  indi- 
vidual objects  are  conceived,  there  remains  'the  indef- 


106 

inite  thought' of  the  unlimited.  .  .  .  Abolish  the  con- 
ditions and  limits  under  which  a  given  thing  is  con- 
ceived, and  what  remains?  Has  an  object  (our  au- 
thor being  witness)  any  being  to  thought  save  as  con- 
ditioned or  limited  V  ... 

"What  exists  to  consciousness  is  known;  speech  of 
it  is  possible  only  where  knowledge  is.  ...  It  is 
impossible  to  place  cause  and  effect  in  relation,  and 
then  declare  the  cause  non-relative.  It  is  as  impossi- 
ble to  affirm  a  consciousness  of  the  Absolute,  and  then 
declare  it  unknown.  .  .  .  Declare  this  Power  un- 
known, and  we  must  divorce  it  from  all  relation  to  ttje 
universe  and  consciousness,  to  the  phenomena  alike 
of  nature  and  of  mind.  .  .  .  Outside  thought  it  is 
impossible  for  thought  to  get,  for  every  symbol  it  uses 
has  been  framed  by  its  own  act  and  is  the  result  of  its 
own  processes. 

"While  Mr.  Spencer  grandly  dismisses  all  religious 
systems  as  'unthinkable  hypotheses,'  he  does  not  mean 
man  to  be  without  a  religion.  As  he  boldly  essays  the 
reconstruction  of  the  universe,  it  is  but  proper  that  he 
should  introduce  man  to  a  new  deity,  and  inaugurate 
a  religion  conformable  to  the  new  order.  And  what 
so  fit  as  that  this  novel  deity  should  be  the  extraordi- 
nary entity  or  non-entity  which  he  has  so  variously 
named  the  Unknown,  the  Unknowable,  the  Ultimate 
Reality,  the  Unconditioned  Cause,  the  Inscrutable 
Power,  the  Absolute,  the  Non-relative,  the  Uncondi- 
tioned Being,  and  the  Unknown  Force.  This  poly- 
nomic,  extensively  described,  but  indescribable  Some- 
what is  to  be  the  God  of  the  future,  and  awe  for  this 
multifarious  and  multinomial  inscrutability,  its  relig- 
ion. .  .  . 

"We  cannot  reverence,  or  love,  or  obey,  or  worship 
the  Unknown;  these  imply  that  we  know  the  object, 
and  are  known  to  it;  that  it  possesses  the  moral  quali- 
ties that  can  awaken  our  reverence  and  love,  and  com- 
mand our  obedience  and  worship.  .  .  . 


107 

"But  let  this  transfigured  religion  of  omniscient  Ag 
nosticism  be  tried  by  a  simpler  test— is  it  capable  of 
realization,  of  practical  embodiment? 

"1  confess  to  a  secret  regard  for  the  Religion  of  Hu- 
manity. It  has  moral  passion  and  purpose  in  it,  is  ca- 
pable of  creating  and  directing  enthusiasm  for  the 
rights  and  liberties  and  against  the  wrongs  and  op- 
pressions of  man.  But  this  religion  of  Agnosticism, 
this  humiliation  of  the  reason  before  a  blank  abstrac- 
tion, created  by  thought  to  paralyze  thought,  is  but  an 
insult  to  the  spirit,  an  insolent  yet  feeble  mockery  of 
the  hopes,  the  loves,  the  ideals,  the  inspirations,  the 
consolations  and  reverences,  that  have  been  at  once 
symbolized  for  our  race  and  realized  in  it,  by  the  grand 
old  thing  named  Religion." 


CHAPTER    XVI. 

CRITICISMS      CONTINUED — REVIEW  BY   ORESTES   A. 
BROWNSON, 

In  the  Catholic  World  for  February,  1872,  ap- 
peared an  article  entitled  "The  Cosmic  Philoso- 
phy"; the  same  being  a  review  of  the  second  ecji- 
tion  (1871)  of  Spencer's  "First  Principles." 

The  writer  summarizes  the  doctrine  of  the 
Unknowable,  and  examines  the  assertion  that  all 
knowledge  is  relative,  and  the  positing  of  a 
Something  underlying  phenomena  of  which  they 
are  the  appearances.  "But  this  Infinite  Some- 
thing, which  is  the  reality  of  the  cosmos,  is  ab- 
solutely unknowable,  and  even  unthinkable. 
How,  then,  can  it  be  asserted  ?" 

Both  religion  and  science,  says  Mr.  Spencer, 
agree  that  the  Infinite  Reality,  or  Something,  is 
absolutely  unknowable — absolutely  inscrutable. 
"Consequently  the  ultimate  scientific  ideas  are 
identical  with  the  ultimate  religious  ideas.  Both 
religion  and  science  are  fused  together,  and  rec- 
onciled without  any  compromise,  and  the  old 
feud  between  them  extinguished  in  the  bosom 
of  the  infinite  unknowable. 

'He  makes  a  solitude  and  calls  it  peace.'  " 
(108) 


109 

The  cosmists,  "by  asserting  that  only  phe- 
nomena are  cognizable,  and  subjecting  man  to 
the  common  cosmic  law,  include  him  in  the  cos- 
mic phenomena,  and  make  him  simply  an  ap- 
pearance, or  manifestation  of  the  unknowable, 
without  any  real  or  substantive  existence  of  his 
own. 

"Furthermore,  by  declaring  the  phenomenal  cannot 
be  thought  in  and  by  itself  without  the  Infinite  Some- 
thing that  underlies  it  as  its  ground  or  reality,  and  then 
declaring  that  something  to  be  unknowable,  unthink- 
able even,  the  new  system  declares  that  there  is  no 
knowable,  and  consequently  no  science  or  knowledge 
at  all.  The  new  system  of  philosophy,  then,  reconciles 
science  and  religion  only  in  a  universal  negation;  that 
is,  by  really  denying  both.  This  can  hardly  satisfy  ei- 
ther a  scientist  or  a  Christian." 

"Mr.  Spencer  starts  with  the  assumption  that  all  re- 
ligions, including  Atheism,  have  a  verity  in  common  as 
well  as  an  error.  .  .  .  But  what  verity  is  common 
to  truth  and  falsehood,  to  Theism  and  Atheism  ?  The 
verity  common  to  religion  and  science,  that  the  solu- 
tion of  the  cosmic  mystery  is  unknowable  ?  But  that 
is  not  a  verity;  it  is  a  mere  negation,  and  all  truth  is 
affirmative." 

The  writer  rehearses  what  Mr.  Spencer  says 
respecting  the  three  suppositions  which  may  be 
made  concerning  the  origin  of  the  universe: 
that  it  is  self-existent,  or  that  it  is  self-created, 
or  that  it  is  created  by  an  external  agency. 
"The  second  supposition  he  rejects  as  the  pan- 
theistic hypothesis;  which  is  a  mistake,  for  no 
Pantheist  or  any  body  else  asserts  that  the  uni- 
verse creates  itself.  The  Pantheist  denies  that 
it  is  created  at  all;  and  the  philosopher  denies 


110 

that  it  creates  itself;  for,  since  to  create  is  to  act, 
self-creation  would  require  the  universe  to  act 
before  it  existed 

"The  first  supposition,  the  self -existence  of  the  uni- 
verse, the  author  denies,  not  because  the  universe  is 
manifestly  contingent  and  must  have  had  a  beginning, 
and  therefore  a  cause  or  creator;  but  because  self -ex- 
istence is  absolutely  inconceivable;  an  impossible  idea. 
He  says:  .  .  . 'self -existence  is  rigorously  inconceiva- 
ble, and  this  holds  true,  whatever  be  the  nature  of  the 
object  [subject]  of  which  it  is  predicated.  Whoever  ar- 
gues that  the  atheistical  hypothesis  is  untenable  be- 
cause it  involves  the  impossible  idea  of  self-existence, 
must  perforce  admit  that  the  theistical  hypothesis  is 
untenable  if  it  contains  the  same  impossible  idea.' 
But  who  ever  argued  that  the  atheistical  hypothesis  is 
untenable  because  it  involves  the  idea  of  self -exist- 
ence? Atheism  is  denied  because  it  asserts  the  self- 
existence  of  that  which  cannot  be,  and  is  known  not 
to  be,  self-existent. 

"But  it  is  evident  that  the  author  rejects  alike  self- 
existence  and  creation;  that  the  cosmos  is  self -exist- 
ent, or  that  it  is  created  by  an  independent,  self-exist- 
ent and  super-cosmic  creator.  How,  then,  can  he  as- 
sert the  existence  of  the  cosmos,  real  or  phenomenal, 
at  all  V  The  cosmos  either  exists  or  it  does  not.  If  it 
does  not,  that  ends  the  matter.  If  it  does,  it  must  be 
either  created  or  self-existent;  for  the  author  rejects 
an  infinite  series  as  absurd,  and  self-creation  as  only 
an  absurd  form  of  expressing  self-existence.  But  as 
the  author  denies  self-existence,  whatever  the  subject 
of  which  it  is  predicated,  and  also  the  fact  of  crea- 
tion, it  follows  rigorously,  if  he  is  right,  that  the  cos- 
mos does  not  exist.  The  author  cannot  take  refuge  in 
his  favorite  nesrio,  or  say,  we  do  not  know  the  origin 
of  the  cosmos,  for  he  has  positively  denied  it  every 
possible  origin;  and  therefore  has,  by  implication,  de- 
nied it  all  existence. 


Ill 

"The  Comtists  restrict,  in  theory,  all  knowledge  to 
sensible  things,  their  mutual  relations,  dependencies, 
and  the  conditions  and  laws  of  their  development 
and  progress;  but  they  at  least  admit  that  these  may 
be  objects  of  science  and  positively  known.  But  our 
cosmic  philosopher  denies  this,  and  asserts  the  relativ- 
ity of  all  knowledge.  .  .  .  But  relative  knowledge 
[in  Mr.  Spencer's  sense]  is  simply  no  knowledge,  be 
cause  in  it  nothing  is  known.  .  .  .  The  relativity 
of  all  knowledge,  then,  is  simply  the  denial  of  all 
knowledge.  It  is  idle,  then,  for  Mr.  Spencer  to  talk  of 
science." 

"Mr.  Spencer  labors  hard  to  prove  the  relativity  of 
all  knowledge.  He  either  proves  it  or  he  does  not.  If 
he  does  not,  he  has  no  right  to  assert  it;  if  he  does,  he 
disproves  it  at  the  same  time.  If  the  proof  is  not  ab- 
solute, it  does  not  prove  it;  if  it  is  absolute,  then  it  is 
not  true  that  all  knowledge  is  relative;  for  the  proof 
must  be  absolutely  known,  or  it  cannot  be  alleged. 
We  either  know  that  all  knowledge  is  relative,  or  we 
do  not.  If  we  do  not,  no  more  need  be  said;  if  we  do 
know  it,  then  it  is  false,  because  the  knowledge  of  the 
relativity  of  knowledge  is  itself  not  relative.  The  as- 
sertion of  the  relativity  of  all  knowledge,  therefore, 
contradicts  and  refutes  itself.  .No  man  can  doubt 
that  he  doubts,  or  that  doubt  is  doubt,  and  therefore 
universal  doubt  or  skepticism  is  impossible,  and  not 
even  assertable.  The  same  argument  applies  to  the 
pretense  that  all  knowledge  is  relative. 

"Rejecting  creation,  the  author  cannot  assert  the  re- 
lation of  cause  and  effect;  rejecting  cause  and  effect, 
he  cannot  assert  even  the  cosmic  phenomena.  They 
are  not  able  to  stand  on  their  own  bottom,  and  there- 
fore not  at  all,  unless  the  Something  of  which  they  are, 
as  he  says,  manifestations,  is  a  cause  producing  and 
sustaining  them.  We  submit,  then,  that  Mr.  Spencer's 
doctrine  of  the  unknowable,  and  the  relativity  of  all 
knowledge,  estops  him  from  asserting  any  thing  as 


112 

knowable,  for  it  really  denies  all  the  knowable  and  all 
the  real — omne  scibile  et  omne  reale." 

In  the  second  part  of  Mr.  Spencer's  work  on 
"The  Knowable,"  "the  cosmos  is  a  ceaseless  evo- 
lution; is,  so  to  speak,  in  a  state  of  perpetual 
flux  and  reflux,  in  which  diffusion  of  one  group 
of  phenomena  is  followed  by  the  birth  of  anoth- 
er, in  endless  rotation,  or  life  from  death,  and 
death  from  life.  Dissolution  follows  concentra- 
tion 'in  eternal  alternation,'  or  both  go  on  to- 
gether. 

"This  is  not  a  new  doctrine,  but  substantially  the 
doctrine  of  a  school  of  Greek  philosophers,  warred 
against  both  by  Plato  and  Aristotle,  that  all  things  are 
in  a  state  of  ceaseless  motion,  of  growth  and  decay,  in 
which  corruption  proceeds  from  generation,  and  gen- 
eration from  corruption,  in  which  death  is  born  of  life, 
and  life  is  born  of  death.  Our  cosmic  philosophers  on- 
ly repeat  the  long  since  exploded  errors  of  the  old  cos- 
mists.  But  pass  over  this. 

"The  author  is  treating  of  the  knowable.  We  ask 
him,  then,  how  he  contrives  to  know  that  there  is  any 
such  evolution  as  he  asserts.  .  .  .  Does  he  know 
that  he  is  only  a  certain  concentration  of  matter  and 
force  resulting  from  a  certain  diffusion  or  loss  of  mo- 
tion? Can  he  not  only  think  but  prove  it?  But  all 
proof,  all  demonstration,  as  all  reasoning,  nay,'  sensible 
.intuition  itself,  depends  on  the  principle  of  cause  and 
effect;  for,  unless  we  can  assert  that  the  sensation 
within  is  caused  by  some  object  without,  that  affects 
the  sensible  organism,  we  can  assert  nothing  outside 
of  us,  not  even  a  phenomenon  or  external  appearance. 
How  does  the  author  know,  or  can  he  know,  that  he 
differs  from  the  ape  only  in  the  different  combination 
of  matter,  motion  and  force? 

"Mr.  Spencer,  in  his  work  on  'Biology,'  asserts  that 


113 

life  results  from  the  mechanical,  chemical,  and  elec- 
trical arrangement  of  the  particles  of  matter.  If  this 
were  so,  it  would,  on  the  author's  own  principles,  ex- 
plain nothing.  It  would  be  only  saying  that  a  certain 
group  of  phenomena  is  accompanied  by  another  group, 
which  we  call  life,  but  not  that  there  is  any  causal  re- 
lation between  them.  That  the  supposed  arrangement 
of  the  particles  of  matter  originates  the  life,  Mr.  Spen- 
cer cannot  assert  without  the  intuition  of  cause,  and 
causes  he  either  denies  or  banishes  to  the  unknowable. 

"Mr.  Spencer  protests  against  being  regarded  as  an 
Atheist,  for  he  denies  the  self -existence  of  the  universe, 
and  neither  aflirms  nor  denies  the  existence  of  God. 
But  Atheist  means  simply  no-theist ;  arid,  if  he  does 
not  assert  that  God  is,  he  certainly  is  an  Atheist.  It  is 
not  necessary,  in  order  to  be  an  Atheist,  to  make  a  pos- 
itive denial  of  God.  .  .  .  What  is  asserted  is  not 
God,  and  is  not  pretended  to  be  the  God  of  theism,  but 
the  reality  or  substance  of  the  cosmos,  and  indistin- 
guishable from  it.  It  is  the  real,  as  the  phenomena 
are  the  apparent,  cosmos. 

"The  author  denies  that  he  is  a  Pantheist,  for  he  de- 
nies the  hypothesis  of  self -creation;  but,  if  he  is  not  a 
Pantheist,  it  is  only  because  he  does  not  call  the  un- 
knowable infinite  power  or  being  which  he  asserts  as 
the  reality  of  the  cosmos,  that  is,  the  real  cosmos,  by 
the  name  of  God.  7)m.9,  or  The^a.  J3ut,  asserting  that 
power  as  the  reality  or  substance  of  the  cosmic  phe- 
nomena, is  precisely  what  is  meant  by  Pantheism.  .  . 

"The  only  difference  between  Atheism  and  Pan- 
theism is  purely  verbal.  The  Atheist  calls  the  reality 
asserted,  cosmos  or  Nature,  and  the  Pantheist  calls  it 
God;  but  both  assert  one  and  the  same  thing." 


CHAPTER    XVII. 

CRITICISMS  BY  PROFESSOR  BIRKS  AND  MONSIEUR 
LITTRE. 

PROFESSOR  BIRKS.— "First  Principles"  was 
criticised  in  1876,  by  Professor  Thomas  Rawson 
Birks,  of  Cambridge,  England. 

The  Professor  criticizes  severely  some  of  Mr. 
Spencer's  statements  in  regard  to  the  forces  of 
attraction  and  repulsion,  denying  that  matter 
can  both  attract  and  repel  by  the  same  law. 

Quoting  from  Mr.  Spencer  the  statement  that 
"the  widest,  deepest,  and  most  certain  of  all 
facts  is  that  the  Power  which  the  universe  man- 
ifests to  us,  is  wholly  inscrutable,"  the  Professor 
thus  comments  thereon: 

"Such,  briefly,  is  the  sum  of  the  whole  doctrine;  and 
it  contains  five  or  six  self-contradictions.  .  .  .  That 
it  exists;  that  it  is  not  an  attribute,  but  either  thing  or 
person;  that  it  is  one  person  or  thing,  and  not  many; 
that  it  is  distinct  from  the  universe  which  manifests 
it;  that  it  is  really  manifested  by  the  universe;  that  it 
is  a  Power  and  not  a  mere  Impotence;  are  six  truths 
affirmed  concerning  it  in  the  very  definition  which 
speaks  of  it  as  utterly  inscrutable  and  unknown. 
(114) 


115 

"And  if  we  add  to  these  the  statements  which  pres- 
ently follow,  that  it  stands  in  a  relation  of  contrast  to 
the  Relative,  (p.  91,)  that  it  is  'the  persistent  body  of  a 
thought  to  which  we  can  give  no  shape,  and  the  object 
of  an  irresistible  belief,'  (p.  93,)  that  it  is  'a  something, 
the  concept  of  which  is  formed  by  combining  many 
concepts,  deprived  of  their  limits  and  conditions,'  (p. 
95,)  that  it  is  'an  actuality  lying  behind  appearances,' 
(p.  97,)  that  it  is  in  such  close  relation  to  the  relative 
realities,  that  every  change  in  one  may  be  viewed  as 
representing  an  answering  change  in  the  other,  so  that 
the  relatives  and  absolutes  are  practically  equivalent, 
(p.  162,)  and  finally,  that  more  or  less  constant  relations 
in  the  absolute  beyond  consciousness  are  matter  of  ex- 
perience, and  generate  like  relations  in  our  states  of 
consciousness,  (Test  of  Truth,  p.  548,)  we  may  see  the 
force  of  Mr.  Mill's  satirical  remark,  that  the  doctrine 
recognizes  as  attainable  a  surprising  and  almost  pro- 
digious amount  of  knowledge  of  the  Unknowable." — 
[Modern  Phys.  Fat.,  etc.,  pp.  26,  27. 

Coming  to  the  department  of  Physics,  and  the 
discussion  of  the  laws  of  Force,  Professor  Birks 
gives  eleven  different  hypotheses  of  scientists  in 
regard  to  the  composition  of  matter. 

The  Professor  affirms  that  all  these  theories 
agree  in  offering  a  hypothesis  more  or  less  defi- 
nite, and  capable  of  becoming  the  subject  of 
mathematical  reasoning  and  calculation. 

"The  doctrine  laid  down  in  the  'First  Principles'  has 
a  character  precisely  opposite.  It  is  a  physical  theory 
composed  simply  of  abstract,  metaphysical  terms,  that 
may  be  applied  indifferently  to  a  thousand  varying  hy- 
potheses, and  cannot  therefore  advance  us  a  single 
step  in  the  path  of  genuine  discovery.  But  it  has  a 
still  worse  fault.  It  is  not  only  vague  and  indefinite, 
but  self-contradictory." 


116 

Professor  Birks  points  out  seventeen  maxims 
upon  which  he  says  Mr.  Spencer  insists  in  his 
theory  of  the  constitution  of  matter.  After  spe- 
cifying these  in  detail,  he  says  that  all  but  two 
are  untrue,  self -contradictory,  or  absurd. 

Quoting  from  Mr.  Spencer  the  following: 
''Matter  cannot  be  conceived  except  as  manifest- 
ing forces  of  attraction  and  repulsion;  we  are 
obliged  to  think  of  all  objects  as  made  up  of 
parts  that  attract  and  repel  each  other;"  Profes- 
sor Birks  proceeds: 

"Here  we  have  been  told,  just  before,  that  we  can- 
not decide  whether  the  phenomena  of  change  arise 
from  both  attractions  and  repulsions,  or  from  one  of 
these  two  kinds  of  force  only.  And  now  we  are  told 
the  exact  reverse,  that  we  are  obliged  to  believe  in  that 
duality  of  the  action  of  force  which  has  just  been  pro- 
nounced to  be  beyond  the  range  of  our  knowledge,  and 
to  be  inconceivable.  This  constant  oscillation  and 
confusion  of  thought  is  most  wearisome  and  vexatious 
for  any  reader  who  desires  really  to  gain  insight  into 
the  questions  in  debate."— [Mod.  Ph.  F.,  p.  208. 

The  passage  in  "First  Principles"  concerning 
central  forces  had,  previous  to  this  attack,  been 
severely  criticised.  It  was  omitted  in  the  later 
editions. 

In  an  Appendix  to  one  of  these  editions 
of  "First  Principles,"  Mr.  Spencer  explains 
why  he  had  omitted  the  passage  in  question 
from  the  later  editions.  He  says  that  the  pass- 
age was  suppressed  to  remove  a  stumbling-block 
out  of  the  way  of  future  readers,  and  to  deprive 
opponents  of  the  opportunity  of  evading  the 


117 

general  argument  of  the  chapter  by  opening  a 
side-issue  on  a  point  not  essential  to  its  argu- 
ment. 

Moreover,  Mr.  Spencer  denies  that  he  assert- 
ed that  there  were  any  central  forces  of  matter 
acting  or  manifesting  themselves  in  the  way 
stated.  He  says  that  what  was  included  in  his 
assertion,  was, 

"That  given  a  central  force,  and  such  is  the  law  accord- 
ing to  which  it  will  vary.  Nothing  is  said  concerning 
the  existence  of  any  central  force." 

And  in  illustration  of  his  argument,  he  asks: 
"  When  I  assert  that  of  the  heat  radiating  in  all  di- 
rections from  a  point,  the  quantity  falling  on  a  given 
surface  necessarily  decreases  as  the  square  of  the  dis- 
tance increases,  do  I  thereby  assert  the  necessary  ex- 
istence of  the  heat  which  conforms  to  this  law  ?" 

An  ordinary  thinker  would  reply: 

"Yes,  you  do.  You  are  here  referring  to  a  law  which 
is  supposed  to  have  been  established  from  observations 
and  experiments  on  the  action  or  manifestation  of 
heat.  If  there  is  no  heat,  there  is  no  law  of  heat.  If 
you  assert  the  law,  you  by  necessary  implication  assert 
the  existence  of  heat." 

Because  Professor  Birks  so  understood  him, 
Mr.  Spencer  thinks  he  did  him  great  injustice. 
He  says: 

"My  proposition — central  forces  vary  universally  as 
the  squares  of  the  distances,  he  actually  transforms 
into  the  proposition — there  is  a  cosmical  force  which 
varies  inversely  as  the  squares  of  the  distances." 

Well,  was  not  Mr.  Spencer  writing  about  a 
cosmical  force?  Whatever  might  be  his  views 


118 

as  to  the  nature  of  force,  he  here,  by  necessary 
implication,  asserts  its  existence. 

His  argument  that  the  statement  of  a  law  in 
physics  does  not  necessarily  imply  the  existence 
of  that  of  which  the  law  is  asserted,  is  as  if  he 
were  to  say,  when  speaking  of  the  evolution  of 
society:  "I  do  not  mean  by  this  to  assert  that 
there  is  any  such  thing  as  a  society;  but  only, 
if  there  were  a  society,  this  is  the  way  in  which 
it  would  be  evolved."  Or,  "Given  a  society,  and 
this  would  be  the  law  of  its  evolution." 


CRITICISM    BY    MONS.  LITTRE. 

Mons.  E.  Littre,  the  eminent  French  philolo- 
gist and  philosopher,  in  his  preface  to  the 
'Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive"  of  Auguste 
Comte,  has  occasion  to  refer  to  the  philosophy 
of  Mr.  Spencer. 

He  says  that  M.  Laugel  considers  Spencer  as 
belonging  to  the  Positivist  school,  while  at  the 
same  time  speaking  of  him  as  a  metaphysician. 

"These  two  qualifications,"  says  M.  Littre, 
"are  incompatible.  He  who  is  a  metaphysician 
is  not  a  positivist — he  who  is  a  positivist  is  not 
a  metaphysician." 

M.  Littre  quotes  M.  Laugel  as  saying  of 
Mr.  Spencer  that  "he  divides  the  objects  of 
human  thought  into  two  categories:  that 
which  can  be  known,  and  that  which  cannot 
be  known;  the  Knowable  and  the  Unknowable." 
(Ce  qui  peut  etre  connu,  et  ce  qui  ne  peut  pas 


119 

etre  connu;  le  cognoscible  et  1'incognoscible.) 
M.  Laugel  then  states  the  doctrine  of  reconcili- 
ation of  religion  and  science. 

Commenting  on  these  extracts,  M.  Littre 
says: 

"There  is  eonfnsion  here,  so  that  one  cannot,  I  fear, 
keep  his  word  either  with  faith  or  science.  The  confu- 
sion is  in  the  assimilation  made  between  the  object  of 
faith  and  the  result  of  science. 

"To  my  mind,"  continues  M.  Littre,  "a  union  which 
brings  together  the  two  Unknowables  under  one  head 
is  more  nominal  than  real;  the  Unknowable  of  faith 
being  the  object  itself  of  faith,  and  the  Unknowable  of 
science  being  a  limit  at  which  one  is  stopped.  To  be 
an  object,  or  to  be  a  limit,  are  two  ideas  entirely  dis- 
tinct. (Etre  objet  ou  etre  limite  sont  deux  notions 
tres  distinctes.)  .  .  . 

"The  unknowable  is  really  the  unknown;  and  upon 
the  unknown  no  one  can  base  anything.  (Sur  Vincon- 
nu  mil  ne  put  rien  fonder.)  From  the  side  of  the 
Knoicablv  has  come  progress,  and  consequently  its 
social  regime."  (C'est  du  cote"  du  cognoscible  qu'ont 
passe  les  progres  et  par  consequent  leur  regime  so- 
cial.) 

"From  all  time,  faith  has  determined  the  Unknowa- 
ble; that  is  to  say,  has  taught  the  beginning  and  end 
of  things.  This  instruction  should  preserve  its  char- 
acter or  lose  it. 

"If  it  should  preserve  it,  since  science  declares  the 
Unknowable  indeterminable,  the  result  would  be  just 
what  it  really  is,  division  and  conflict.  The  reconcili- 
ation which  Mr.  Spencer  supposes  to  come  from  the 
Unknowable  cannot  be  effected. 

"If,  on  the  contrary,  faith  renounces  its  determina- 
tions, its  instruction  loses  its  character;  it  becomes  con- 
founded with  that  of  science.  There  is,  not  conciliation, 
but  absorption.  Then  it  can  complain  that  there  has 


120 

been  given  it  an  empty  word  in  place  of  its  realities; 
(un  mot  vide  en  place  de  ses  realite"s;)  and  that  in  the 
variable  limit  which  science  designates  the  unknowa- 
ble, it  does  not  obtain  even  a  faint  glimmering  of 
what  it  believes  and  hopes. 

u.  Mr.  Spencer  has  well  perceived  how  he  has  been 
led  to  determine  the  Unknowable;  calling  it  that  pow- 
er of  which  the  universe  is  the  manifestation ;  while 
declaring  inconsequent  and  contradictory  any  asser- 
tions whatever  relative  to  its  nature,  its  acts,  its  mo- 
tives. Nothing  shows  better  than  this  the  impossibil- 
ity of  the  attempted  reconciliation.  (Rien  ne  montre 
mieux  que  ceci  rimpossibilite*  de  la  conciliation  ten- 
tee.)  .... 

"The  attempt  to  confound  the  Unknowable  of  sci- 
ence with  that  of  faith  has,  then,  suffered  shipwreck  (a 
done  e"choue")." 


CHAPTER    XVIII. 

CRITICISMS     CONCLUDED.  —  WILFRED    WARD— ST. 
GEORGE  MIVART— A.  J.  BALFOUR. 

THE     CLOTHES      OF      RELIGION. 

WILFRED  WARD,  IN  THE  NATIONAL  REVIEW 
FOR  JUNE,  1884. — Referring  to  the  discussion 
between  Messrs.  Spencer  and  Harrison,  the  writ- 
er, after  quoting  from  one  of  Mr.  Harrison's  ar- 
ticles, says: 

"This  is,  to  my  mind,  quite  unanswerable  common 
sense.  Mr.  Spencer  has  no  right— has,  indeed,  no  log- 
ical power — to  have  his  cake  after  he  has  eaten  it.  ... 
To  suppose  that  by  dressing  up  nothing  he  can  make 
it  something —  ...  to  conceive  that  out  of  the  state- 
ments 'nothing  can  be  known,'  and  a  sort  of  a  something 
exists  beyond  our  knowledge,  we  can  evolve  the  abso- 
lutely certain  existence  of  an  unknowable  object  of 
worship,  consisting  of  an  Infinite  and  Eternal  Energy 
whence  all  things  proceed,  is  to  introduce  a  new  spe- 
cies of  Evolution  which  Mr.  Spencer  himself  could 
hardly  sanction  when  in  his  right  mind.  The  leap  is 
very  great;  and  Darwin  confesses  that  'Natura  non 
facit  saltum."  (Nature  makes  no  leaps.) 

The  writer  claims  that  the   Religion   of  Hu- 
(121) 


122 

manity,  advocated  by  Harrison,  is  no  better  than 
the  Religion  of  the  Unknowable  of  Spencer. 

"The  truth  seems  to  be  that  these  philosophers,  hav- 
ing conspired  together  to  kill  all  religion — the  very  es- 
sence of  which  is  a  reallv  existing  personal  God, 
known  to  exist,  and  accessible  to  the  prayers  of  His 
creatures — and  having,  as  they  suppose,  accomplished 
their  work  of  destruction  and  put  Eeligion  to  death, 
have  proceeded  to  divide  its  clothes  between  them. 

"The  saying  of  the  Psalmist,  which  was  applied  to 
other  slayers  of  their  God,  may  be  used  of  these  also — 
'Diviserunt  sibi  vestimenta  mea  et  super  vestem  meam 
miserunt  sortem.'  (They  parted  my  garments  among 
them  and  upon  my  vesture  they  cast  lots.) 

"The  ideas  of  Infinity,  Eternity,  and  Power,  which 
have  hitherto  clothed  the  Deity,  fell  to  Mr.  Spencer's 
share;  together  with  the  correlative  emotion  of  awe. 
Mr.  Harrison  came  in  for  a  larger  quantity.  .  .  .  Bro- 
therly love,  the  improvement,  moral,  mental  and  ma- 
terial, of  our  fellow-men,  self-sacrifice  for  the  general 
good,  devotion  to  an  ideal — here  are  some  of  the 
'clothes  of  religion'  which  Mr.  Harrison  and  the  Posit- 
ivists  have  appropriated.  .  .  . 

"Mr.  Spencer  dresses  up  the  Unknowable  with  Infin- 
ity, Eternity,  and  Energy;  Mr.  Harrison  dresses  up 
Humanity  with  Brotherly  Love  and  the  worship  of  an 
Ideal.  But  the  clothes  won't  fit.  The  world  may  be 
duped  for  a  time,  and  imagine  that  where  the  garments 
are,  there  the  reality  must  be;  but  this  cannot  last.  It 
is  not  the  cowl  that  makes  the  monk,  and  it  is  not  the 
clothes  that  make  religion." 


ST.  GEORGE  MIVART  IN  THE  DUBLIN  RE- 
VIEW.— An  elaborate  and  exhaustive  criticism  of 
Spencer's  Psychology  appeared  in  the  Dublin 
Review  at  various  times  during  the  years  extend- 


123 

ing  from  1874  to  1880.  It  consisted  of  nine 
parts,  and  was  entitled  "An  Examination  of  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer's  Psychology."  Part  I  was 
published  in  the  October  number,  1874,  and  Part 
IX  in  the  January  number,  1880. 

Mr.  Mivart  antagonizes  Spencer's  Psychology 
in  important  points. 

In  the  fourth  article,  published  in  the  April 
number,  1877,  in  closing  his  criticism  on  the  first 
volume,  he  says: 

"This  first  volume,  therefore,  full  as  it  is  of  ingen- 
ious and  suggestive  physiological  thoughts,  and  admir- 
able as  a  thesaurus  of  explanations  of  brute  psychisms, 
leaves  the  arguments  for  the  radical  distinctness  of 
intellect  from  sensation,  not  only  unimpaired,  but  re- 
inforced." 

After  reviewing  the  first  part  of  the  second 
volume,  he  says: 

"At  the  end  of  these  eight  chapters,  we  must,  then, 
(as  it  appears  to  me,)  recognize  the  futility  of  Mr.  Spen- 
cer's attempt  to  reduce  the  reasoning  process  to  even 
an  intellectual  reflex  comparison  of  relations  as  such; 
a  fortiori,  then,  he  fails  to  reduce  it  to  that  sort  of  au- 
tomatic action  which  he  seems  alone  to  recognize." 

THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  BELIEF:  BY  RT.  HON.  A. 
J.  BALFOUR,  LONDON,  1895. — "Where  the  physi- 
cist assumes  actual  atoms,  and  motions,  and 
forces,  Mill  saw  nothing  but  'permanent  possi- 
bilities of  sensation,'  and  Spencer  knows  no- 
thing but  the  'Unknowable.'  " 

Speaking  of  the  Unknowable,  Mr.  Balfour 
says: 


124 

"For  any  thing  I  am  here  prepared  to  allege  to  the 
contrary,  this  may  be  real  enough;  but  unfortunately, 
it  has  not  the  kind  of  reality  imperatively  required  by 
science.  It  is  not  in  space.  It  is  not  in  time.  It  pos- 
sesses neither  mass  nor  extension,  nor  is  it  capable  of 
motion.  Its  very  name  implies  that  it  eludes  the 
grasp  of  thought,  and  cannot  be  caught  up  into  formu- 
lae. Whatever  purpose,  therefore,  such  an  'object'  may 
subserve  in  the  universe  of  things,  it  is  as  useless  as  a 
'permanent  possibility'  itself  to  provide  subject-matter 
for  scientific  treatment. 

"If  these  [the  'Unknowable'  of  Spencer  and  the  'per- 
manent possibilities  of  sensation'  of  Mill]  be  all  that 
truly  exist  outside  the  circle  of  impressions  and  ideas, 
then  is  all  science  turned  to  foolishness,  and  evolution 
stands  confessed  as  a  mere  figment  of  the  imagination. 
Man,  or  rather  'I',  become  not  merely  the  centre  of  the 
world,  but  am  the  world.  Beyond  me  and  my  ideas 
there  is  either  nothing,  or  nothing  that  can  be  known. 
The  problems  about  which  we  disquiet  ourselves  in  vain, 
the  origin  of  things  and  the  modes  of  their  develop- 
ment, the  inner  constitution  of  matter  and  its  relations 
to  mind,  are  questions  about  nothing,  interrogations 
shouted  into  the  void.  The  baseless  fabric  of  the  sci- 
ences, like  the  great  globe  itself,  dissolves  at  the  touch 
of  theories  like  these,  leaving  not  a  rack  behind.''— 
[Foundations  of  Belief,  pp.  125,  126. 

Commenting  on  what  Mr.  Spencer  says  as  to 
the  conclusions  of  Science,  Mr.  Balfour  quotes: 

"To  ask  whether  science  is  substantially  true,  is  [he 
observes]  much  like  asking  whether  the  sun  gives 
light?" — [First  Prin.,  p.  19.]  It  is,  I  admit,  very  much 
like  it.  But  then,  on  Mr.  Spencer's  principles,  does  the 
sun  give  light?  After  due  consideration,  we  shall 
have  to  admit,  I  think,  that  it  does  not.  For  it  is  a 
statement  which,  if  made  intelligently,  not  only  in- 
volves the  comprehension  of  matter,  space,  time,  and 


125 

force,  which  are,  according  to  Mr.  Spencer,  all  incom- 
prehensible; but  there  is  the  further  difficulty  that,  if 
his  system  is  to  be  believed,  'what  we  are  conscious  of 
as  properties  of  matter,  even  down  to  weight  and  resist- 
ance, are  but  subjective  affections  produced  by  object- 
ive agencies  which  are  unknown  and  unknowable.'— 
[Prin.  of  Psy.,  Vol.  II,  p.  493. 

"  It  would  seem,  therefore,  either  that  the  sun  is  a 
'subjective  affection,'  in  which  case  it  can  hardly  be 
said  to  'give  light';  or,  it  is  'unknown/  and  'unknowa- 
ble,' in  which  case  no  assertion  respecting  it  can  be  re- 
garded as  supplying  us  with  any  very  flattering  speci- 
men of  scientific  certitude." — [Foundations  of  Belief, 
p.  295. 

To  this  Mr.  Spencer  replies  by  saying  that 
Mr.  Balfour  holds  the  same  view;  citing  page 
284  of  Balfour's  "Foundations  of  Belief." 

But  all  that  Mr.  Balfour  there  says  is  that 
when  two  friends  "read  together  the  same  de- 
scription of  a  landscape,"  it  does  not  "stir  within 
them  precisely  the  same  quality  of  sentiment,  or 
evoke  precisely  the  same  subtle  associations;" 
arguing  thence  that  if  no  representation  of  the 
splendors  of  Nature  can  produce  in  us  any  per- 
fect identity  of  admiration,  we  cannot  expect 
the  definitions  of  theology  or  science  to  produce 
in  us  any  perfect  identity  of  belief. 

It  certainly  seems  difficult  to  discover,  in  any 
thing  that  is  here  said  by  Mr.  Balfour,  sufficient 
to  justify  the  statement  that  he  holds  the  same 
view  as  Spencer  in  regard  to  "ultimate  scientific 
ideas."  The  point  was  whether  Mr.  Spencer,  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  his  philoso- 
phy, had  sufficiently  recognized  the  objective 


126 

existence  of  the  material  world .  There  is  assur- 
edly no  admission  that  he  had  done  so  in  what 
Balfour  had  said  concerning  the  different  effect 
which  the  same  description  of  a  landscape  would 
have  upon  two  individuals. 

So  far  from  agreeing  with  Mr.  Spencer  in  his 
view  as  to  the  entire  unreliability  of  sense  per- 
ceptions, Mr.  Balfour  says: 

"By  the  very  constitution  of  our  being  we  seem 
practically  driven  to  assume  a  real  world  in  corre- 
spondence with  our  ordinary  judgments  of  perception/' 
—[Foundations  of  Belief,  p.  255. 

The  fact  that  two  persons  are  differently  af- 
fected by  the  contemplation  of  a  landscape,  so 
far  from  proving  that  the  landscape  itself  is 
merely  a  subjective  affection  of  each,  or  a  state 
of  his  consciousness,  proves  directly  the  reverse: 
that  the  landscape  is  there,  and  that  the  two 
persons  are  differently  affected  by  it  because 
they  are  themselves  differently  constituted.  On 
the  other  theory  there  would  be  two  landscapes, 
while  now  there  is  but  one.  They  are  both 
looking  at  the  same  landscape.  Where  one  sees 
water  the  other  sees  water;  where  one  sees  trees 
the  other  sees  trees;  and  where  one  sees  a  moun- 
tain the  other  sees  a  mountain;  though  these  ob- 
jects, either  in  themselves  or  when  grouped  to- 
gether, may  make  a  somewhat  different  impres- 
sion upon  each. 

The  fact  that  the  two  persons  see  at  the  same 
time  and  in  the  same  place,  what  they  find  in  con- 
versation to  be  in  its  outline  and  general  fea- 


127 

tures  the  same  landscape,  proves  that  the 
landscape  itself,  as  they  know  it,  exists  or  ob- 
tains beyond  the  consciousness  of  either.  They 
know  it  was  there  before  they  saw  it,  and  they 
know  that  after  they  shall  have  ceased  to  look 
upon  it,  it  will  still  remain  in  the  same  portion 
of  universal  space. 

The  criticisms  quoted  in  this  work,  taken  to- 
gether, constitute  a  symposium  of  the  views  of 
some  of  the  best  writers  and  most  profound 
thinkers  of  the  latter  half  of  the  present  century 
—representatives  of  all  shades  of  opinion,  from 
the  Positivist  and  Agnostic  to  the  Deist  and  the 
Christian;  also  of  both  phases  of  Christian  be- 
lief, Catholic  and  Protestant. 

The  few  chapters  that  remain  will  be  devoted 
to  an  examination  of  the  Spencerian  metaphys- 
ical philosophy,  with  particular  reference  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  Unknowable,  and  to  the  claim 
that  is  made  that  that  doctrine  has  effected  a 
reconciliation  between  Science  and  Religion. 

In  pursuing  this  examination,  the  writer  hopes 
at  least  to  be  able  to  make  his  statements  intel- 
ligible. Any  thing  in  metaphysics  which  is  rea- 
sonable and  true  ought  to  be  capable  of  being 
brought  home  to  the  comprehension  of  every 
careful  and  thoughtful  reader. 


CHAPTER    XIX. 


SPACE   AND   TIME — CONSCIOUSNESS. 


SPACE   AND  TIME. 

Speaking  of  space  and  time,  Mr.  Spencer 
says: 

"To  say  that  space  and  time  exist  objectively,  is  to 
say  that  they  are  entities.  The  assertion  that  they  are 
non-entities  is  self -destructive:  non-entities  are  non- 
existences;  and  to  allege  that  non-existences  exist  ob- 
jectively, is  a  contradiction  in  terms." — [First  Princi- 
ples, Sec.  15. 

Since,  therefore,  we 

"  Cannot  conceive  of  space  and  time  as  entities,  and 
are  equally  disabled  from  conceiving  them  as  either 
the  attributes  of  entities  or  non-entities,"  and  since  "we 
are  compelled  to  think  of  them  as  existing  and  yet  can- 
not bring  them  within  those  conditions  under  which 
existences  are  represented  in  thought,  the  conclusion 
is  that  space  and  time  are  wholly  incomprehensible."— 
[Ibid. 

Is  there  not  an  unnecessary  difficulty   here 
raised  by  the  ambiguous  use  of  the  terms  "exist" 
and  "existences"?    Existence  is  here  used  as  sy- 
nonymous with  entity;  being;  substance;  and  a 
(128) 


129 

non-entity  is  declared  to  be  a  non-existence. 
But  "exist"  has  another  meaning  equally  legiti- 
mate, that  is,  "to  manifest  itself;  to  continue  to 
be."  In  this  sense  space  and  time  exist  object- 
ively. They  are  manifested;  they  continue  to 
be. 

Again: 

"Of  space  and  time  we  cannot  assert  either  limita- 
tion or  the  absence  of  limitation." 

Is  this  correct?  On  the  contrary,  do  we  not, 
every  day,  in  the  ordinary  transactions  of  life, 
assert  limitation  both  of  space  and  time?  Of 
space  we  assert  limitation  every  time  we  make  a 
measurement  of  any  portion  of  the  space  about 
us,  for  any  purpose  whatever.  And  of  time  we 
assert  limitation  whenever  we  speak  of  a  year,  a 
day,  or  an  hour.  If  the  statement  had  been, 
"When  we  speak  of  space  and  time  generally, 
we  do  not  assert  either  limitation  or  the  absence 
of  limitation,"  it  would  have  been  correct.  But 
that  would  have  been  another  proposition. 

Once  more: 

"Space  and  time  are  wholly  incomprehensible."  We 
are  compelled  to  think  of  them  as  existing,  and  yet 
cannot  bring  them  within  those  conditions  under 
which  existences  are  represented  in  thought." 

What  is  the  difficulty  in  comprehending  a  lim- 
ited portion  of  space  or  a  limited  period  of  time? 
When  thinking  of  space,  as  John  Stuart  Mill 
justly  remarks: 

"We  leave  to  it  all  that  belongs  to  it  as  space— its 
three  dimensions,  with  their  geometrical  properties. 
...  If  an  object  which  has  these  well  marked  posi- 


130 

live  attributes,  is  unthinkable  because  it  has  a  nega- 
tive attribute  as  well,  the  number  of  thinkable  objects 
must  be  remarkably  small."— [Examination  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  Philosophy. 


CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Nor  is  Mr.  Spencer  always  exact  in  his  defini- 
tions. Thus  he  says: 

"Consciousness  implies  perpetual  change  and  the  per- 
petual establishment  of  relations  between  its  success- 
ive phases." — [First  Prin.,  Sec.  19. 

Here  is  an  ambiguity  in  the  use  of  the  word 
"perpetual,"  which  must  have  been  employed  in 
the  sense  of  "continuous"  or  "successive." 

In  the  explanations  which  preceded  this  state- 
ment, the  author  had  said: 

"Our  states  of  consciousness  occur  in  succession.  Is 
this  chain  of  states  of  consciousness  infinite  or  finite? 
We  cannot  say  infinite;  not  only  because  we  have  indi- 
rectly reached  the  conclusion  that  there  was  a  period 
when  it  commenced,  but  also  because  all  infinity  is  in- 
conceivable— an  infinite  series  included.  We  cannot 
say  finite;  for  we  have  no  knowledge  of  either  of  its 
ends.  Go  back  in  memory  as  far  as  we  may,  we  are 
wholly  unable  to  identify  our  first  states  of  conscious- 
ness; the  perspective  of  our  thoughts  vanishes  in  a  dim 
obscurity  where  wre  can  make  out  nothing.  Similarly 
at  the  other  extreme.  We  have  no  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  a  termination  to  the  series  at  a  future  time."- 
[First  Prin.,  Sec.  19. 

Here  the  author  says  we  cannot  say  that  the 
chain  of  states  of  consciousness  is  infinite,  be- 
cause we  have  reached  the  conclusion  that  there 


131 

was  a  period  when  it  commenced.  This  is  equiv- 
alent to  saying,  we  cannot  say  that  the  chain 
of  states  is  infinite  because  we  have  reached  the 
conclusion  that  it  is  finite.  Yet  in  the  very 
next  sentence  he  says  we  cannot  say  the  chain  is 
finite,  because  we  have  no  knowledge  of  either 
of  its  ends.  But  when  we  "reached  the  conclu- 
sion" that  "there  was  a  period  when  it  com- 
menced," did  we  not  assert  a  knowledge  of  one 
of  its  ends? 

He  further  says: 

"Go  back  in  memory  as  far  as  we  may,  we  are  wholly 
unable  to  identify  our  first  states  of  consciousness." 

But  is  that  material?  Does  the  existence  or 
non-existence  of  any  thing  in  our  experience  de- 
pend upon  the  memory  of  it  ?  Go  back  in  mem- 
ory as  far  as  we  may,  we  are  wholly  unable  to 
identify  the  moment  of  our  birth.  Therefore 
we  were  never  born. 

That  the  child  has  its  first  states  of  conscious- 
ness, is  manifest  from  the  origin  of  conscious- 
ness, as  given  by  the  author  himself.  He  says: 

"During  the  first  stage  of  incipient  intelligence,  be- 
fore the  feelings  produced  by  intercourse  with  the  out- 
er world  have  been  put  in  order,  there  are  no  cogni- 
tions, strictly  so  called;  and,  as  every  infant  shows  us, 
these  slowly  emerge  out  of  the  confusion  of  unfolding 
consciousness  as  fast  as  the  experiences  are  arranged 
into  groups— as  fast  as  the  most  frequently  repeated 
sensations,  and  their  relations  to  each  other,  become 
familiar  enough  to  admit  of  their  recognition  as  such 
or  such,  whenever  they  recur." — [First  Prin.,  Sec.  24. 

Here  is  an  admirable,  scientific   statement  of 


132 

the  origin  of  consciousness.  At  first,  there  is 
none.  Then,  it  is  gradually  unfolded,  like  a 
flower.  Is  there  any  difficulty  here  in  seeing  a 
first  state  of  consciousness?  And  because  the 
individual,  in  after  years,  cannot  remember,  or 
is  not  aware  of,  the  first  state  of  consciousness, 
does  that  prove  there  was  none? 

Not  only  does  Mr.  Spencer  show  the  origin 
of  consciousness  in  the  child,  but  he  traces  the 
origin  of  consciousness  in  animals. 

But  when  Mr.  Sidgwick  called  attention  to  a 
passage  wherein  Spencer,  in  describing  "that 
differentiation  of  the  physical  from  the  psychical 
life"  which  accompanies  advancing  organization 
and  advancing  development  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem, had  said,  "as  nervous  integration  advances 
there  must  result  an  unbroken  series  of  the 
changes"  constituting  psychical  life  —  "there 
must  arise  a  consciousness,"  Mr.  Spencer  says: 
"Now,  I  admit,  that  here  is  an  apparent  incon- 
sistency. I  ought  to  have  said  that  there  must 
result  an  unbroken  series  of  these  changes, 
which,  taking  place  in  the  nervous  system  of  a 
highly  organized  creature,  gives  coherence  to  its 
conduct,  and  along  with  which  we  assume  con- 
sciousness, because  consciousness  goes  along 
with  coherent  conduct  in  ourselves."  Seeing 
that  the  tracing  of  the  origin  of  consciousness 
thus  distinctly  would  not  consist  with  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Unknowable,  which  he  had  based  up- 
on a  dim  or  vague  consciousness — for,  if  the 
doctrine  is  placed  upon  this  basis,  animals  also 


133 

should  have  a  consciousness  of  the  Unknowable 
—he  here,  for  the  first  time,  implies  doubt  or 
uncertainty  as  to  the  existence  of  consciousness 
in  animals. 

But  the  existence  of  consciousness  in  animals 
cannot  be  ignored  by  Mr.  Spencer,  who  says 
(Psychology,  p,  572) ,  that  the  common  notion 
that  there  is  a  line  of  demarcation  between  rea- 
son and  instinct  has  no  foundation  whatever  in 
fact;  and  (ibid.  p.  573)  that  there  is  a  series  of 
insensible  steps  by  which  brute  rationality  may 
pass  into  human  rationality. 

Nor  is  animal  consciousness  habitually  ig- 
nored by  Mr.  Spencer.  Thus,  in  his  criticism 
of  Bain  on  the  Emotions  and  the  Will,  he  speaks 
several  times  of  the  consciousness  of  birds.— 
[Essays,  Vol.  I,  p.  256. 

So,  also,  in  his  discussion  with  Mr.  Marti- 
neau,  he  speaks  of  the  newly  hatched  chicken  as 
having  "feeling,  and  therefore  consciousness." 
[Ib.  p.  378. 

To  come  back  to  the  subject  of  states  of  con- 
sciousness. Mr.  Spencer  says  we  cannot  say 
that  the  chain  of  states  of  consciousness  is  in- 
finite and  we  cannot  say  that  it  is  finite.  But  if 
there  be  any  such  chain,  it  must  be  either  finite 
or  infinite  in  duration.  Hence  this  is  equivalent 
to  asserting  that  we  cannot  say  that  there  is  any 
chain  of  consciousness  at  all. 

Again,  he  says  we  cannot  say  that  the 
chain  of  states  (of  consciousness)  is  finite,  be- 
cause we  do  not  know  the  other  end  of  the  chain. 


134 

"We  have  no  immediate  knowledge  of  a  termination 
to  the  series  at  a  future  time." 

Neither  have  we  any  immediate  knowledge  of 
any  future  state  of  consciousness.  And  if  the 
fact  that  we  do  not  know  in  advance  the  last 
state  of  consciousness,  proves  that  there  is  to  be 
no  last  state  of  consciousness;  then  the  fact  that 
we  do  not  know  in  advance  any  future  state  of 
consciousness,  proves  that  there  is  to  be  no  fu- 
ture state  of  consciousness. 

The  author  follows  up  these  statements  with  a 
formal  argument  to  prove  that  there  can  be  no 
last  state  of  consciousness.  Thus: 

"If  ceaseless  change  of  state  is  the  condition  on 
which  alone  consciousness  exists,  then  when  the  sup- 
posed last  state  has  been  reached  by  the  completion  of 
the  preceding  change,  change  has  ceased;  therefore 
consciousness  has  ceased;  therefore  the  supposed  last 
state  is  not  a  state  of  consciousness  at  all ;  therefore 
there  can  be  no  last  state  of  consciousness." — [First 
Prin.,  Sec.  19. 

Whatever  apparent  validity  there  may  be  in 
this  very  abstruse  argument,  is  owing  to  the  use 
of  the  term  ''ceaseless."  Strike  that  out,  and 
substitute  "successive,"  and  the  whole  argument 
falls  to  the  ground.  The  changes  in  the  states 
of  consciousness  will  continue  to  be  success- 
ive so  long  as  consciousness  lasts ;  which  is  all 
that  can  be  expected.  When  the  nervous 
system  on  which  consciousness  depends  for 
its  existence,  gives  way,  then  consciousness 
ceases. 


135 

In  his  "Principles  of  Biology,"  Vol.  I.  Sec.  1, 
Mr.  Spencer  speaks  of  nervous  disturbances 
which  are  communicated  to  the  chief  nervous 
centre,  and  "there  constitute  consciousness." 
These  disturbances  are  caused  by  the  changes 
in  the  relations  of  phenomena,  which  produce 
sensations  of  touch  and  pressure,  of  heat  and 
cold,  etc. 

Does  not  the  consciousness  thus  produced 
cease  when  the  nervous  system  is  destroyed  ? 
Is  it  claimed  that  there  is,  in  the  Spencerian 
philosophy,  any  form  of  consciousness  that  does 
not  depend  upon  the  nervous  system?  If  not, 
then  what  is  the  difficulty  in  arriving  at  the  last 
state  of  consciousness? 

What  validity  can  there  be  in  an  argument 
framed  for  the  purpose  of  disproving  a  fact 
which  is  not  only  attested  by  the  experience  of 
all  mankind,  but  which  necessarily  results  from 
the  author's  own  philosophy? 

When  a  person  has  arrived  at  the  last  stage 
of  his  conscious  existence,  then  is  his  last  state 
of  consciousness.  Though  he  may  not  know 
that  it  is  the  last,  yet  it  nevertheless  is,  in  fact, 
his  last  state  of  consciousness.  No  fine-spun, 
metaphysically  constructed  argument  can  over- 
throw this  plain  fact,  the  truth  of  which  is 
known  to  all  the  world.  We  should  hesitate 
to  believe  that  this  ingenious  argument  had 
been  made  in  aid  of  the  doctrine  of  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul.  That  doctrine  ought  to  be 
permitted  to  stand  or  fall  on  its  own  merits, 


136 

without  the  adventitious  assistance  of  reasoning 
which  seems  strangely  out  of  place  when  we  con- 
sider the  system  of  philosophy  in  which  it  ap- 
pears. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THE  UNKNOWABLE. — FIRST  CAUSE. 

We  cannot  rightly  affirm  the  existence  of  any 
thing  unless  we  know  that  it  exists.  And  we 
must  know  not  only  that  it  exists,  but  that  it  ex- 
ists in  relation,  since  we  know  nothing  except  as 
it  exists  in  relation.  But  if  it  exists  in  relation, 
then  it  is  knowable.  To  say  of  any  thing,  there- 
fore, that  it  exists,  is  to  say  that  it  is  knowable; 
and  to  say  that  it  is  unknowable  is  to  say  that  we 
cannot  affirm  that  it  exists. 

Again: 

The  Unknowable  is  also  unthinkable.  It  is 
trebly  unthinkable. —  [First  Principles,  Sec.  24. 

The  fact  that  any  other  hypothesis  is  unthink- 
able— cannot  be  formulated  in  thought — is,  in 
the  mind  of  Mr.  Spencer,  a  fatal  objection.  The 
Atheistic  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  universe  is 
rejected  for  that  reason.  The  Theistic  theory  is 
rejected  for  the  same  reason.  Pantheism,  for  the 
same  reason.  "It  is  not,"  he  says,  "a  question  of 
probability  or  credibility,  but  of  conceivability." 
—[First  Prin.,  Sec.  11. 

(137) 


138 

"  Each  of  these  theories  is  equally  vicious, 
equally  unthinkable." — [Ibid. 

In  the  first  volume  of  the  "Principles  of  Biol- 
ogy," Sec.  171,  speaking  of  the  Evolution  hy- 
pothesis, as  opposed  to  the  hypothesis  of  the 
special  creation  of  living  beings;  the  author  says 
of  the  latter,  "It  is  not  even  a  thinkable  hypoth- 
esis;" and  speaks  of  it  as  being,  for  that  reason, 
"illusive."  Of  the  former,  on  the  contrary,  he 
says: 

"Instead  of  being  a  mere  pseud-idea,  we  saw  that  it 
admitted  of  elaboration  into  a  definite  conception — so 
showing  its  legitimacy  as  a  hypothesis." 

In  Section  118,  also,  of  that  work,  writing  on 
the  same  subject,  he  says  of  the  special  creation 
hypothesis,  that  it  is  illusive  because  of  the  im- 
possibility of  realizing  it  in  thought. 

Yet  the  doctrine  of  the  Unknowable,  which  is 
confessedly  open  to  the  same  objection,  he  not 
only  considers  a  legitimate  hypothesis,  but  asks 
us  to  accept  as  "the  most  certain  of  all  truths." 

FIKST  CAUSE. 

The  Unknowable  is  posited  as  First  Cause. 
It  is  said  that  persistence  of  force  is  the  highest 
generalization  of  science;  and  that  known  force, 
or  "force  as  known  to  us,"  which  persists,  is  but 
the  symbol  or  correlative  of  an  unknown  force, 
which  unknown  force  is  posited  as  First  Cause 
of  all  phenomena. 

1.  What  is  meant  by  persistence  of  force  as 
the  highest  generalization  of  science? 


139 

Force  is  not  an  entity.     Force  is  an  attribute. 

Persistence  of  force  is  the  persistence  with 
which  matter,  whether  at  rest  or  in  motion,  man- 
if ests  certain  degrees  of  force  under  certain  con- 
ditions, and  the  persistence  with  which  force, 
though  disappearing  under  certain  conditions, 
reappears,  or  is  again  manifested,  under  other 
conditions. 

In  aid  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Unknowable,  Mr. 
Spencer  considers  force  an  entity.  At  times, 
again,  he  looks  upon  it  as  an  open  question 
whether  force  is  an  entity  or  not.  For  instance, 
he  says: 

"Leaving  undiscussed  the  question  whether  it  is  pos- 
sible to  conceive  of  force  apart  from  extending  some- 
thing exercising  it,"  etc.— [Essays,  Vol.  II,  p.  98. 

But  it  is  not  possible  to  conceive  of  force 
apart  from  extending  something  exercising  it; 
for  the  simple  reason  that  whenever  force  ap- 
pears, it  appears  as  having  been  exercised  by  an 
extended  something. 

"The  idea  of  resistance,"  says  Mr.  Spencer,  "cannot 
be  separated  in  thought  from  the  idea  of  an  extended 
body  which  offers  resistance."— [First  Prin.,  1897,  Sec. 
16,  p.  55. 

Now,  if  resistance,  being  a  manifestation  of 
force,  cannot  be  separated  in  thought  from  the 
idea  of  an  extended  body  which  offers  resist- 
ance, then  it  is  at  least  a  fair  inference,  that  no 
manifestation  of  force  can  be  separated  in 
thought  from  the  idea  of  an  extended  body 
which  manifests  such  force. 


140 

Accordingly  we  find  Mr.  Spencer  announcing 
substantially  this  very  proposition.  Speaking 
of  force,  he  says: 

"We  cannot  imagine  it  except  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  something  having  extension."  —  [First 
Prin.,  2d  Edition,  Sec.  18,  p.  60. 

Is  force  here  treated  as  an  entity,  or  as  an  at- 
tribute? 

2.  The  next  question  is,  how  do  we  arrive  at 
the  truth  of  the  proposition  that  persistence  of 
force  is  the  highest  generalization  of  science? 

The  process  is  the  familiar  one  of  abstraction 
and  generalization. 

Accompanying  the  process,  there  are  two  other 
cognate  processes:  inductive  and  deductive  rea- 
soning. We  make  investigations  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  external  world,  and  by  induction 
arrive  at  conclusions  concerning  the  attributes 
which  can  properly  be  predicated  of  objects. 

The  process  of  deductive  reasoning  has  been 
going  on,  also,  at  the  same  time — reasoning  of 
which,  as  is  well  known,  abstraction  and  gener- 
alization are  at  the  very  foundation. 

Mark,  now,  that  all  the  time,  in  the  progress 
of  this  threefold  process,  we  have  been  dealing 
with  attributes.  We  have  not  been  following  a 
chain  of  cause  and  effect.  That  is  a  different 
thing  entirely.  Not  but  that  cause  and  effect 
have  been  from  time  to  time  considered  in  con- 
nection with  these  processes.  The  relation  of 
cause  and  effect  sometimes  coincides  with  that 
of  premise  and  conclusion.  An  occasional  coin- 


141 

cidence  does  not,  however,  change  the  character 
of  the  process.  Writers  on  logic  have  specified 
the  confounding  of  these  relations  as  one  of  the 
most  fruitful  sources  of  confusion  of  thought. 

Since,  then,  we  have  arrived  at  the  persist- 
ence of  force  by  a  process  which  has  all  the  way 
been  a  logical  one — since  we  have  all  the  way 
been  dealing  in  attributes,  and  have  not  been 
following  a  chain  of  cause  and  effect — how  does 
it  come  that  when  we  have  arrived  at  the  highest 
attribute,  we  can  turn  around  and  predicate  that 
attribute  as  First  Cause  and  Ultimate  Being? 

Force  may  be  a  cause  of  certain  effects.  So 
may  other  attributes.  But  force  being  an  attri- 
bute, neither  force  as  known  to  us,  nor  unknown 
force,  can  be  First  Cause,  or  Absolute  Being. 
If  force  as  known  to  us  is  an  attribute,  then  un- 
known force  is  an  unknown  attribute,  and  cannot 
therefore  be  First  Cause  and  Absolute  Being. 

In  his  Essay  on  the  "Nature  of  Electricity," 
Mr.  Spencer  says: 

"It  cannot  be  that  what  in  the  first  case  produces  a 
change  of  state,  in  the  second  case  produces  an  entity" 

So  here  we  may  say,  it  cannot  be  that  what 
in  all  the  previous  stages  of  this  process  has  been 
an  attribute,  becomes  in  the  last  stage  an  entity. 

In  science,  a  cause  is  at  the  same  time  the  effect 
of  another  cause,  or  other  causes.  But  here  we 
have  posited  for  us  a  cause  which  is  not  the  ef- 
fect of  any  other  cause.  It  is  said  to  be  out  of 
relation.  But  a  cause  cannot  be  out  of  relation. 

The  effect  is  admitted  to  be  related  to  its 


142 

cause,  but  it  is  claimed  that  the  cause  is  not  re- 
lated to  its  effect.  We  have  a  relative,  but  no 
correlative — relation  without  correlation. 

If  Mr.  Spencer  has  a  right  to  posit  an  Un- 
knowable as  the  cause  of  phenomena,  why  has 
not  another  person,  A,  the  same  right  to  posit  a 
second  Unknowable  behind  the  first;  and  B,  a 
third  behind  the  second;  and  so  on?  An  end- 
less chain  of  Unknowables  would  be  much  more 
reasonable  than  a  single  Unknowable;  because 
such  a  chain  would  have  an  analogy  in  the  chain 
of  causation  known  to  science. 

Mr.  Spencer,  in  combating  the  theory  of  the 
self -creation  of  the  universe,  shows  that  such  a 
theory  would  require  two  existences,  one  behind 
the  other;  which  is  exactly  what  the  doctrine  of 
the  Unknowable  requires.  Assuming  that  such 
a  hypothesis,  besides  being  inconceivable,  upon 
which  he  lays  great  stress,  would  imply,  behind 
actual  existence,  potential  existence  passing  in- 
to actual  existence,  he  reasons  thus: 

"Moreover,  even  if  it  were  true  that  potential  exist- 
ence is  conceivable  as  a  different  thing  from  actual  ex- 
istence, and  that  the  transition  from  the  one  to  the 
other  can  be  mentally  realized  as  a  self-determined 
change,  we  should  still  be  no  forwarder:  the  problem 
would  simply  be  removed  a  step  back.  For  whence  the 
potential  existence  ?  This  would  just  as  much  require 
accounting  for  as  actual  existence;  and  just  the  same 
difficulties  would  meet  us.  Respecting  the  origin  of 
such  a  latent  power,  no  other  suppositions  could  be 
made  than  those  above  named — self-existence,  self-cre- 
ation, creation  by  external  agency.  The  self-existence 
of  a  potential  universe  is  no  more  conceivable  than  we 


143 

have  found  the  self-existence  of  the  actual  universe 
to  be.  The  self-creation  of  such  a  potential  universe 
would  involve  over  again  the  difficulties  here  stated— 
would  imply  behind  this  potential  universe  a  more  re- 
mote potentiality;  and  so  on,  in  an  infinite  series,  leav- 
ing us  at  last  no  forwarder  than  at  first.  While  to  as- 
sign as  the  source  of  this  potential  universe  an  external 
agency,  would  be  to  introduce  the  notion  of  a  poten- 
tial universe  for  no  purpose  whatever."— [First  Princi- 
ples, Sec.  11. 

Now,  let  us  paraphrase  this  passage  by  sub- 
stituting for  "potential  existence"  "the  Unknow- 
able;" and  we  have  the  following: 

Moreover,  even  if  it  were  true  that  the  Unknowable 
is  conceivable  as  a  different  thing  from  actual  existence, 
and  that  the  transition  from  the  one  to  the  other  can 
be  mentally  realized  as  a  self-determined  change,  we 
should  still  be  no  forwarder:  the  problem  would  simply 
be  removed  a  step  back.  For  whence  the  Unknowa- 
ble ?  This  would  just  as  much  require  accounting  for 
as  actual  existence;  and  just  the  same  difficulties 
would  meet  us.  Respecting  the  origin  of  such  a  latent 
power,  no  other  suppositions  could  be  made  than  those 
above  named — self-existence,  self -creation,  creation  by 
external  agency.  The  self-existence  of  an  Unknowa- 
ble is  no  more  conceivable  than  we  have  found  the 
self -existence  of  the  actual  universe  to  be.  The  self- 
creation  of  such  an  Unknowable  would  involve 
over  again  the  difficulties  here  stated — would  imply 
behind  this  Unknowable  a  more  remote  Unknowable; 
and  so  on,  in  an  infinite  series,  leaving  us  at  last  no 
forwarder  than  at  first.  While  to  assign  as  the  source 
of  the  Unknowable  an  external  agency,  would  be  to 
introduce  the  notion  of  an  Unknowable  for  no  purpose 
whatever, 


CHAPTER    XXI. 

THE  UNKNOWABLE  CONTINUED — CREATION — ATHE- 
ISM— AGNOSTICISM . 

Creation,  according  to  the  theological  sense  of 
the  term,  has  generally  been  understood  to  im- 
ply creation  of  the  world  out  of  nothing.  "  In 
the  beginning  God  created  the  heaven  and  the 
earth." 

The  Miltonian  conception  of  creation  from 
chaos  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  theory  of  evo- 
lution. 

Malebranche  held  that  all  phenomena  are 
presented  to  the  mind  by  continued  and  suc- 
cessive creations  from  instant  to  instant. 

"La  conservation  des  creatures  est  une  creation 
continued." 

These  are  the  three  theories  of  creation;  and 
it  is  difficult  to  conceive  any  other  theory. 

The  first  and  third  are  repudiated  by  Mr. 
Spencer.  Speaking  of  the  theory  of  creation  at 
the  beginning,  he  says: 

"The  production  of  matter  out  of  nothing  is  the  real 
mystery. 

(144) 


145 

"Even  supposing  that  the  genesis  of  the  universe 
could  really  be  represented  in  thought  as  the  result  of 
an  external  agency;  the  mystery  would  be  as  great  as 
ever;  for  there  would  still  arise  the  question — how 
came  there  to  be  an  external  agency  ?  To  account  for 
this,  only  the  same  three  hypotheses  are  possible — self- 
existence,  self-creation,  and  creation  by  external  agen- 
cy. Of  these,  the  last  is  useless;  it  commits  us  to  an 
infinite  series  of  such  agencies,  and  even  then  leaves 
us  where  we  were.  .  .  .  Those  who  cannot  conceive 
a  self -existent  universe,  and  who  therefore  assume  a 
creator  as  the  source  of  the  universe,  take  for  granted 
that  they  can  conceive  a  self -existent  creator.  The 
mystery  which  they  recognize  in  this  great  fact  sur- 
rounding them  on  every  side,  they  transfer  to  an  al- 
leged source  of  the  great  fact;  and  then  suppose  that 
they  have  solved  the  mystery.  But  they  delude  them- 
selves. As  was  proved  at  the  outset  of  the  argument, 
self -existence  is  rigorously  inconceivable;  and  this 
holds  true,  whatever  be  the  nature  of  the  object  of 
which  it  is  predicated.  Whoever  agrees  that  the  athe- 
istic hypothesis  is  untenable  because  it  involves  the 
impossible  idea  of  self-existence,  must  perforce  admit 
that  the  theistic  hypothesis  is  untenable  if  it  contains 
the  same  impossible  idea." — [First  Prin.,  Sec.  11. 

The  Unknowable  is  posited  not  only  as  First 
Cause,  but.  as  "The  Creating  Power."  In  what 
sense  is  the  Unknowable  the  Creating  Power? 
Which  mode  of  creation  will  be  adopted  for  the 
Unknowable?  Will  it  be  claimed  that  the  uni- 
verse was  created  by  the  Unknowable  as  an  ex- 
ternal agency?  If  so,  by  a  slight  paraphrase, 
we  have  from  Mr.  Spencer  himself  the  following 
argument: 

Even  supposing  that  the  genesis  of  the  universe 
could  really  be  represented  in  thought  as  the  result  of 


146 

an  Unknowable;  the  mystery  would  be  as  great  as  ev- 
er; for  there  would  still  arise  the  question—how  came 
there  to  be  an  Unknowable  ?  To  account  for  this,  only 
the  same  three  hypotheses  are  possible — self -existence, 
self -creation,  and  creation  by  another  Unknowable. 
Of  these,  the  last  is  useless;  it  commits  us  to  an  infinite 
series  of  such  Unknowables;  and  even  then  leaves  us 
where  we  were.  .  .  .  Those  who  cannot  conceive  a 
self -existent  universe,  and  who  therefore  assume  an 
unknowable  Creating  Power  as  the  source  of  the  uni- 
verse, take  for  granted  that  they  can  conceive  a 
self-existent,  unknowable  Creating  Power.  The  mys- 
tery which  they  recognize  in  this  great  fact  surround- 
ing them  on  every  side,  they  transfer  to  an  alleged 
source  of  the  great  fact — to  an  unknowable  and  un- 
thinkable Creating  Power.  They  then  suppose  that  they 
have  solved  the  mystery.  But  they  delude  themselves. 
As  was  proved  at  the  outset  of  the  argument,  self-ex- 
istence is  rigorously  inconceivable;  and  this  holds 
true,  whatever  be  the  nature  of  the  object  of  which  it 
is  predicated— whether  it  be  called  the  Creator,  First 
Cause,  the  Unknowable,  or  the  Creating  Power.  Who- 
ever agrees  that  the  atheistic  hypothesis  is  untenable 
because  it  involves  the  impossible  idea  of  self-exist- 
ence, must  perforce  admit  that  the  hypothesis  of  the 
Unknowable  is  untenable  if  it  contains  the  same  im- 
possible idea. 

We  may  therefore  discard  the  idea  of  the  cre- 
ation of  the  universe  by  the  Unknowable  as  an 
external  agency.  How  then  can  the  Unknowa- 
ble be  the  Creating  Power?  Shall  we  adopt  the 
theory  of  Malebranche,  and  say  theUnknowable 
projects  phenomena  into  the  universe  by  contin- 
uous creation?  But  this  theory  also  is  rejected 
by  the  author  of  "First  Principles." 

We  are,  then,  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  it 


147 

is  in  the  creation  by  evolution  that  the  Unknow- 
able is  considered  the  Creating  Power.  But  ev- 
olution is  a  process  of  unfolding  in  accordance 
with  the  primordial  laws  of  matter  and  motion. 
Since  these  laws  are  stable  and  uniform  in 
their  operation,  what  office  is  there  for  the  Un- 
knowable to  perform  in  the  work  of  creation? 
Is  it  to  see  that  the  laws  are  kept  in  operation? 
This  might  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  one  of 
the  titles  of  the  Unknowable  is,  "The  Sustain- 
ing Power."  But  since  no  intelligence  is  as- 
cribed to  the  Unknowable,  how  is  it  to  know 
whether  the  laws  are  properly  carried  out  or  not? 
And  if  it  should  know  or  should  find  out  that 
something  was  going  wrong,  how  could  the 
wrong  be  righted,  since  no  activity  is  ascribed 
to  the  Unknowable?  It  is  difficult  to  see  what 
would  be  its  function  in  the  process  of  creation 
by  evolution. 

There  is,  therefore,  no  possible  sense  in 
which  the  Unknowable  can  be  the  Creating  or 
Sustaining  Power.  And  how  came  the  Unknow- 
able into  existence?  It  is  called  the  First 
Cause — the  Ultimate  Cause.  But  the  Ultimate 
Cause  must  be  uncaused;  and  if  uncaused,  it 
must  be  self-existent.  Mr.  Spencer  says,  "self- 
existence  is  rigorously  inconceivable."  How 
then  can  he  assume  an  Unknowable  as  the  Creat- 
ing Power  of  the  universe?  Are  not  a  Creat- 
ing Power  and  a  Creator  the  same  thing?  How 
can  he  object  to  the  doctrine  of  creation  by  a 
Creator,  on  the  ground  that  the  Creator  would 


148 

be  self-existent,  and  therefore  inconceivable,  and 
at  the  same  time  maintain  the  existence  of  a 
Creating  Power  which  must  be  equally  self-ex- 
existent  and  equally  inconceivable?  Why  has 
not  the  Theist  as  much  right  to  have  an  incon- 
ceivable Creator  as  the  author  of  First  Principles 
has  to  have  an  inconceivable  Creating  Power? 


ATHEISM. 

The  existence  of  a  God  is  inconceivable,  and  the 
necessity  of  such  an  existence  in  a  universe  gov- 
erned by  law,  is  inconceivable.  But  it  is  equally 
inconceivable  how  the  universe  could  have  exist- 
ed from  all  eternity,  and  could  now  be  drifting 
through  the  ages  without  any  sustaining  power 
or  controlling  mind,  and  without  any  definite 
purpose  as  to  the  final  outcome. 

John  Stuart  Mill  has  shown  that  truth  does 
not  rest  on  the  foundation  that  the  contrary  is 
inconceivable.  If  a  proposition  is  not  only  in- 
conceivable but  at  the  same  time  contradictory 
or  absurd,  then  it  is  to  be  rejected;  but  not 
merely  because  it  is  inconceivable. 

If  that  were  so,  then,  as  has  been  shown  by 
Dr.  Brownson — whose  criticism  of  Spencer  is  in 
some  respects  the  most  searching  and  cogent  of 
all — it  can  easily  be  proved  that  there  is  no  ex- 
isting cosmos.  The  argument  will  run  thus: 

What  is  inconceivable  is  not  true. 

It  is  inconceivable  that  there  should  be  a  created 
cosmos;  and  it  is  inconceivable  that  there  should  be  a 
cosmos  existing  from  all  eternity. 


149 

But  if  there  be  a  cosmos,  it  either  was  created  or  is 
self-existent. 

Therefore,  it  is  not  true  that  there  is  any  existing 
cosmos  whatever. 

The  converse  argument  will  run  as  follows: 

It  is  true  that  there  is  an  existing  cosmos. 
It  is  inconceivable  that  this  cosmos  should  have  been 
created,  cr  should  have  existed  forever. 
But  one  or  the  other  is  true. 
Therefore,  something  is  true  that  is  inconceivable. 

The  corollary  to  this  is  the  proposition  of  Mr. 
Mill,  that  merely  because  any  thing  is  inconceiva- 
ble, we  cannot  therefore  say  that  it  is  false;  and 
the  further  proposition  that  we  cannot  say  that 
any  thing  is  necessarily  true,  the  contrary  of 
which  is  inconceivable. 

To  affirm  that  God  does  not  exist,  and  to  say 
that  we  cannot  affirm  that  God  exists,  are  two 
very  different  propositions.  And  the  difference 
between  them  is  the  difference  between  Atheism 
and  Agnosticism. 

In  discussing  the  relative  merits  of  Atheism 
and  Agnosticism,  we  must  define  certain  terms, 
to  wit:  GOD,  THEISM,  ATHEISM,  AGNOSTICISM. 
By  the  term  God  I  mean  a  supreme  intelli- 
gent Being,  as  the  definition  is  given  in  Web- 
ster. By  the  term  Theism  is  meant  a  belief  in 
the  existence  of  a  supreme  intelligent  Being; 
and  by  the  term  Atheism,  a  disbelief  or  denial 
of  the  existence  of  such  a  Being. 

But  it  is  claimed  that  the  word  Atheist  being 
derived  from  the  Greek  Theos,  meaning  God, 


150 

and  A,  the  Greek  Alplia,  which  is  privative, 
Atheism  simply  means  without  Theism,  or  with- 
out any  belief  in  God,  and  does  not  necessarily 
imply  denial  of  his  existence.  This  is  not  en- 
tirely correct.  It  is  true  that  Alpha  is  privative, 
but  the  term  privative  does  not  mean  merely 
without.  It  implies  not  only  privation,  but  ne- 
gation, and  gives  a  negative  force  to  a  word. 

The  office  which  Alpha  performs  can  best  be 
illustrated  by  some  examples : 

The  Greek  boulomai  means  to  will,  to  wish,  to  be 
willing.  A-bouleo  means  to  be  unwilling.  The  force  of 
a-bouleo  would  not  be  maintained  if  a  person  simply 
had  no  will  upon  the  subject.  He  must  be  positively 
unwilling.  It  is  equivalent  to  ou  (not)  and  boulomai. 
"A-bouleo  =  ou  boulomai."— [Liddell  &  Scott. 

The  Greek  glukus  means  sweet.  A-glukees  means 
not  sweet,  sour,  harsh.  It  would  not  be  sufficient  that 
a  thing  should  be  without  sweetness. 

Diallasso  means  to  reconcile.  A-diallaktos,  irrecon- 
cilable. That  a  person  is  not  reconciled  to  his  enemy, 
or  is  without  being  reconciled,  is  not  sufficient.  He 
must  refuse  to  be  reconciled. 

Seebo,  to  worship,  to  be  religious;  a-sebees,  ungodly, 
unholy,  profane. 

In  the  following  instance,  alpha  is  merely  privative: 

Dikazo,  to  judge.  A-dikastos,  without  judgment  giv- 
en, undecided. 

It  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the  attribute  quali- 
fied or  of  the  act  performed.  If  in  this  case  the  Greek 
verb  had  meant  to  judge  favorably,  then  the  prefix 
would  have  indicated  adverse  judgment. 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  the  etymological 
signification  of  the  word  Atheism  is  not  far  dif- 
ferent from  its  popular  signification. 


151 

AGNOSTICISM. 

By  the  term  Agnosticism  is  meant  the  posi- 
tion of  one  who  denies  that  he  has  any  knowl- 
edge concerning  the  existence  of  a  God,  or  any 
evidence  sufficient  for  a  faith  in  such  a  Being. 
But  he  does  not  deny  the  existence  of  such  a  Be- 
ing. He  falls  back  upon  his  ignorance.  The  sub- 
ject may  be  illustrated  by  the  following  catechism : 

QUESTION. 
Is  there  a  God? 

ANSWER. 

By  the  Atheist  and  Agnostic  in  unison. — What  do 
you  mean  by  a  God? 

QUESTION. 

By  a  God  I  mean  a  supreme  intelligent  Being.  Is 
there  such  a  Being  ? 

ANSWER. 

By  the  Atheist.— No. 

By  the  Agnostic.— I  do  not  know. 

The  Agnostic  and  the  Comtist  are  at  one  so 
far  as  the  existence  of  God  is  concerned.  Nei- 
ther of  them  affirms  or  denies  anything  upon 
the  subject.  Neither  the  Agnostic  nor  the 
Comtist  philosophy  is  atheistic.  Neither  of 
these  philosophies  goes  behind  phenomena — 
neither  of  them  searches  for  a  first  cause.  The 
Spencerian  metaphysical  philosophy  goes  behind 
phenomena — it  searches  for  a  first  cause,  and 
finds  it  in  something  which  it  calls  the  Unknow- 
able; but  it  is  not  God.  It  looks  where  God 
should  be,  but  finds  him  not.  Nowhere  in  phe- 
nomena, nor  in  the  incomprehensible,  or  at  least 
the  uncomprehended,  mysteries  of  matter,  nor 
yet  in  the  immeasurable  beyond,  does  it  find  a 
place  for  God. 


152 

Neither  the  Agnostic  nor  the  Comtist  claims 
to  know  of  the  existence  of  any  thing  behind 
the  phenomena  of  the  universe.  The  Spenceri- 
an  metaphysical  philosopher  affirms  that  he 
knows  of  the  existence  of  something  behind  phe- 
nomena. While  he  does  not  affirm  categorically 
that  it  is  not  God,  yet  this  existence,  having  nei- 
ther attributes  nor  intelligence,  cannot  be  God. 
The  Spencerian  metaphysical  philosopher  does, 
therefore,  in  effect,  deny  the  existence  of  God; 
since  he  substitutes  for  him  another  existence, 
which  leaves  no  place  for  God  in  the  universe. 


CHAPTEK    XXII. 

DOCTRINE  OF   THE   UNKNOWABLE — DIM  OB   VAGUE 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 

The  existence  of  the  Unknowable  is  posited 
from  a  dim  or  vague  consciousness;  from  an  in- 
complete thought.  It  is  admitted  that  the  Un- 
knowable cannot  be  distinctly  formulated  in 
thought;  that  when  the  consciousness  becomes 
vivid,  the  Unknowable  disappears.  But  it  is 
claimed  that  from  a  faint  or  dim  consciousness — 
from  half -formed  thoughts — we  may  posit  that 
which  is  the  most  certain  of  all  truths.  This  is 
equivalent  to  asserting  that  when  we  are  in  a 
a  dreamy  state — when  we  are  in  a  reverie — we 
are  in  the  best  possible  condition  for  the  ascer- 
tainment of  truth.  Let  us  see  how  this  condi- 
tion of  mind  is  described: 

"Manifestations  that  occur  under  the  conditions 
called  those  of  perception  .  .  .  are  ordinarily  far 
more  distinct  than  those  which  occur  under  the  con- 
ditions known  as  those  of  reflection,  or  memory,  or 
imagination,  or  ideation.  These  vivid  manifestations 
do,  indeed,  sometimes  differ  but  little  from  the  faint 
(153) 


154 

ones.  When  nearly  dark,  we  may  be  unable  to  decide 
whether  a  certain  manifestation  belongs  to  the  vivid 
order  or  the  faint  order— whether,  as  we  say,  we  really 
see  something,  or  fancy  we  see  it.  ... 

"During  what  we  call  our  states  of  activity,  the  vivid 
manifestations  predominate.  It  is  only  on  lapsing  in- 
to the  unconsciousness  termed  sleep,  that  manifesta- 
tions of  the  vivid  order  cease  to  be  distinguishable  as 
such,  and  those  of  the  faint  order  come  to  be  mistak- 
en for  them.  .  .  . 

"When,  as  we  say,  absorbed  in  thought,  the  disturb- 
ance of  the  faint  current  is  but  superficial.  .  .  .  There 
meanwhile  flows  on  a  main  stream  of  faint  manifesta- 
tions wholly  unrelated  to  the  vivid  manifestations — 
what  we  call  a  reverie,  perhaps,  or  it  may  be  a  process 
of  reasoning.  And  occasionally,  during  the  state 
known  as  absence  of  mind,  this  current  of  faint  mani- 
festations so  far  predominates  that  the  vivid  current 
scarcely  affects  it  at  all.  .  .  .  Manifestations  of  the 
one  order  are  vivid,  and  those  of  the  other  are  faint. 
Those  of  the  one  order  are  originals,  while  those  of  the 
other  order  are  copies."— [First  Prin.,  Sec.  43. 

We  fail  to  see  in  this  any  thing  that  gives  a 
peculiar  value  to  the  faint  manifestations.  On 
the  contrary,  it  shows  that  a  faint  consciousness 
is  such  as  we  have  when  in  a  reverie,  or  in  a 
dreamy  condition. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  Sec.  26  of  First  Principles, 
where  the  subject  is  examined  more  closely,  with 
reference  to  the  Unknowable: 

"  Besides  that  definite  consciousness  of  which  logic 
formulates  the  laws,  there  is  also  an  indefinite  con- 
sciousness which  cannot  be  formulated.  Besides  com- 
plete thoughts,  and  besides  the  thoughts  which  though 
incomplete  admit  of  completion,  there  are  thoughts 
which  it  is  impossible  to  complete,  and  yet  which  are 


155 

still  real  in  the  sense  that  they  are  normal  affections 
of  the  intellect.    .    .    . 

"It  is  rigorously  impossible  to  conceive  that  our 
knowledge  is  a  knowledge  of  appearances  only,  with- 
out at  the  same  time  conceiving  a  Reality  of  which 
they  are  appearances;  for  appearance  without  reality 
is  unthinkable.  Strike  out  from  the  argument  the 
terms  Unconditioned,  Infinite,  Absolute,  with  their 
equivalents,  and  in  place  of  them  write  'negation  of 
conceivability,'  or  'absence  of  the  conditions  under 
which  consciousness  is  possible,'  and  you  find  that  the 
argument  becomes  nonsense.  Truly  to  realize  in 
thought  any  one  of  the  propositions  of  which  the  ar- 
gument consists,  the  Unconditioned  must  be  repre- 
sented as  positive  and  not  negative.  [This  in  reply  to 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  who  says  that  the  notion  of  the 
unconditioned  is  only  negative;  and  in  reply  to  Mr. 
Mansel,  who  says  that  the  infinite  must  be  regarded  as 
the  mere  negation  of  thought.]  How,  then,  can  it  be  a 
legitimate  conclusion  from  the  argument  that  our  con- 
sciousness of  it  is  negative  ?  An  argument,  the  very 
construction  of  which  assigns  to  a  certain  term  a  cer- 
tain meaning,  but  which  ends  in  showing  that  this 
term  has  no  such  meaning,  is  simply  an  elaborate  sui- 
cide. Clearly,  then,  the  very  demonstration  that  a  def- 
inite consciousness  of  the  Absolute  is  impossible  to  us, 
unavoidably  presupposes  an  indefinite  consciousness 
of  it." 

Clearly,  the  difference  here  is  owing  mainly 
to  a  different  use  of  terms.  Mr.  Mansel  and  Sir 
William  Hamilton  explain  that  by  the  terms  ab- 
solute and  unconditioned  they  mean  merely  the 
negation  of  the  knowable.  But  when  Mr.  Spen- 
cer uses  these  terms,  he  means  the  positive  ex- 
istence of  the  Unknowable;  and,  insisting  upon 
the  terms  being  taken  in  the  sense  in  which  he 


156 

uses  them,  and  urging  that  the  argument  made 
on  the  other  side  requires  the  same  meaning  to 
be  given  to  them,  he  claims  that  there  is  an  in- 
consistency. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  he  lays  much  stress 
upon  the  fact  that  it  is  necessary  that  the  Un- 
conditioned be  represented  as  positive  in  order 
"to  realize  in  thought  any  one  of  the  propositions 
of  which  the  argument  consists." 

In  determining  whether  there  be  an  Unknow- 
able or  not,  Mr.  Spencer  rigorously  insists  that 
the  propositions  of  which  the  argument  consists 
shall  be  realized  in  thought.  But  that  the  Un- 
knowable itself  should  be  realized  in  thought, 
he  considers  of  no  consequence. 

Again:  We  fail  to  see  how  the  distinction  be- 
tween definite  and  indefinite  consciousness  has 
any  thing  to  do  with  this  argument.  If  the  ar- 
gument is  good,  it  is  because  the  very  terms 
made  use  of  imply  the  positive  existence  of  the 
Unconditioned.  Does  Mr.  Spencer  mean  to  fall 
back  upon  an  indefinite  consciousness  to  make 
good  an  argument  which  would  otherwise  be  in- 
valid or  uncertain?  If  his  conclusion  follows 
^  from  the  premises,  he  does  not  need  an  indefi- 
nite consciousness  to  sustain  the  argument.  If 
it  does  not  follow,  how  can  the  indefinite  con- 
sciousness make  it  good?  Surely  he  cannot 
mean  to  appeal  for  evidence  of  the  Unknowable 
to  the  indefinite  consciousness  of  Hamilton  and 
Mansel,  neither  of  whom  concedes  any  con- 
sciousness of  such  an  existence. 


157 

Further  along  in  the  same  section,  he  comes 
still  more  closely  to  the  question: 

"And  here  we  come  face  to  face  with  the  ultimate 
difficulty:— How  can  there  possibly  be  constituted  a 
consciousness  of  the  unformed  and  unlimited,  when, 
by  its  very  nature,  consciousness  is  possible  only  un- 
der forms  and  limits?  If  every  consciousness  of  ex- 
istence is  a  consciousness  of  existence  as  conditioned, 
then  how,  after  the  negation  of  conditions,  can  there 
be  any  residuum  ?  ...  In  each  concept  there  is  an 
element  which  persists.  .  .  .  The  persistence  of 
this  element,  under  successive  conditions,  necessitates 
a  sense  of  it  as  distinguished  from  the  conditions,  and 
independent  of  them.  The  sense  of  a  something  that 
is  conditioned  in  every  thought,  cannot  be  got  rid  of 
because  the  something  cannot  be  got  rid  of.  How, 
then,  must  the  sense  of  this  something  be  constituted  ? 
Evidently  by  combining  successive  concepts  deprived 
of  their  limits  and  conditions" 

We  have  emphasized  the  last  sentence,  be- 
cause it  contains  a  complete  statement  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  Unknowable.  The  question  is 
thus  very  fairly  stated: 

"How  can  there  possibly  be  constituted  a  conscious- 
ness of  the  unformed  and  unlimited,  when,  by  its  very 
nature,  consciousness  is  possible  only  under  forms  and 
limits?" 

The  answer  is: 

"By  combining  successive  concepts  deprived  of  their 
limits  and  conditions." 

Now,  if  this  can  be  done,  then,  we  admit,  the 
doctrine  of  the  Unknowable  can  be  established. 
To  say  that  we  can  do  this,  is  to  say  that  con- 
cepts which  are  possible  only  under  form  and 


158 

condition,  can  be  deprived  of  their  forms  and 
conditions,  and  then  combined  together. 

We  can  think  only  in  relation.  Take  away 
the  relations  existing  in  thought,  and  you  take 
away  the  thought.  Neither  a  dim  nor  a  vivid 
consciousness  will  remain. 

Not  only  are  these  "limits  and  conditions" 
necessary  to  thought,  but  in  consciousness  they 
are  necessary  to  the  continuance  of  thought. 
Unless  these  concepts,  after  being  formed,  can  be 
continued  in  successive  existence,  they  cannot 
be  "combined,"  even  if  they  could  be  deprived 
of  their  limits  and  conditions. 

The  continued  concepts,  those  denominated 
by  our  author  faint  manifestations,  are,  he  as- 
sures us,  copies  of  the  vivid  manifestations. 
But  copies  cannot  be  more  potent  than  the  orig- 
inals; therefore  both  classes  of  manifestations, 
the  vivid  and  the  faint,  are  equally  dependent 
on  form  and  condition  for  their  existence. 

This  view  of  the  matter  is  confirmed  by  Prof. 
Bain.  He  says: 

"The  really  fundamental  separation  of  the  powers 
of  the  Intellect  is  into  three  facts  called  (1)  Discrimi- 
nation, the  Sense,  Feeling,  or  Consciousness  of  Differ- 
ence; (2)  Similarity,  the  Sense,  Feeling,  or  Conscious- 
ness of  Agreement;  [these  two  divisions  correspond 
to  the  'vivid  consciousness'  of  Spencer;]  and  (3)  Retent- 
iveness,  or  the  power  of  Memory  or  Acquisition."  (This 
last  division  corresponds  to  the  "faint  consciousness" 
of  Spencer.)— ["Mind  and  Body,"  N.  Y.,  1894,  pp.  82,83. 

Speaking  of  Retention,  Acquisition,  or  Mem- 
ory, which  he  defines  as  "the  power  of  continu- 


159 

ing  in  the  mind  impressions  that  are  no  longer 
stimulated  by  the  original  agent,"  Prof.  Bain 
says: 

"It  must  be  considered  as  almost  beyond  a  doubt 
that  [apparently  quoting  from  the  elder  Scaliger]  'the 
renewed  fee' ing  occupies  the  very  same  parts  and  in 
the  same  manner  as  the  original  feeling,  and  no  other 
parts  nor  in  any  other  manner  that  can  be  assigned.' " 
—[Ibid.,  p.  89. 

The  copies  must  have  the  same  limits  and 
conditions  as  the  originals.  How,  then,  can 
successive  concepts  be  "deprived  of  their  limits 
and  conditions"?  To  deprive  a  thought  of  its 
limits  and  conditions  is  to  strike  it  out  of  exist- 
ence. 

Inasmuch,  then,  as  the  vivid  and  faint  mani- 
festations stand  upon  the  same  foundation,  and 
the  faint  are  copies  of  the  vivid,  which  are  the 
more  to  be  relied  upon? 

We  have  the  authority  of  Mr.  Spencer  him- 
self for  saying  that  the  faint  manifestations  are 
not  so  reliable  as  the  vivid.  Writing  upon  the 
same  subject  in  another  place,  he  says: 

"Deliverances  of  consciousness  given  in  the  vivid 
terms  we  call  sensations,  excite  a  confidence  immeas- 
urably exceeding  the  confidence  excited  by  the  deliv- 
erances given  in  the  faint  terms  we  distinguish  as 
ideas." 

After  giving  illustrations,  he  concludes  as  fol- 
lows: 

"By  all  persons,  then,  and  in  all  cases,  where  the 
characters  of  the  acts  of  consciousness  are  in  other 
respects  the  same,  the  deliverances  given  in  vivid 
terms  are  accepted  in  preference  to  those  given  in  faint 


160 

terms.  Obscure  perceptions  are  rejected  rather  than 
clear  ones;  remembrances  which  are  definite  are  trust- 
ed rather  than  those  which  are  indefinite;  and  above 
all,  the  deliverances  of  consciousness  composed  of 
sensations  are  unhesitatingly  preferred  to  those  com- 
posed of  the  ideas  of  sensations."— [Psychology,  Sec. 
410. 

And  speaking  of  a  certain  theory,  he  says: 

"It  could  not  be  accepted  without  asserting  that 
things  are  most  certainly  known  in  proportion  as  they 
are  most  faintly  perceived." 

And  yet,  notwithstanding  this  distinct  verdict 
in  favor  of  the  vivid  manifestations  when  com- 
pared with  the  faint  manifestations,  we  are  asked 
to  accept  the  Unknowable  "as  the  most  certain 
of  all  truths,"  when  posited  from  a  dim,  vague, 
indefinite  consciousness;  while  it  is  admitted 
that  before  a  vivid  consciousness — before  a  com- 
plete thought — the  Unknowable  disappears. 


CHAPTER    XXIII. 

DOCTRINE   OF   THE    UNKNOWABLE — ANTITHESIS  OP 
THOUGHT. 

It  is  claimed  that  we  are  under  the  necessity 
of  predicating  the  positive  existence  of  the  Un- 
knowable as  the  antithesis  of  thought. 

What  is  an  antithesis?  It  is  something  "set 
over"  against  something  else. 

All  thought  is  in  relation.  What  is  the  na- 
ture of  this  relation?  It  is  the  relation  of  ob- 
jects to  ourselves  and  to  each  other;  not  their 
relation  to  something  existing  in  some  other 
mode  than  that  in  which  these  objects  exist.  If 
such  were  the  relation  that  enables  the  individ- 
ual to  cognize  the  external  world,  then  the  argu- 
ment for  the  unknowable  might  be  good.  But 
it  is  the  relation  of  things  with  each  other  that 
renders  them  cognizable.  Phenomena  cannot 
be  related  to  the  Unknowable,  because,  by  the 
hypothesis,  the  Unknowable  is  out  of  relation. 
One  of  its  many  names  is  the  Non-Relative. 
How  can  any  thing  be  in  relation  to  that  which 
is  entirely  out  of  relation? 
(161) 


162 

The  Unknowable  is  said  to  be  "behind"  phe- 
nomena. If  behind,  then  it  is  outside.  And 
how  can  the  relations  between  objects  throw  any 
light  upon  any  thing  outside  of  the  objects 
themselves?  No  relation  can  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  any  object  outside  the  terms  of  the  rela- 
tion. The  relation  of  A  to  B  cannot  prove  the 
existence  of  C.  But  it  proves  the  existence  of 
A  and  B,  else  they  could  not  be  in  relation.  Let 
A  and  B  be  two  objects  in  the  external  world; 
and  let  C  be  the  Absolute  or  Unknowable.  The 
relation  is  between  A  and  B :  not  between  A  and 
B  on  the  one  side  and  C  on  the  other. 

When  I  look  at  a  chair  in  the  room  in  which 
I  am  sitting,  what  is  it  that  enables  me  to  cog- 
nize the  chair?  Is  it  not  the  relation  between 
the  chair  and  the  other  objects  in  the  room?  as 
also  the  relation  between  the  chair  and  the 
room,  and  between  the  chair  and  room  on  the 
one  side  and  myself  on  the  other?  Or  is  it  the 
relation  between  all  these  and  some  unknown 
power  which  may  be  supposed  to  have  brought 
them  into  existence?  As  well  might  it  be  said 
that  what  enables  me  to  cognize  the  chair  is  the 
relation  between  the  chair  and  the  cabinet-mak- 
er who  manufactured  it,  or  between  the  chair 
and  the  tradesman  who  sold  it.  Manifestly  it  is 
neither  the  one  nor  the  other.  Much  less  is  it  a 
relation  existing  between  the  chair  and  some- 
thing behind  the  chair,  the  cabinet-maker,  and 
the  tradesman. 

What  enables  us  to  cognize  phenomena  is  not 


163 

a  relation  supposed  to  exist  between  the  phe- 
nomena and  the  noumena,  but  the  relations  per- 
ceived to  exist  between  the  phenomena  them- 
selves. 

The  relation  that  renders  cognition  possible, 
is  the  relation  between  things  knowable;  not 
between  the  knowable  and  the  unknowable. 
Things  in  themselves  knowable  become,  through 
their  relation  to  each  other,  subjects  of  cogni- 
tion. After  that,  the  boundaries  of  knowledge 
are  extended  by  proceeding,  not  from  the  know- 
able  to  the  unknowable,  but  from  the  known  to 
the  unknown.  As  Voltaire  says:  "On  va  d'ordi- 
naire  du  connu  a  1'inconnu." 

Let  it  be  borne  in  mind  that  there  is  no  anal- 
ogy between  the  antithesis  claimed  for  the  Un- 
knowable, and  that  insisted  upon  by  James  Mar- 
tineau  (Essays,  Vol.  3,  p.  204) ,  in  regard  to  in- 
finite space  and  time.  His  argument,  that  you 
cannot  say  that  you  know  the  moon  to  be  differ- 
ent from  the  sun,  and  at  the  same  time  say  you  do 
not  know  it  to  be  different  from  the  infinite 
space  in  which  it  moves;  and  that  you  cannot 
Say  you  know  Caesar's  life  and  date  to  be  other 
than  Seneca's,  and  at  the  same  time  say  you  do 
not  know  either  from  the  infinite  time  in  which 
it  appears — is  a  good  argument.  Here  there  is 
an  antithesis.  By  contrast  and  correlation,we  can 
form  some  idea — an  indefinite  idea  it  is  true — 
but  some  idea  of  infinite  time  and  space;  as  John 
Stuart  Mill  justly  maintains.  But  of  the  Un- 
knowable we  can  form  no  idea  whatever,  be- 


164 
cause  here  there  is  no  antithesis  of  thought. 

If  the  Unknowable  furnishes  an  antithesis  for 
thought,  how  is  it  that  it  is  said  to  be  not  only 
unknowable  but  unthinkable?  If  any  thing  is 
an  antithesis  of  thought,  can  it  at  the  same  time 
be  outside  the  boundaries  of  thought?  If  a 
thought  be  in  antithesis,  can  either  term  of  the 
antithesis  be  outside  the  thought? 

It  is  not  correct  to  say  (as  in  "First  Princi- 
ples," Sec.  26)  that  "the  Noumenon  is  every 
where  named  as  the  antithesis  of  the  Phenome- 
non." It  is  not  so  named  by  Mr.  Mansel,  nor 
by  Sir  William  Hamilton.  It  is  not  so  named 
by  Auguste  Comte,  nor  by  many  others. 

Again,  it  is  asserted  that  "appearance  without 
reality  is  unthinkable."  But  the  reality,  ac- 
cording to  Mr.  Spencer  himself,  is  equally  un- 
thinkable. The  argument  therefore  is,  that  in 
order  to  think  of  something  that  is  thinkable,  it 
is  necessary  to  think  of  something  that  is  not 
thinkable.  In  order  to  understand  anything  of 
what  is  knowable,  it  is  necessary  to  predicate 
the  positive  existence  of  something  unknowable. 
In  order  to  think  in  relation,  it  is  necessary  to 
think  out  of  relation.  But  to  think  out  of 
relation  is  impossible.  Therefore,  in  order  to 
think,  it  is  necessary  not  to  think. 

What  is  reality?  It  is  this  objective  world  in 
which  we  live,  move,  and  have  our  being.  It  is 
this  which  is  the  basis  of  all  science — the  source 
of  all  positive  knowledge.  It  is  the  only  reality 
which  we  know  or  can  know. 


165 

Further,  our  author  says: 

"It  is  a  doctrine  called  in  question  by  none,  that 
such  antinomies  of  thought  as  whole  and  part,  equal 
and  unequal,  singular  and  plural,  are  necessarily  con- 
ceived as  correlatives;  the  conception  of  a  part  is  im- 
possible without  the  conception  of  a  whole;  there  can 
be  no  idea  of  equality  without  one  of  inequality.  And 
it  is  admitted  [?]  that  in  the  same  manner  the  Rela- 
tive is  itself  conceivable  as  such  only  by  opposition  to 
the  Irrelative  or  Absolute."— [First  Prin.,  Sec.  26. 

The  answer  to  this  may  be  given  in  the  lan- 
guage of  Sir  William  Hamilton: 

One  of  these  correlatives  is  nothing  beyond 
the  negation  of  the  other. 

"Correlatives,"  he  says,  "certainly  suggest  each  oth- 
er; but  correlatives  may  or  may  not  be  equally  real 
and  positive.  In  thought,  contradictories  necessarily 
imply  each  other;  for  the  knowledge  of  contradictories 
is  one.  But  the  reality  of  one  contradictory,  so  far 
from  guaranteeing  the  reality  of  the  other,  is  nothing 
else  than  its  negation.  Thus  every  positive  notion 
(the  concept  of  a  thing  by  what  it  is)  suggests  a  nega- 
tive notion  (the  concept  of  a  thing  by  what  it  is  not); 
and  the  highest  positive  notion,  the  notion  of  the  con- 
ceivable, is  not  without  its  corresponding  negative  in 
the  notion  of  the  inconceivable.  But  though  these 
mutually  suggest  each  other,  the  positive  alone  is  real ; 
the  negative  is  only  an  abstraction  of  the  other,  and  in 
the  highest  generality  even  an  abstraction  of  thought 
itself."— [Hamilton's  Criticism  of  Cousin. 

Mr.  Spencer  replies  to  this  by  reaffirming  his 
former  position,  and  adds: 

•'If  the  Non-Relative  or  Absolute  is  present  in 
thought  only  as  a  mere  negation,  then  the  relation  be- 
tween it  and  the  Relative  becomes  unthinkable,  be- 
cause one  of  the  terms  of  the  relation  is  absent  from 


166 

consciousness.  And  if  this  relation  is  unthinkable, 
then  is  the  relative  itself  unthinkable  for  want  of  its 
antithesis;  whence  results  the  disappearance  of  all 
thought  whatever." 

Here  we  cannot  refrain  from  again  making  a 
slight  paraphrase;  and  we  will  have  the  argu- 
ment running  thus: 

"If  the  Non-Relative  or  Absolute  is  present  in 
thought  as  a  Reality,  then,  this  Reality  being  unthink- 
able, any  relation  between  it  and  the  Relative  becomes 
unthinkable;  because  one  of  the  terms  of  the  relation 
is  absent  from  consciousness.  And  if  this  relation  is 
unthinkable,  then  is  the  relative  itself  unthinkable; 
whence  results  the  disappearance  of  all  thought  what- 
ever." 

What  is  the  verdict  of  consciousness  on  this 
question?  Does  consciousness  say  that  in  order 
to  think  of  something  that  can  be  thought  of, 
it  is  necessary  to  think  of  something  that  can- 
not be  thought  of?  Does  consciousness  tell  us 
that  in  order  to  think  in  relation  it  is  necessary 
to  think  out  of  relation  ?  Does  it  tell  us  that  in 
in  order  to  cognize  something  that  exists,  we 
must  recognize  as  existing  something  which  we 
do  not  know  to  exist? 

Mr.  Spencer  repeatedly  speaks  of  depriving 
thought  of  its  limits  and  conditions  for  the  pur- 
pose of  establishing  a  consciousness  of  the  Un- 
knowable. But  he  overlooks  the  fact  that  he 
had  already  claimed  that  the  existence  of 
the  Unknowable  is  a  necessary  condition  of 
thought. 

If  the  Unknowable  is  a  necessary  condition  of 


167 

thought,  then,  in  depriving  thought  of  its  limits 
ami  conditions,  he  eliminates  the  Unknowable, 
which  was  the  most  essential  condition.  If 
the  Unknowable  was  a  necessary  condition  of 
thought,  why  not  let  it  remain?  What  the  ne- 
cessity for  depriving  thought  of  that  or  any  oth- 
er condition  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  the 
existence  of  that  which  had  already  been  predi- 
cated as  necessary?  Why  not  let  thought  re- 
main, with  its  necessary  limits  and  conditions? 
What  the  necessity  for  this  abstruse  metaphys- 
ical process?  Why  take  thought  to  pieces  mere- 
ly for  the  purpose  of  reconstructing  it? 

First,  thought  is  to  be  deprived  of  its  limits 
and  conditions;  and  then,  successive  concepts, 
consisting  of  unconditioned  thought — which  is 
really  no  thought  at  all — are  to  be  combined  to- 
gether in  order  to  form  a  consciousness  of  the 
Unknowable.  And  thus  thought  is  to  get  back 
the  condition  of  which  it  has  been  deprived; — a 
condition  which,  according  to  the  author  of 
"First  Frinciples,"  was  in  the  first  place,  and  all 
the  time  has  been,  necessary  to  its  existence. 

Mr.  Spencer  replies  to  Hamilton  that  while 
he  (Hamilton)  does  not  admit  the  existence  of 
the  Unknowable  as  an  antithesis  of  thought,  he 
does  admit  the  same  existence  on  the  authority 
of  divine  revelation.  This  is  the  "argumentum 
ad  hominem";  and  while  it  may  be  good  as 
against  Hamilton,  it  is  not  good  against  one  who 
does  not  accept  the  revelation,  and  who  denies 
that  he  has  any  dim  or  vague  consciousness  of 


168 

the  Unknowable.  What  answer  will  be  made  to 
such  a  one?  Will  he  be  contradicted,  and 
told  that  he  has  borne  false  testimony  against 
his  consciousness?  Or  will  he  be  told  that  he 
does  not  know  what  his  consciousness  testifies? 
Mr.  Spencer  himself  says  that  no  one  knows 
what  is  in  the  consciousness  of  a  person  except 
that  person  himself.  How,  then,  can  he  say 
what  is  in  the  consciousness  of  others? 

The  fact  that  Auguste  Comte  and  Sir  William 
Hamilton  and  Mr.  Mansel  deny  that  they  have 
any  consciousness  of  the  positive  existence  of 
the  Unknowable  as  the  antithesis  of  thought, 
is  of  itself  sufficient  to  entirely  overthrow  this 
branch  of  the  argument  in  favor  of  the  Unknow- 
able, as  existing  in  universal  consciousness. 


CHAPTER    XXIV. 

DOCTRINE    OF  THE  UNKNOWABLE — IDEALISM. 

"We  are  thus  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the  re- 
lations of  co-existence,  of  sequence,  and  of  difference, 
as  we  know  them,  do  not  obtain  beyond  conscious- 
ness."—[Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol  I,  Chap.  IV., 
Sec.  93. 

This  proposition  is  not  only,  as  the  author 
says,  "apparently  incredible";  it  is  really  incred- 
ible. It  is  incredible  because  it  is  contrary  to 
the  universal  experience  of  mankind. 

The  proposition  is,  that  the  relations  of  co-ex- 
istence, etc.,  as  we  know  them,  do  not  obtain  be- 
yond consciousness. 

Let  us  suppose  that  "we"  consist  of  four  per- 
sons: A,  B,  C,  and  D.  Our  consciousness  is  not 
in  common.  Each  has  his  own  consciousness, 
and  the  consciousness  of  each  is  beyond  that  of 
each  of  the  others.  The  question  is,  whether 
the  relations  of  co-existence,  of  sequence,  and 
of  difference,  as  we,  the  four,  know  them,  obtain 
beyond  consciousness. 

These  relations,  though  they  may  be  at  times 
somewhat  different,  are,  as  we  find  by  compari- 
(169) 


170 

son,  substantially  the  same  in  the  consciousness 
of  the  four.  Now,  the  very  fact  that  the  rela- 
tions obtain  in  the  consciousness  of  A,  proves 
that  they  obtain  beyond  the  consciousness  of  B, 
C,  and  D.  And,  in  like  manner,  the  very  fact 
that  they  obtain  in  the  consciousness  of  B,  C, 
and  D,  or  either  of  them,  proves  that  they  ob- 
tain beyond  the  consciousness  of  A. 

What,  then,  is  the  cause  of  these  subjective 
relations  which  are  beyond  the  consciousness 
of  each,  and  which,  at  the  same  time,  are  within 
the  consciousness  of  each?  We  do  not  obtain 
them  one  from  the  other.  They  must,  there- 
fore, have  corresponding  relations  in  the  exter- 
nal world,  existing  beyond  consciousness.  We 
all  know  that  the  relations  obtain,  not  only  in 
our  own  consciousness,  but  in  the  consciousness 
of  others;  and  we  know  that  there  is  no  other 
explanation  of  this  than  the  existence  of  the 
material  world  around  us,  in  the  relations  of 
co-existence,  of  sequence,  and  of  difference. 

Let  us  bring  this  question  of  idealism  to  a 
practical  test: 

Suppose  a  person  to  go  into  a  dark  room, 
thinking  it  to  be  empty,  while  in  fact  there  are 
several  stoves  in  various  portions  of  the  room. 
He  soon  perceives  relations  of  co-existence,  of 
sequence,  and  of  difference  obtaining  in  the 
room.  He  not  only  has  the  persistent  conscious- 
ness of  those  relations,  but  he  has  at  the  same 
time  a  painful  impression  that  while  he  was  on  his 
way  to  the  room,  and  before  he  had  entered  it, 


171 

those  relations  obtained  in  the  room,  beyond  his 
consciousness.  When  he  strikes  against  one  of 
these  stoves,  whose  ideas  or  whose  subjective  af- 
fections or  relations  or  states  of  consciousness 
does  he  hit  against?  Surely,  not  his  own;  for  he 
did  not  know  the  stoves  were  there.  If  these  rela- 
tions obtained  beyond  his  consciousness  when 
he  did  not  know  of  their  existence,  do  they  not 
equally  obtain  beyond  his  consciousness,  now 
that  he  does  know  of  their  existence?  Or  do  re- 
lations which  previously  obtained  beyond  his 
consciousness  now  become  merged  into  his  con- 
sciousness, and  thereby  lose  the  separate  exist- 
ence which  they  previously  had? 

It  is  plain  that  the  relations  of  co-existence, 
of  sequence,  and  of  difference,  as  we  know  them, 
do  in  fact  obtain  beyond  consciousness. 

There  are  other  tests,  also,  for  correcting  the 
individual  consciousness — other  ways  of  ascer- 
taining whether  the  relations  in  consciousness 
have  corresponding  relations,  which  are  known 
to  us,  beyond  consciousness. 

For  instance:  Take  some  of  the  illustrations 
made  use  of  by  Mr.  Spencer  for  the  purpose  of 
proving  his  concluding  proposition.  He  says: 

"The  consciousness  of  a  given  relation  of  two  posi- 
tions in  space  must  vary  quantitatively  with  variation 
of  bodily  bulk.  Clearly,  a  mouse,  which  has  to  run  many 
times  its  own  length  to  traverse  the  space  which  a  man 
traverses  at  a  stride,  cannot  have  the  same  concep- 
tion of  this  space  as  a  man.  .  .  .  Distances  which 
seemed  great  to  the  boy,  seem  moderate  to  the  man;  and 
buildings  once  thought  imposing  in  height  and  mass, 


172 

dwindle  into  insignificance.  ...  A  small  or  mod- 
erate magnitude  is  under-estimated  when  a  great  mag- 
nitude has  just  before  occupied  the  attention.  A 
building  that  appeared  large  when  it  stood  amid 
smaller  buildings,  loses  much  of  its  seeming  largeness 
if  a  far  larger  building  is  erected  close  to  it.  Or,  to  take 
a  better  case— when  the  sun  is  seen  in  the  midst  of  the 
sky,  with  none  but  great  angular  spaces  between  it  and 
the  horizon,  it  looks  very  much  less  than  it  does  when 
close  to  the  horizon,  where  the  angular  space  it  sub- 
tends is  comparable  side  by  side  with  small  angular 
spaces.  .  .  .  Apparent  size  depends  on  distance 
from  the  eye,  and  apparent  form  changes  with  every 
change  in  the  point  of  view.  .  .  . 

"We  are  thus  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  what  we 
perceive  as  space-relations,  cannot  be,  either  in  their 
natures  or  degrees,  like  those  connections  among  ex- 
ternal things  to  which  they  are  due.  They  change 
both  qualitatively  and  quantitively  with  the  struc- 
ture, the  size,  the  state,  and  the  position  of  the  percip- 
ient. And  when  we  see  that  what  is  objectively  con- 
sidered the  same  connection  between  things,  may,  as  a 
space-relation  in  consciousness,  be  single  or  double — 
when  we  remember  that,  according  as  we  are  near  or 
far  off,  it  may  be  too  large  to  be  simultaneously  per- 
ceived or  too  small  to  be  perceived  at  all — it  becomes 
impossible  to  suppose  any  identity  between  this  ob- 
jective connection  and  some  one  of  the  multitudinous 
subjective  relations  answering  to  it." — [Prin.  of  Psy- 
chology, Vol  I.,  pp.  213  to  215. 

This  is  a  different  conclusion  from  the  one 
which  we  are  examining.  It  will  not  be  claimed 
that  there  is  any  "identity"  between  the  object- 
ive connections  and  the  relations  in  conscious- 
ness. The  question  is,  whether  the  relations  of 
co-existence,  etc.,  as  we  know  them,  obtain  be- 


173 

yond  consciousness.  The  foregoing  argument 
amounts  to  this:  Our  senses  often  deceive  us — 
frequently  we  do  not  see  things  as  they  are; 
therefore,  we  do  not  see  them  at  all.  Hence,  we 
have  no  certain  knowledge  of  things  which  we 
perceive  in  the  external  world. 

On  the  subject  of  knowledge,  the  position  of 
Mr.  Spencer  is  anomalous.  He  has  no  positive 
knowledge  that  what  he  sees,  hears  and  feels,  has 
any  objective  existence.  But  he  knows  that 
something  which  he  cannot  see,  hear,  or  feel, 
does  really  exist. 

The  knowable  he  does  not  know;  but  the  un- 
knowable he  knows. 

Hence,  ignorance  consists  in  knowledge  of 
what  can  be  known,  and  knowledge  consists  on- 
ly in  the  knowledge  (ignorance)  of  what  is  en- 
tirely unknowable. 

In  other  words: 

What  we  know,  we  do  not  know;  but  what  we 
do  not  know,  we  know. 

And  are  we  thus  to  pervert  the  English  lan- 
guage in  aid  of  a  new  system  of  philosophy? 

There  are  tests  by  which  to  correct  the  illu- 
sions of  consciousness.  If  a  house  looks  larger 
or  smaller  than  it  is,  by  measurement  we  can 
find  out  how  large  it  really  is.  This  test  of 
measurement  we  apply  even  to  the  sun.  By 
mathematical  calculation,  based  upon  measure- 
ment, we  come  to  form  an  adequate  and  true 
conception  of  the  size  of  the  sun;  and  thus  the 
sun,  "as  we  know  it,"  obtains  beyond  conscious- 


174 

ness,  in  its  relations  of  co-existence  and  of  dif- 
ference, among  the  heavenly  bodies. 

Again:  The  erroneous  impression  derived 
from  one  of  the  senses  may  be  corrected  by 
impressions  derived  from  the  other  senses. 
Also  the  erroneous  impressions  of  one  person 
may  be  corrected  by  comparing  them  with  the 
impressions  of  other  individuals  and  with  the 
collected  experiences  of  mankind.  So,  also, 
they  may  be  compared  with  the  previous  expe- 
riences of  the  same  individual.  His  present 
impressions  of  an  object  can  be  co-ordinated 
with  and  corrected  by  his  past  impressions  of 
the  same  object. 

The  idealism  of  Spencer  is  different  from  that 
of  Berkeley  and  of  Hume.  While  Berkeley 
leaves  nothing  existing  beyond  consciousness, 
Spencer  leaves  something  existing;  but  what  is 
it?  After  stating  that  the  relations  of  co-ex- 
istence, of  sequence,  and  of  difference,  as  we 
know  them,  do  not  obtain  beyond  consciousness, 
he  proceeds  to  explain  what  there  is  beyond 
consciousness: 

"More  certain,  then,  than  the  relativity  of  relations, 
as  we  conceive  them,  is  the  existence  of  non-relative 
forms  to  which  they  refer;  since  proof  of  the  first  in- 
volves perpetual  assumption  of  the  last.  There  is 
some  ontological  order  whence  arises  the  phenomenal 
order  we  know  as  space;  there  is  some  ontological  or- 
der whence  arises  the  phenomenal  order  we  know  as 
time;  and  there  is  some  ontological  nexus  whence 
arises  the  phenomenal  relation  we  know  as  difference." 

These,  then,   are  what  obtain  beyond  con- 


175 

sciousness:  Non-relative  forms,  two  ontological 
orders,  and  an  ontological  nexus.  But  what  are 
non-relative  forms?  The  very  term  "form"  im- 
plies a  relation.  It  is  impossible  to  think  of  a 
form  except  in  relation.  What,  then,  is  a  non- 
relative  form?  And  what  is  an  ontological  or- 
der? or  an  ontological  nexus?  The  term  "onto- 
logical" is  not  known  to  science. 

We  have  been  told  in  "First  Principles,"  that 
the  Unknowable  exists  out  of  relation;  and  one 
of  the  numerous  names  given  to  it  is  "The  Non- 
relative."  Non-relative  forms,  then,  are  no- 
thing more  nor  less  than  forms  of  the  Unknow- 
able. And  the  ontological  orders  which  give 
rise  to  the  relations  of  co-existence  and  of  se- 
quence, as  we  know  them,  are  orders  of  the  Un- 
knowable. So,  also,  the  ontological  nexus  which 
gives  rise  to  the  relation  of  difference,  as  we 
know  it,  is  a  nexus  of  the  Unknowable. 

Thus  there  are  only  forms  of  consciousness 
within,  and  forms  of  the  Unknowable  without. 
But  these  forms  of  the  Unknowable  cannot  be 
cognized.  Mr.  Spencer  does  not  recognize  a 
complete  cognition  at  all;  only  something  which 
"we  call  a  cognition;"  that  is,  "a  relative  cogni- 
tion as  distinguished  from  an  absolute  cogni- 
tion."—[Essays,  Vol.  II,  p.  241. 

The  doctrine  of  the  Unknowable,  with  its  ac- 
companying idealism,  results,  therefore,  in  the 
final  analysis,  in  complete  skepticism. 

That  such  should  be  the  outcome  of  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Unknowable,  is  not  surprising.  It 


176 

is  a  doctrine  speculative  and  metaphysical  in 
the  highest  degree.  When  a  writer  professedly 
enters  into  the  region  beyond  phenomena;  when 
he  institutes  a  search  for  a  first  or  ulti- 
mate cause;  when  he  enters  upon  a  discus- 
sion of  the  relations  of  the  non-relative  and  the 
unknowable;  when  he  undertakes  to  explain  the 
inexplicable;  when  he  asks  us  to  contemplate 
the  unthinkable,  it  is  not  strange  that  he  should 
fail  to  make  himself  understood.  Where  there 
is  nothing  to  be  communicated,  nothing  but 
that  fact  can  be  made  clear. 

There  remains  to  be  examined,  in  the 
closing  chapter,  the  reconciliation  between  sci- 
ence and  religion. 


CHAPTER    XXV. 

RECONCILIATION      BETWEEN      SCIENCE      AND      RE- 
LIGION. 

As  shown  in  the  preceding  chapters,  Mr. 
Spencer  does  not  recognize  the  separate  exist- 
ence of  the  external  world,  or  cosmos.  In  this 
he  is  consistent.  For,  if  there  be  an  existing 
cosmos,  it  is  either  self-existent,  or  it  was 
brought  into  being  by  a  self-existent  Creator. 
But  self-existence  Mr.  Spencer  holds  to  be  "rig- 
orously inconceivable";  and  every  thing  that  is 
inconceivable,  except  the  Unknowable,  he  re- 
jects. There  being  no  self-existence,  there  can 
be  no  cosmos.  His  idealism  involves  the  same 
conclusion. 

The  universe,  then,  does  not  exist.  But  some- 
thing exists?  Yes:  what  is  it?  Not  anything 
known,  nor  even  anything  knowable;  but  some- 
thing entirely  unknowable. 

The  Unknowable,  then,  exists.  Do  we  know 
it  exists?  Yes;  this  is  "the  most  certain  of  all 
truths."  Though  it  is  unknowable,  inconceiva- 
ble, and  even  unthinkable,  yet  we  know  that  it 
(177) 


178 

exists;  it  is  inextricable  from  consciousness;  it 
is  the  antithesis  of  thought. 

What  is  this  Unknowable?  Has  it  intelli- 
gence? No.  Has  it  activity?  No.  Has  it  any 
attributes?  No.  Has  it  any  relation  to  the 
universe?  No.  Though  it  is  the  creating  pow- 
er, it  has  created  nothing.  Though  it  is  first 
cause,  it  is  not  the  cause  of  any  effect.  But 
while  the  Unknowable  has  effected  nothing,  the 
discovery  of  it  has  effected  a  reconciliation  be- 
tween Science  and  Religion. 

Science  and  Religion  are  radically  different  in 
their  character,  in  their  province,  and  in  their 
objects.  This  necessarily  makes  them  different 
in  their  methods.  And  here  is  where  they  have 
been  brought  most  into  conflict.  Their  antago- 
nism, therefore,  has  been  essentially  and  mainly 
an  antagonism  of  methods.  The  method  of  Sci- 
ence has  been  a  method  of  investigation  and  de- 
liberation. Its  primary  functions  consist  in  the 
collection  of  facts,  the  weighing  of  evidence,  and 
the  drawing  of  conclusions.  The  method  of  Re- 
ligion is  just  the  reverse.  It  comes  with  what 
it  claims  to  be  the  truth,  and  says,  Receive 
it. 

This  conflict  Mr.  Spencer  proposes  to  recon- 
cile— nay,  claims  to  have  reconciled — by  a  doc- 
trine. But  since  the  antagonism  is  not  based 
upon  a  doctrine,  how  can  it  be  reconciled  by  a 
doctrine?  How  can  a  difference  of  method  be 
harmonized  by  a  doctrine?  It  is  not  an  antag- 
onism of  doctrine.  Science  has  never  denied 


179 

that  God  could  not  be  known  in  his  essence, 
and  religion  has  never  denied  that  things  could 
not  be  known  in  their  essence. 

The  antagonism  being  not  in  doctrine  but  in 
method,  the  only  way  in  which  a  reconciliation 
could  be  effected,  would  be  to  induce  Science  to 
believe  without  evidence — which  would  be  im- 
possible— or  to  induce  Religion  to  submit  its 
claims  to  investigation,  and  to  the  weighing  of 
evidence. 

It  is  said  that  the  more  scientific  Science  be- 
comes, the  more  nearly  it  is  brought  to  a  recog- 
nition of  the  Omnipotent  Unknowable;  while 
the  more  religious  Religion  becomes,  the  more 
it  ignores  every  thing  but  this  same  Unknowable 
Existence.  By  the  mere  announcement  of  this 
principle,  it  is  claimed  that  the  reconciliation 
has  been  effected. 

First,  is  it  true  that  the  recognition  of  the  pos- 
itive existence  of  the  Unknowable  is  the  highest 
result  of  science?  When  and  where  has  such  a 
thing  been  stated  by  any  scientist  except  by  the 
author  of  the  New  Philosophy? 

The  scientists  of  the  nineteenth  century  ignore 
the  entities  of  the  schoolmen — they  recognize 
the  fact  that  the  boundaries  of  science  lie  be- 
tween the  known  and  the  unknown.  How  much 
of  the  unknown  is  unknowable  they  do  not  un- 
dertake to  say.  Mr.  Spencer  himself  was  at  one 
time  wavering  on  this  point.  A  note  had  been 
prepared  by  him,  which  read  as  follows: 

"instead  of  positively  saying  that  the  absolute  is 


180 

unknowable,  we  must  say  that  we  cannot  tell  whether 
it  is  knowable  or  not." 

And  the  author  says  that  then,  in  1873,  the 
note  still  bore  the  wafers  by  which  it  had  been 
attached  to  the  original  manuscript.  Why  he 
omitted  that  note,  he  could  not  then  remember. 
-[Essays,  Vol.  II,  p.  220. 

Secondly:  Is  it  true  that  the  recognition  of 
the  Unknowable  is  the  highest  element  in  relig- 
ion? On  the  contrary,  is  it  not  true  that  relig- 
ion presupposes  the  existence  of  an  object  of 
worship,  which,  though  unknown  and  unknowa- 
ble in  its  essence,  may  become  known  in  its  re- 
lations to  man?  Such  an  object  of  worship  is 
supposed  to  have  attributes  which  can  bring  it 
into  communication  with  man.  Has  any  other 
kind  of  religion  ever  been  known  in  the  history 
of  the  race  ? 

All  the  religions  of  history  have  been  anthro- 
pomorphic. Such  is  the  religion  of  the  Brah- 
mins as  interpreted  by  the  incarnations.  Such, 
also,  is  the  Buddhist  religion.  The  conceptions 
of  the  Islamite  are  anthropomorphic.  The  re- 
ligion of  the  Jews  was  intensely  anthropomor- 
phic. The  Christian  religion  has  not  only  adopt- 
ed and  incorporated  the  religion  of  the  Jews, 
but  it  has,  in  addition,  an  anthropomorphic  sys-  Jijt, v 
tern  of  its  own.  Without  an  anthropomorphic  . 
God,  what  becomes  of  faith,  of  reverence,  of  / 
worship,  of  love,  of  sacrifice,  of  gratitude,  and 
of  hope? 

When  Paul  saw  an  altar  which  the  Athenians 


181 

had  erected  "  to  the  Unknown  God,"  he  said, 
"Whom  ye  ignorantly  worship,  him  declare  I 
unto  you."  He  recognized  the  fact  that  in  or- 
der to  be  made  the  object  of  worship  and  the 
basis  of  a  religion,  God  must  be  made  known, 
in  other  words,  he  must  be  made  anthropomor- 
phic. Man  must  be  made  to  believe  that  the 
object  he  worships  is  in  so  far  like  himself  as  to 
possess  like  thoughts  and  feelings,  so  that  a 
bond  of  sympathy  can  be  established.  Thence 
is  opened  up  a  whole  world  of  relations  which 
else  are  impossible.  And  nothing  less  than  this, 
is  religion.  God,  being  believed  to  be  infinite 
in  those  attributes  which  are  possessed  by  man 
in  a  finite  degree,  and  which,  therefore,  he  can 
understand — attributes  of  love,  mercy,  justice, 
wisdom,  goodness,  and  power — becomes  intelli- 
gently an  object  of  love  and  worship;  a  being  to 
be  propitiated. 

The  God  of  the  religionists,  though  he  may 
be  unknowable,  is  not  unthinkable;  for  he  is 
projected  from  human  thought.  But  the  Un- 
knowable of  Spencer  is  not  only  unknowable, 
but,  as  he  himself  admits,  unthinkable,  as  well. 
Hence,  it  is  an  abstraction;  nay,  more,  a  nega- 
tion of  all  thought  whatever,  as  Sir  William 
Hamilton  maintains.  We  can  truly  say  that  so 
far  as  we  know  it  does  not  exist.  Mr.  Balfour 
remarks  that  so  far  as  he  knows  it  may  be  true 
enough  that  the  Unknowable  exists,  but  he 
claims  that  it  is  outside  of  science  and  of  all  sci- 
entific research;  and,  he  might  have  added,  out- 


182 

side  of  all  legitimate  scientific   speculation.     So 
far  as  we  know,  the  Unknowable  is  nothing. 

Some  critics  have  commented  on  the  fact  that 
the  term  "Unknowable,"  wherever  it  is  used  by 
the  author  of  "First  Principles,"  appears  with 
an  initial  capital  letter;  and  so,  also,  of  every 
term  which  is  used  as  its  equivalent.  This  crit- 
icism, though  it  might  at  first  appear  to  be  a  tri- 
fling one,  is  not  entirely  without  force,  if  the  use 
of  the  capital  letter  be  looked  upon  as  an  at- 
tempt to  make  something  out  of  nothing.  Such 
an  attempt  would  of  course  be  futile.  The  Un- 
knowable is  unknowable  still;  the  Unthinkable 
is  unthinkable  still;  and  Nothing  can  never  be 
more  than  nothing. 

The  attempt,  therefore,  to  reconcile  Science 
and  Religion  by  means  of  the  Unknowable,  is 
an  attempt  to  reconcile  something  with  some- 
thing else  through  the  intermediation  of  no- 
thing. The  religionist  is  asked  to  withdraw  his 
thoughts  from  the  contemplation  of  his  highest 
ideal,  and  turn  them  into  the  blank  void  of  no- 
thingness. If  he  can  succeed  in  doing  this, 
then  the  old-time  antagonism  between  Religion 
and  Science  is  removed. 

With  what  sort  of  religion  has  the  reconcilia- 
tion been  effected?  Not  with  the  Christian  re- 
ligion. This  has  been  repeatedly  antagonized 
by  Mr.  Spencer.  Nor  has  the  reconciliation 
been  effected  with  any  religion  which  has  as  an 
essential  element  any  system  of  morality. 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  there  is  no  con- 


183 

nectioii  between  Spencer's  Data  of  Ethics  and 
the  Unknowable.  On  the  contrary,  the  author 
of  the  Data  of  Ethics  states  explicitly  that  there 
is  no  relation  between  morality  and  the  Un- 
knowable. The  following  is  his  language: 

"Right,  as  we  can  think  it,  necessitates  the  thought 
of  not-right,  or  wrong,  for  its  correlative;  and  hence 
to  ascribe  Tightness  to  the  acts  of  the  Power  manifest- 
ed through  phenomena,  is  to  assume  the  possibility 
that  wrong  acts  may  be  committed  by  this  Power. 
But  how  came  there  to  exist,  apart  from  this  Power, 
•conditions  of  such  kind  that  subordination  of  its  acts 
to  them  makes  them  right  and  insubordination  wrong  ? 
How  can  Unconditioned  Being  be  subject  to  condi- 
tions beyond  itself  ?"— [Data  of  Ethics,  Sec.  99. 

At  the  banquet  given  to  Mr.  Spencer  in  New 
York,  in  1882,  Professor  Fiske,  the  great  expos- 
itor of  Spencer  in  this  country,  in  his  after-din- 
ner speech,  made  a  mistake  when  he  undertook 
to  connect  the  moral  law  with  the  Unknowable. 

"Human  responsibility,"  said  Professor  Fiske  on  that 
occasion,  "is  made  more  strict  and  solemn  than  ever 
when  the  eternal  Power  that  lives  in  every  event  of 
the  universe  is  thus  seen  to  be,  in  the  deepest  possible 
sense,  the  author  of  the  moral  law  that  should  guide 
our  lives." 

The  Professor  here  essayed  to  establish  for 
Mr.  Spencer  a  doctrine  which  he  had  himself 
expressly  repudiated. 

Since,  then,  the  Unknowable  is  not  subject  to 
the  moral  law,  nor  in  any  way  connected  with  it, 
and  has  no  moral  character,  what  becomes  of  the 
reconciliation  between  Science  and  Religion? 


184 

If  there  be  a  reconciliation,  must  it  not  be  with 
a  religion  devoid  of  morality? 

Here  we  have  a  doctrine  which  ignores  mo- 
rality, which  its  own  author  distinctly  discon- 
nects from  his  own  system  of  ethics,  and  which 
at  the  same  time  he  sets  up  as  the  mediator  be- 
tween Science  and  Religion. 

What  Science  is,  we  all  know;  what  Religion 
is  or  has  been,  is  equally  well  established.  Bui 
efforts  are  now  being  made  to  change  the  mean- 
ing of  the  term  "Religion."  Should  those  ef- 
forts succeed — should  the  word  acquire  a  signif- 
ication far  different  from  the  meaning  which 
has  been  attached  to  it  in  all  the  ages  of  the 
past,  then  and  not  till  then  will  there  be  a  rec- 
onciliation between  Science  and  Religion. 


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